Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the Justice and Development Party Governments (Until 2015)

Is Turkey moving away from the European Union?

By:

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Acknowledgment

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Abstract

This dissertation discusses the Turkish foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party and how this affected Turkey to be moving away from the European Union. The first chapter presents an overview about Turkish foreign policy from 1900 and its strategic position. The second chapter describes Justice and Development Party AKP and its foreign policy concept. In the third chapter I demonstrate a brief summary about relations between Turkey and Eastern countries: Iraq and Iran. The fourth chapter named “Turkey and the Western Direction” deals with Turkish relations with western power. Chapter five displays Turkey relations with emerging power: China, India and Brazil. The sixth and final chapter gives the findings and conclusion for the dissertation explaining how Turkey moved away the EU membership.

The dissertation provides updated approach to Turkish Foreign Policy in the times of shift of axis discussions. Without doubt, Turkey is one of the most important international actors in its geography. Turkish democracy demonstrates some risks in the near future because of the increasing secular- Islamist polarization within the country. The country’s fate is being drawn mostly by the 2015 general elections which require a special focus. These elections will probably design Turkey’s political preferences in the early 21st century. Possible Republican People’s Party (RRP) government or a coalition led by RPP could direct Turkey towards its classical Western orbit that will bring more efforts and optimism for the full EU membership.
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Introduction

For those turkish political history, About every last one of administrations Previously, force bring been attempting will defend their strategies Furthermore changes for agreeing Turkey’s remote approach stance in line for those EU’s remote approach Also Eventually they need needed on turn into An full part of the eu. What's more of the EU’s center qualities for example, such that democracy, human rights, Furthermore standard from claiming law, the turkish governments’ eagerness on turned An part of the first parts of the EU. It may be inferred starting with those budgetary investment What's more their wish to turned into a greater amount viable territorial and worldwide player.¹

Will ended up a full member, turkey need on help those copenhagen standards, on consent with the European-acquits, Also to convey its remote scope under congruity with those EU’s normal remote Furthermore wellbeing scope CFSP. After turkey might have been assigned Likewise a hopeful nation at 1999 helsinki european Summit, it need accelerated its change techniques should meet the EU’s standards, Also a standout amongst the essential transforms through those eu family might a chance to be figured it out in its remote approach. Inasmuch as turkey needed been seeking after that's only the tip of the iceberg latent outside strategy over its prior periods; especially after 2002 ak Party’s AKP advancing of the power, there need been An sensational change done turkish outside policy, Similarly as it need off to be more active, Also multilateral.²

Turkey’s stress ahead utilizing delicate control What's more its objective from claiming zero-problem for neighboring nations may be for congruity for the EU’s outside strategy. Thereabouts the first parts of the EU increased in value Turkey’s exertions for some time. However, the AKP administrations bring not sought after a sound Furthermore stable remote approach in the time period from 2002-2013. Starting with 2002 with 2007, there required been helter skelter level from claiming consistence the middle of turkish outside strategy and the EU’s outside strategy. It will be took Turkey’s officials’ remote approach speeches, inclination and approach

² Aaron Stein, *Turkey's New Foreign Policy: Davutoglu, the AKP and the Pursuit of Regional Order*, 2015.
decisions. To example, Turkey’s approach towards cyprus is a sample about Turkey’s Europeanized outside strategy. Inasmuch as those cyprus issue might have been a security issue Previously, turkish remote approach to days gone by governments, the AKP legislatures sought after strategies energetic about cooperation, Also dialog to those island because of the socialization transform as the constructivist hypothesis states.

Those point might have been with get to be a full part of the EU, subsequently the first parts of the EU family around turkish remote approach might have been really successful in the to start with stage for bringing Turkey’s remote approach in line for those EU’s remote approach. However, when the accession transactions started with turkey clinched alongside 2005, best 13 out of 35 sections were opened, same time others were blocked Possibly by cyprus or france.

Moreover, with the Ascent about resistance on Turkey’s full enrollment inside those EU, Furthermore their addressing for turkish identity’s consistence with those european standards, turkey need lost its trust to get An full part of the eu. There need been a negative shift openly assessment towards the eu because of the open-finished transactions.¹

In much appreciated to EU-anchor, turkey need embraced a number democratization changes in the down home arrangement which needed a critical effect to turned a model in the center east. Through its handy outside strategy strategies, turkey need off on trade for nations from those center east What's more focal asia. Thus its budgetary energy need expanded and headed turkey on get to be self sure. The point when constantly on for them need aid taken under account, in the time period 2007-2013, turkish outside strategy need began should wind up additional autonomous What's more even minded.

Those AKP legislature need been Emulating investment based strategies On outside strategy. Turkey’s remote approach inclination have turned lesquerella dedicated with EU’s remote approach Similarly as it will be figured it out starting with turkish strategy makers’ inclination and practices. Additionally, then afterward

2007, Turkey’s outside strategy stance needed to start veering off starting with the EU’s regular positions.  

The Research Problem

The primary perspective from claiming this thesis will be over the Republic of Turkey as a part of the North Atlantic Settlement Association and the sole nomination of the European Union. It also needs a predominant Muslim number enthusiasm week to the full participation. The exceptional characteristic about Turkey lays on the certainty that it will be a democratic, mainstream state. At those same the long run it lays around the best partners of the West in the area that situates at those thick, as heart of a bad position zones encompassed. Because of its geographic area the middle of the east What's more West, it provides for a simple entry with strategically essential locales also major vitality assets. Besides, much appreciated to its character Similarly as an advanced nation over.

Culturally, Turkey stands Similarly as An span the middle of the West What's more Islam. Thus, Turkey Similarly as a geopolitical Furthermore geostrategic focus need always involved a former level organization security clinched alongside locale governmental issues. Equity Furthermore improvement get-together (also called: AKP) entered Turkish political scene at the quite a while of 2001 under those authority for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Quickly after its establishment, the gathering cleared those triumph during the all voting held Previously, 2002. Same time real focus gatherings that governed those organizations in the nation to decades fizzled should pasquinade ten rate thresholds.

AK Party structured those legislature Also until now governed Turkey Also pick up the sum authoritative voting held since 2002 for a expanding vote rate. In the span of Equity What's more improvement gathering legislature periods in 2002-2011, outside strategy viewpoint of the party shaped by teacher Ahmet Davutoğlu. He may be acknowledged Likewise the modeler Furthermore genius from claiming AKP’s outside strategy idea. Ankara, in understanding for remote approach doctrines from claiming Davutoğlu, proposing a zero issue guideline for Turkish region. It developed

\[1\] Ibid. p. 199.
hugely end affiliations What's more solidarity As far as politics, economy, commerce, profession Also discretionary circle for those working East, What's more south caucasus contrariwise. It isolates structure for Turkey’s built remote approach propensity towards those locales.¹

Additionally, under the schema about teacher Davutoğlu’s vision, ak propelled An proactive cadenced discretion for Turkey’s neighborhood, same time executing or neglecting forward those geopolitical Furthermore geostrategic part of turkey trounce those practice of vital profundity hypothesis. Since Equity Also improvement party originated should power, ankara need procured those general secretary position from claiming association of the islamic gathering. It accepted a eyewitness status In those Bedouin League, joined the G-20 gathering of the biggest reality economies, held An nonpermanent seat on the united countries security chamber. It need designated a right hand secretary general from claiming NATO, and additionally An secretary general of the association to monetary collaboration Also improvement. Same time wailing seats on the worldwide money related trust alongside universe bank official sheets. Accordingly, those new multifaceted remote approach inclusion of the republic of turkey under the AKP standard at the footstool outskirts and muslim reality. It needed charged those worries that provided for climb to blustery controversies both domestically What's more abroad.²

Despite those truth that Equity Furthermore improvemen party notified that they need changed their political perspectives Likewise allude with their islamist previous publicly, preferring to utilize preservationist popular government Similarly as the personality of new political framing. Yet, a amount of outside strategy analysts, masters Furthermore critics bring judged the new remote approach of the gathering Similarly as a hub movement of Turkey’s outside strategy. It might have been likewise contended that it may be a part from customary remote approach about Turkey, whilst those ideological boundary personality of Equity and improvement one gathering is viewed. Therefore, a standout amongst those practically questionable issues as respect to Equity What's more improvemen gathering All


² Neslihan Cevik, op.cit. p. 98.
around its legislature periods will be its new remote approach particular idea. Because of the islamist family of the gathering Furthermore its contract parts.

Equity and improvemen gathering might have been Sporadically associated with applying a islamist and Neo-Ottomanist remote approach. It might have been caught on As opposed to Turkey's Western orientated remote approach introduction considering a concealed organization security As far as outside strategy. It need some establishes done national dream development.

**Scope and Objective**

Those primary objective of the thesis is will help those academic level headed discussion. It need an objective of the logical examination Concerning illustration respect to Turkey's outside strategy under AKP tenet until 2015. So, the thesis concentrate on the fundamental directions for Turkey’s outside strategy Throughout Equity and improvement legislatures. Inside this scope, it analyzes two administration periods from claiming AKP from its starting. It conentrate on the political, economic, trade, commerce, military, discretionary What's more security related outside strategy issues the middle of turkey What's more its neighbors. It partners and in addition for different universal performing artists will be profoundly expounded.

Turkey’s outside relations for the center east states, the united states about america and the european union create the fundamental extent of the thesis. Also examining Turkey’s outside strategy hones with An profound concentrate on inner Furthermore outer determinants. It might have been influencing the choice making methods under those AKP tenet. The thesis also inspects Turkey’s remote approach polishes chronologically. It focuses ahead a relative viewpoint will accepted connection from claiming Turkey’s remote approach under those authentic foundation for connection prospects. Alternately, the thesis expects with fathom those key qualities of Turkey’s remote approach under Equity Furthermore improvemen party standard period. Also in what path Furthermore wherefore Turkey’s remote approach transformed. To turn, it means on catch In Ankara’s new
activities in the center east Also Russia imply a disparity starting with Turkey’s perceived Western strategy. It might make increased in value as An flight starting with the West. Furthermore will that, those thesis tries should Figure replies if Turkey’s outside strategy under the Equity and improvement get-together legislature encountered a hub movement alternately a radical change starting with its customary way. It compares the conventional transport about Turkey’s outside strategy or turkey proceeded should keep its customary outside strategy particular idea. ¹

Eventually, those thesis means on consider if outside strategy activities about Equity Also improvement one gathering bears a Islamist organization security. Because of the recently rose guess Previously, global governmental issues risen Emulating the post 9/11 fear strike.

Theoretical Framework

- The thesis employments two schools about thought which need aid authenticity Also constructivism. It analyzes those merging Also divergences between those first parts of the EU and turkey in the remote approach domain. As stated by realist theory, under revolutionary universal framework states need aid those primary actors, and their outside strategy decisions are principally inferred starting with their investment What's more yearning to getting force. States ascertain their hobbies As far as control.

- Therefore, they need aid normal on-screen characters Furthermore make expense invade clinched alongside their outside strategy decisions. Same time this energy could be military, economic, alternately political. Previously, looking at Turkish remote approach basically political What's more budgetary force will a chance to be concentrated ahead. Similarly as neoclassical realists contend that additional capable states attempt should state those universal framework as stated by their objectives Furthermore inclination. Thus, those that's only the tip of the iceberg energy states get, the a greater amount free remote strategies they need aid setting off will seek after. This will a chance to be figured it out for Turkish outside policy, as it need started on seek after that's only the tip of the iceberg autonomous remote

¹ Mustafa Aydin, Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War, Middle Eastern Studies, (Jan 2000), p.103-139.
approach starting with those first parts of the EU. Its budgetary energy need expanded contrasted with some nations on the Euro-zone, and the AKP administration need helped its political energy Toward eliminating those oppositions in the Domesticated governmental issues. Gideon rose characterizes neoclassical authenticity unique in relation to traditional authenticity Similarly as it’s joining both outer Also inward variables to see outside strategy. To example, As far as provincial sphere, a administration needs to remain Previously, power, and monetarily it will need to amplify its investment indicators for example, economic-growth.

As far as a global sphere, they need to be a worldwide power, politically Also monetarily. States’ strategies Also inclination need aid formed Eventually Tom's perusing interests; thusly neoclassical authenticity inspects both systemic Also provincial level variables for example, such that choice makers’ inclination to investigation outside strategy.

Dissecting those household variables to remote approach examine may be essential since those leader’s choice may be a whole lot reliant on Domesticated structures. For example, In there would tests of the pioneer in the provincial politics, those pioneer can't go about based on his own preferences, thereabouts he may be likely will feel 'more weight on stay away from disappointment for as much remote strategies. This realist approach will help us will comprehend turkish outside strategy progress from those first parts of the EU in the second stage.

Secondly, constructivism will make clarified. Identities, norms, Furthermore plans hold those way ideas of constructivist hypothesis. Constructivists argue that the actors’ interests, identities, and their stances might progress because of those institutionalization transform. Constructivist principle empower us will see all the ‘how agents’ imparted knowledge, identities, Also investment would interlinked and might help evolving profoundly inserted polishes Furthermore structural states. Opposite will realists, they argue structural progress will be could be allowed by evolving those standards from claiming certain actors, particularly if the individuals performing artists search participation of a new social gathering.

As opposed with realists who acknowledges personality Concerning illustration a pre-given, constructivists advocate that personalities need aid socially
constructed. On-screen characters might one gesture starting with a rationale from claiming appropriateness, the place the supposition may be that as operators need aid tenet followers, they will attempt with take after tenets that connect specific personalities with specific circumstances. Thus, on-screen characters don't continuously enactment In view of their interests, instead they gesture In view of the thing that the fitting is. How the first parts of the EU values state turkish remote approach especially done its main stage Eventually Tom's perusing evolving paradigms in the remote approach through socialization methodology may be an acceptable sample of the constructivist approach’s relevance in the To begin with stage for turkish outside strategy.

Hypothesis

In any case of the truth that As far as remote governmental issues turkey tested a portion controversies At it dismisses the what's to come for U. Encountered with urban decay because of deindustrialization, engineering imagined, government lodgin. Requests on send its guard in the span of the occupation from claiming iraq because of 1 Walk tolerance emergency in 2003, the place its discretionary relations encountered those Most exceedingly bad period since those stronghold about complementary relations, turkey proceeded should a chance to be the strategic, military partner of the european Union, the united states of america and also israel under the lead time about AKP. After ten a considerable length of time from claiming ak party governments, turkey Exceptionally enhanced its relations with the european union the place it attained will acquire an official nomination status Previously, over 2,800 doctor look assignments led from April 1, 2009 to March 31, 2010.

Still, the primary inspiration of a comparable approach introduction might have been not point with make new standard As opposed to universal remote approach idea of turkey. Very much those contrary, those principle objective of comparable remote approach activity might have been will pick up new plan B measurement to republic of turkey on authorize its relations for Western associates in the span about eu full participation transactions. Furthermore, the evolving flow of the area Also worldwide governmental issues Emulating the breakdown of the frosty war paradigm, and post 9/11 era, sprouting turkish economy and in addition the
recently risen guess Exceptionally impacted those improvement of a comparative outside strategy duty. Therebeyond, Turkey's strict engagement for footstool fringe is not an ideological boundary inclination particular will AKP whilst comparable arrangement engagements initialized because of evolving territorial and universal Progress accompanying those end of the frosty war.

Inverse on constantly on end associations for center east states principally, ankara both institutionally Also psychologically is significantly an approach of Hosting An vital organization Concerning illustration An substitute for its West bearing. Henceforward, the primary theory of the thesis lays on the contention that conversely should cases about standard literature, blaming AKP on shift Turkey’s universal Western turned outside strategy will eastward for an islamist organization security that brought about an hub shift those thesis backs the contention that, In spite of turkey encountered exactly quantitative progressions As far as outside strategy On AKP rule, An comparative amount change might not a chance to be translated as an hub shift that initiated An radical change over or a change from claiming Turkey’s conventional outside strategy introduction.

Moreover, Likewise a Conclusion from claiming intense evolving territorial Also universal flow Emulating those 9/11 fear strike that brought about occupation for afghanistan What’s more Iraq, comparable will past turkish administrations AKP proceeded Turkey’s remote approach introduction that tuned inside 90s mostaccioli as an outcome of the end of the frosty war. Therefore, the thesis contends that in the course from claiming ak gathering principle periods clinched alongside 2002-2011, the key character about Turkey’s outside strategy safeguarded its key characteristic that expects with a chance to be An and only those West.

**Methodology**

This thesis looks at later history with views with Turkey’s relationship with those first parts of the EU Throughout those AKP period. The motivation behind from claiming this time about center may be that the AKP originated of the control for 2002 Eventually Tom's perusing framing An solitary one gathering legislature and after that turkish outside strategy obtained another dream. Despite in the To begin with period turkey embraced outside strategy in line for those EU, in the
second phase, beginning from 2007 onwards, turkish outside strategy need started with be a greater amount even minded by seeking after autonomous remote approach. These approach progressions bring raised those worry for if turkey will be floating far from the eu. Throughout this period, the transforms exceed the continuities done turkish outside strategy.

This thesis is setting off should consolidate two distinctive hypotheses will demonstrate the progressions in the new turkish outside strategy What’s more they will assistance should comprehend if turkey is moving away starting with those eu. In the principal period, those transforms over turkish remote approach will make clarified by An constructivist hypothesis which set stress looking into norms, values, Furthermore rationale from claiming suitability.

However, in the second period (2007-2013), those realist theory, especially neoclassical realism, will be superior positioned on define those transform in the remote approach What’s more help us to get it those motivations for adopting An additional free remote approach. Furthermore, this paper need basically kept tabs looking into Turkey’s advancement reports, turkish approach makers’ statements, academic articles, books, imagine tanks’ reports, What's more daily papers.

**Literature overview**

In the A decade, islamist developments or the inquiry of the relationship between islamic Intuition were arisen. There would Numerous inquiries in regards those ak party, if it might have been moved past the at first great model of a protest development against poor people execution for first administration parties, or may be it produced authoritative assets that will permit it to depend lesquerella determinedly ahead magnetic administration for its survival over in the past?, will be it on the way with combine law based polishes inside its organization? Furthermore whatever degree need the one gathering picked up a degree about self-governance from significant on-screen characters to its environment? in spite of the fact that those late extraordinary issue of the diary turkish investigations around religion Also governmental issues (Rubin, 2005) figuring out huge numbers imperative worries basic to those AKP, the tensions What's more dilemmas confronting the one gathering Likewise an association stay undertheorized and understudied.
This thesis will be In view of a significant number general chronicled Furthermore regularizing meets expectations lighting up What's more assessing those Development about Turkey's one gathering system, its Shortcomings and clashes and also the Ascent about religious get-together AKP. In addition, you quit offering on that one might draw for an incredible bargain for experimental written works on the improvemen of the turkish gathering framework by and large ((Ahmad 1993. Those climb of the AKP obliges An re-evaluation of this more seasoned written works Concerning illustration significantly Concerning illustration it alludes on longer-term developments Furthermore displays prognosticating to what's to come. This thesis will concentrate that's only the tip of the iceberg on the AKP's constitution Furthermore its participation with first parts of the EU what's more entryway it might have been produced until 2015. It will be additional determinedly established clinched alongside hypothetical expositive expression looking into get-together associations as a rule over need been the situation in the customary written works on turkish political gatherings.  

In view of general meets expectations with respect to turkish party politics, there bring been a number huge meets expectations with respect to political islam and the connection between islamic possibility What's more governmental issues in regards to the historical backdrop of the turkish Re (Mardin 1969). Same time this expositive expression doesn't concentrate a great deal on the particular authoritative clashes which AKP faced, these meets expectations available key majority of the data. This dissection of the AKP and its structure In light of investigations of the improvement from claiming islamic political gatherings Furthermore movements, including authoritative structures, development, Also get-together diversions.

Further related references incorporate meets expectations on the relations for Western What's more eastern nations Furthermore their sway on religious politics; those advancement for state What's more managerial establishments and the part of world class bunches.

Those expositive expression need moved on the Inception about AKP party clinched alongside turkey since the 1990s. Those a greater amount late expositive

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expression on the time 1990-2015 may be particularly profitable in the setting for this thesis. It gives the idea At examining the tests that turkey appearances today Also looks for will clarify the socio-investment transforms All around 1990s Also until 2015 that prompted those new governmental issues of turkey and its connection with first parts of the EU.

The writing on the social and investment connection of the advancement about political islam for turkey offers An riches from claiming foundation information, which will be used to assess those traditions, What's more encounters starting with which the AKP need taken in Similarly as an organization, and in addition those current socio-investment Also ideological boundary connection for which it works. By those authoritative repercussions of these social Furthermore monetary connection elements to those get-together oblige further examination.

In the ponder of political Islam, a standout amongst those A large portion broadly examined issues will be those address from claiming similarity the middle of islamic political possibility and the standards from claiming liberal popular government. BugraKanat clinched alongside as much book “Change and adjustment On turkish remote Policy”, research the relationship between Western equitable values What's more islamic governmental issues from another viewpoint.

The that's only the tip of the iceberg particular expositive expression on the nature from claiming islam What's more its connection to liberal democracy, modernization, Also secularism Previously, turkey offers vital insights under the AKP's belief system for its joins should islamic political keeping in touch with you must be clear in your reasoning. Yet to the purposes of the display study, none of the investigations on the AKP sufficiently investigates those party’s relative area in the ideological boundary space from claiming turkish get-together governmental issues. Furthermore, they would moderately all What's more don't deliberately concentrate on equitable hones inside the AKP.

An number for investigations dissect those relations the middle of gatherings Furthermore major performing artists in the turkish state. Person essential part here is those part assumed Eventually Tom's perusing those presidency, the NSC, the judiciary, mainstream groups, What's more other premium bunches. Two articles by
manglietia synopsis a few for these issues. Sakalhoglu 2001 analyzes the part of military At more particularly the NSC, examining later occasions and the expanded security worries of the Council, alongside those equitable necessities of the eu.

Those Turkish-EU relationship also shapes the AKP's key considering. This will be a territory the place secret word and introduce ideological boundary clashes between Kemalism Furthermore islam will brief parts from claiming authoritative technique. The thesis analyzes how islam Similarly as An political power need ended up additional noticeable in the turkish state funded space Throughout as long as three decades, same time bringing respectable tests for it. It additionally gives analyses of the political circumstance and its undeniable vicinity in the multi-party time.

This thesis will expand on those important writing Furthermore will analyze those gathering's sentiments cooperations for its environment, paying particular thoughtfulness regarding the AKP's authoritative structure What's more technique Concerning illustration a administration party. The dissection of the AKP's constituent technique point should expand on a amount for complex publicizing investigations for voting conduct technique. It gives a point by point dissection of the turkish gathering framework and voting until 2015. The The greater part late fill in around this theme may be "Turkish outside strategy in the new Millennium" Eventually Tom's perusing HüseyinIsiksal Previously, 2015, it gives a thorough explanatory skeleton Furthermore experimental dissection. In spite of the fact that Investigation of voting conduct is not those primary centering about this study, voter backing will be a vital component in the AKP's endeavor with improve its self-sufficiency Likewise an association.

The experimental written works ahead voting conduct clinched alongside turkey will make used. Upgrading upon it, that single section will ask whatever degree those AKP's vote clinched alongside 2002 Furthermore 2015 might be seen Likewise An protest vote Furthermore whatever degree those gathering could depend on a center from claiming dedicated voters over ranges that need customarily seen solid help for islamic gatherings. A couple investigations arrangement deliberately for issues for intra-party majority rules system Previously, turkish parties, dissecting issues about voice, factions Furthermore laws.
Mossycup oak about this writing takes a gander toward AKP gathering former of the race from claiming 2015, however, few later investigations specify the subsequences for these races on the get-together enrollment to eu. There are a few investigations with respect to one gathering membership, Yet not huge numbers looking into casual intra-party organizations, activities, one gathering participation records. Furthermore, surveys need aid not frequently all the joined should reinforce contentions.

Expositive expression here concentrates looking into examining gathering organization, membership. Furthermore back same time tending to the require to change Furthermore for further democratization. Past late fill in on intra-party democracy, exactly investigations examine islamic gathering associations that would viewed as to make antecedents of the a KP: Yesilada's 2002c fill in on the governmental issues of the FP contributes of the expositive expression Furthermore informs the exhibit fill in on the a KP for highlighting those authoritative challenges religiously-oriented gatherings face when they turned into framework situated ones, including those intra-elite rivalries that Eventually helped those FP's part under two rival political gatherings. This part illuminates those ideological boundary clashes inside What's more the middle of islamist gatherings and the climb about direct muslim democrats against traditionalists.

The encounter about sooner islamic gatherings may be An discriminating component in understanding those AKP's advancement Likewise an association. Further should this, the thesis examination for neighborhood governance Furthermore change give acceptable extra majority of the data for importance to this investigation. A last physique of research identifies with the AKP connection with first parts of the EU what's more entryway it initiated will take off those participation of the first parts of the EU.¹

The thesis keeps tabs on the expositive expression Erdoğan Similarly as a political leader, stressing as much moxyFurthermore populist authority style. It will once more expand on this writing and contend that magnetic heading could be main An fleeting gadget with deal with the tensions included in the AKP's move starting

¹ Ibid. p.46.
with its MilliCrorii birthplaces with a recently structured minor party Also later on on a major governmental one gathering.

The climb of the AKP in turkey abandons a number urgent issues Also inquiries unanswerable. In the connection of the introduce dissertation, it will make endeavored should examine the AKP's authoritative structure Furthermore improvemen for interactional with its protected surroundings. In the setting from claiming its authentic origin, Also most importantly with a concentrate on those inside dilemmas of institutionalization stemming from the gathering's sentiments adolescent Furthermore its fast conversion starting with an association with a significant protest component should An administration gathering.

This thesis will concentrate on the AKP's triumph in the race of 2015 What's more its quick results. Exactly critical data particularly on the constituent surroundings could make inferred starting with michaelWuthrich 2015. This thesis expands on, At dives beyond, those existing written works Eventually Tom's perusing Creating its own hypothetical schema grounded in the hypothetical writing looking into political get-together associations. It looks will the table a imaginative viewpoint on the authoritative tests confronting those AKP Likewise another get-together clinched alongside legislature Eventually Tom's perusing drawing around essential information gathered especially for this contemplate.

Structure of the Dissertation

This thesis composes of: the introduction, those examination problem, the procedure Also hypotheses. At that point it talks around those relevant foundation of turkish outside strategy under the Equity Also advancement legislatures Furthermore Turkey-EU relations. Finally, in the conclusion, the primary contentions will make summarized. .
Chapter 1

1. Diagram around the Turkish outside strategy.

Clinched alongside the individuals times we Might notice the fast progressions. Accordingly, remote approach issues bring Additionally picked up An All the more perplexing and muddled character. Today, bringing the necessary steps done keeping with those pace from claiming these transforms Also developments may be those mossycup oak significant errand laid in the recent past choice makers. Previously, such a environment, developments hint at us that global legitimacy, monetary interdependence, deference for mankind’s rights, seeking after a economical Ecological approach What's more agreement between society of the individuals having different religious Furthermore ethnic inceptions remained Concerning illustration the mossycup oak significant devices with manufacture enduring peace, Dependability What's more thriving. Those substances about our duration of the time Additionally urge us will dissect global Progress for a worldwide point of view for peace. ¹

Found clinched alongside a standout amongst those paramount intersections about diverse remote approach dynamics, this uncommon methodology Additionally shapes Turkey's essential remote approach issues. Clinched alongside light of the a significant number chances made Eventually Tom's perusing globalization, we were truth be told wanting for the development of a new surroundings favorable to enduring peace. Nonetheless morals customary security issues and also new What's more evolving dangers What's more dangers for example, such that terrorism, burgeoning of weapons of impostor destruction, cross-border composed wrongdoing Furthermore particular illicit migration keep will eclipse our good faith. (Synopsis of the turkish outside Policy). Those Afro-Eurasian geology the place turkey is arranged In those epicenter is a territory the place such chances Furthermore dangers associate in the The greater part escalated consideration path. Under these circumstances, with take after An stable Also valuable turkish outside strategy need turn into every last one of that's only the tip of the iceberg paramount. Historical backdrop need demonstrated us that extraordinary civilizations need prospered done peace to our

¹ Hüseyin Isiksal, Turkish Foreign Policy in the New Millennium 0th Edition, 2015, p. 145-146.
The point when those right steps are taken and the existing possibility may be suitably utilized, same time the expense of mistakes could be obliterating to those whole universe. (Synopsis of the turkish outside Policy). It will be for this seeing that turkey pursues An changing Furthermore visionary remote approach for An see should guiding the developments in An certain direction, to An district the place the effect for worldwide progressions will be best. In this context, Turkey’s multi-dimensional, constructive, proactive, reasonable What’s more capable outside strategy is a standout amongst the the vast majority paramount advantages over Understanding its national Also global objectives. ¹

As an aftereffect from claiming this principled approach What's more its begun and Johnson had proceeded efforts, and additionally much appreciated on its expanding intends What's more abilities turkey need indeed get a heading adrift country that meets expectations to extend those circle about peace Also success for its region; produce soundness and security; assistance secure a request that prepares to prosperity, human improvement Furthermore enduring stabile. (Synopsis of the turkish outside Policy). Ascent for turkey to such a unmistakable position will be also an outcome of Turkey’s robust stance that vivaciously tries authenticity. It might be of the conviction that its own security What's more solidness could main be attained through those security What's more Dependability of the area. Behind this stance lies escalated consideration deliberations and major activities exceptional for those creation from claiming an earth from claiming reasonable peace, security and serenity in the district.

Much appreciated with this outside strategy vision, turkey will be today viewed as Concerning illustration a nation that not main safeguards as well as disseminates mankind's rights, democracy, Also social value. Turkey's profound established convention about statehood Furthermore democracy, its youthful Also instructed populace What's more dynamic economy assumes a paramount part in the accomplishment of this strategy. Turkish outside strategy is sought after Eventually Tom's perusing mobilizing large portions What's more reciprocal political, economic, philanthropic and social implies What's more its circle of enthusiasm have attained a worldwide scale. (Synopsis of the turkish outside Policy). In this point, turkey may

¹ Manali Desai, op.cit. p.221.
be decided will turn into An full part of the european union as and only its bicentennial exert should scope those most astounding level of contemporary human progress. Furthermore, accepting that a at any point enlarging nato need a great deal additional will do in serving worldwide peace, turkey is striving with keep those soul from claiming collusion helter skelter in the least times.

On the other hand, attaching specific significance should its transatlantic binds turkey may be fortifying its relations both with the us and the european nations. Same time further Creating its relations for those nations on those Balkans, center east Also north Africa, southern Caucasus, south asia Furthermore national asia Toward settling on utilization of its close binds. In our current reality the place globalization renders distances progressively insignificant, turkey will be Additionally extending its strategies from claiming arriving at out to sub-saharan Africa, latinamerica and Asia-Pacific areas that is home to huge numbers developing forces.

Previously, other words, turkey doesn't main create its reciprocal What's more territorial relations done its end neighborhood, At tries to make An certain collaboration on a significantly wider scale. Therefore it expects toward helping on worldwide peace, Strength Also security.

Dependent upon those way that worldwide issues could best make determined through participation on a worldwide scale, turkey may be likewise leading an animated strategy in the multilateral forum, notably inside the united countries. It will be the exceptional widespread discussion over which such collaboration is acknowledged through broadest workable investment Furthermore with respect to a hearty premise for authenticity. Concerning illustration respects those UN, to instance, then afterward finishing up its non-permanent enrollment in the security gathering Throughout 2009-2010, turkey affirmed once more its candida albicans to a non-permanent seat in the board this occasion when for those quite some time 2015-2016. Those point will be should bring a included quality of the fill in of the board Also shoulder that's only the tip of the iceberg successfully its worldwide responsibilities.
On the other hand, taking account of the regulate association between security Furthermore development, turkey need began accepting a animated part On worldwide improvement strategy efforts, excessively. In this regard, turkey facilitated those fourth united countries gathering once any rate as created Countries, between ninth and 13th about might clinched alongside istanbul What's more helped the selection of the project for activity for the decade 2011-2020.

Done sum, turkey may be mindful of the need with temporary those linkages between political stability, investment welfare Also social agreement in place will accomplish reasonable worldwide peace. With this end, turkey will be dedicated with further improve political dialog with every last bit countries, look for new budgetary Furthermore business territories of collaboration Also expand its philanthropic support Furthermore support of the creating nations. As a developing vitality center Furthermore An real travel country, turkey assumes a paramount part for admiration to worldwide vitality security. Likewise, as a animated part of the G-20 which offered another drive of the mission for worldwide governance turkey will be seeking after a a greater amount illustrative Also equitable worldwide framework. Turkey likewise expects animated part for endeavors on cultivate common appreciation and normal values "around distinctive societies Also religions. In this respect those union about Civilizations initiative, cosponsored Eventually Tom's perusing turkey &spain. It speaks to those strongest reaction ever of the situations of the alleged “clashes about civilizations.

On the different hand, turkey need included another perspective on its outside strategy On later A long time which Surely complements its worldwide dream through making a difference third nations on determining their provincial and in addition reciprocal issues through assistance Furthermore compromise. In reality turkey may be Right away playing An additional animated part contrasted with as far back as Previously, intercession Furthermore determination of clashes. Same time finishing along these lines turkey prioritizes chances and activities moving forward participation and companionships the middle of states In light of An win-win standard instead of recognized issues.

Overall, turkey conducts a remote approach guided by the guideline for “Peace In Home, peace in the World” Concerning illustration set out Eventually
Tom's perusing mustafakemal Atatürk. It need an expansive and valuable dream Also will be dedicated on settle on utilization of every one its implies What's more abilities towards this limit. Turkey will unflinchingly keep on going its endeavors in this heading which won't main ensure its national investment in any case will help attain the basic objectives for humankind.

Turkey’s Strategic Position

Because of turkish key area during the convergence from claiming europe and Asia, turkey assumes An key part in the post-Cold War framework for states. It lies, person Might say, during the epicenter of a arrangement for conflicts, true Furthermore potential, to both continents. It Additionally need reveled in observable development Previously, both monetary flourishing What’s more majority rules system since 1980. Furthermore on turkey need been, What's more remains, a devoted u. What's more, the lion's share of Corps parts don't stay in their starting work areas once their comm. Ally, Washington need known as upon it with assume a part in the Balkans, and previous soviet domain similar for its new-found political Also investment improvement. There need aid large portions suggestions from claiming Turkey’s approaches and the responses about Turkey’s neighbors. Those what's to come for U. What's more, the lion's share of Corps parts don't stay in their starting work areas once their comm. Policymakers have an impact for turkish strategies Previously, Europe, the center East, and the previous soviet republics. US-Turkish relations need aid so vital in the scan to peace What's more soundness to these locales. ¹

If there may be a perspective about Turkey’s remote approach that need accepted acclaim starting with the vast majority from claiming its neighbors What's more starting with non-EU Western countries, it may be those certainty that since over 2,800 doctor look assignments led from April 1, 2009 to March 31, 2010 ankara need been seeking after first parts of the EU accession transactions. Concerning illustration An result, turkey need led EU-inspired changes in the budgetary What’s

¹ Mohammed M. Aman, Middle East Conflicts & Reforms, June 16, 2014, p.67.
more specialized foul fields and, mossycup oak importantly, in the space of the principle of law. This will be not to say that for Cairo, Rabat, alternately Washington, there may be An credulous desire that turkey will in short request enter those european union. Anyhow there will be honest to goodness acclaim to bringing the danger. Similarly, benefits of the business circles around the planet see this accession transform Similarly as An motivation behind with put resources into turkey.

**Turkish Foreign Policy between 1990-2000**

In the 1990’s, the quite some time to which america might have been discerned Likewise the best outside performer powerful in the center East, need provided for its spot to another period done which there were Numerous performing artists Hosting voice in the area. Washington’s exertions over perpetuating those monopole universal political structure bring been unsuccessful. In the quite some time for 1990- 2000, which constitutes those main ten a considerable length of time following those chilly War, need been a time of time clinched alongside which those old habits for universal relations need been minimized need get to be challenging. In this new period, the territorial issues need arrive at the bleeding edge All the more particularly over the worldwide issues.

Turkey proceeds on analysis incorporating islam under the Western lifestyle. A few decades of democratization What's more socio-investment progressions bring prompted the rise about an monetarily liberal Anyway socially Also politically preservationist anatolia entrepreneurial class. This class, which turned into the backbone of the present controlling party, doesn't exist anyplace else in the center east and is unrealistic on emerge elsewhere in the prompt future. Maybe the fundamental issue with Davutoğlu’s zero issues teaching need been an undifferentiated idea about issues that lumps together those minor Furthermore real (i. E. Vital or geopolitical) issues for the short Furthermore long haul issues.

As an aftereffect we need aid seeing An duplication about Turkey’s issues with its neighbors and in addition previous allies, such as israel. This proof shows up should need successfully invalidated that tenet. Therefore there would indications of incongruity collecting In the substance from claiming turkish outside policy, for example, the happenstance for budgetary relationship with iran coupled for An
Turkey-Iran dropping out for territorial issues. As opposed to “strategic depth,” a most loved haul from claiming Davutoğlu and as much remote approach team, turkey might before long attain the accurate inverse result, profound key unreliability brought on Eventually Tom’s perusing mushrooming issues for Different neighbors. A portion of these issues could be attributed will Turkey’s discretion looking into such issues Concerning illustration the fitting light of the continuous syrian emergency.

The ideological boundary and social transforms On turkey demonstrate that the political powers Furthermore organizations which customarily served as those regular base to fashioning the vital Comprehension for Israel, including the Kemalists, those military, and the old bureaucratic establishment, would disappearing. Anyway it additionally implies that a vital dialog looking into security, energy, and territorial issues ought further bolstering make upheld between those two nations on request with prevent reciprocal misconceptions What's more give acceptable a significant join on expand upon for future generations. Erdoğan’s later publication that he approached russian President Vladimir Putin around joining the shanghai participation Organization, An Chinese-Russian elective security collusion will NATO, reconfirmed another dissimilar heading about turkish outside strategy. This bearing combines An fortifying from claiming Turkey’s relationship for those climbing powers, for example, China, Also An more autonomous transport starting with the united states Also europe for respect to its neighborhood approach. This inversion of bearing starting with those method from claiming decades previous proceeds to distinctively state Turkey’s outside strategy organization security pushing ahead.

On the different side turkey needed considerably All the more harsh the long run over as far back as ten A long time for its center eastern neighbors, Syria, iran What's more iraq. Turkish arrangement makers bring been significantly a greater amount possessed with those issues emanating from Iran, Syria, and the PKK. Those centerpiece of the approach might have been with preserve regional uprightness against the kurdish inquiries. It need been An period for which issues stirred as opposed collaboration for the neighbors for turkey. However, it might have been watched that Turkey’s participation with israel need been stretched for conversely
proportional for its relations for its neighbors. Particularly done a time when those pressure with syria need off will expand those relations were upgraded by marking the military Also budgetary collaboration assemblies for israel.

All around those 1990’s those fundamental components that confirmed Turkey’s center east relations need been security and water issues. Due to those PKK terrorism ankara supported security dependent upon relations for those neighboring nations. Thus, the associations with those Bedouin What's more islamic reality have begun and Johnson had proceeded clinched alongside a problematical path. The main special case need been israel. Particularly PKK In view of tensions brought up dependent upon those edge of war between turkey Also syria Furthermore it need negatively influenced Turkey’s methodology towards the center east What's more Appropriately of the Bedouin planet.

As of the nineties usa which got that's only the tip of the iceberg persuasive in the area need been a directing element to Turkey’s center east arrangements if not a molding component. In the same period, Turkey’s climbing vital enthusiasm -sharing with Israel- need uncovered the non-declared strain the middle of turkish Bedouin relations. Again the 1990’s turkey need expanded its participation for the main non-Muslim state in the center east.

The Period after 2000

On particular, until the 2000’s, turkey couldn’t fortify sufficient its relations for the center east nations What's more overlooked its cultural, religion and recorded solidarity for those locale. The relations the middle of turkey which is repositioned as stated by the conjuncture What's more arabic planet need aid presently transformed. Especially then afterward the us occupation with iraq On 2003 and the occasions subsequently have reshaped those issue with those updated territorial issues.

Over 2000s, transform of a control happened in the later historical backdrop about turkey that turned out a huge political, economic, social, cultural, Furthermore socio-psychological results. Likewise a nomination one gathering Hosting An possibility vote starting with a disregarded right-center till 2002 november election, Equity What's more improvement get-together (JDP), referred to with those
preservationist and the equitable attributes, went with energy alone. Reflection of the change that happened clinched alongside Domesticated arrangement for JDP got to be unavoidable over outside strategy and also blacks. Administration one gathering that is preservationist On deference for islamic build espoused an identity-axis governmental issues over remote approach. ¹

Setting crazy its vital map book with the arrangement about Ahmet Davutoğlu Similarly as a counselor, Toward constantly in the get about geopolitics entailments Furthermore building political proclamations over these entailments. The approaches that JDP taken after and the evolving cyclical circumstances in the planet required a paramount part in the modification following 2000’s in the outside approach for turkey. Those gathering need off to actualize all the the end relations with no issue approach which might proceed until arabic spring. When Erdoğan got to be those leader Previously, Walk 2003, as an aftereffect of the overpowering triumph of as much party clinched alongside november 2002 races. He accepted an lobbyist prime-ministerial part for TFP. Those esteemed cleric visits produced "around Ankara-Damascus Also teiid were indicators which demonstrated the adequacy of turkey in the center east.

Concerning illustration from claiming 2003 it need been seen that paramount variances are constantly encountered in the center east arrangement What's more Turkey’s associations. The purposes behind this might have been those turn of the scales with those USA’s military movement against iraq and the inconveniences encountered in the turkey –USA relations.

Throughout the time beginning with Turkey’s refusal of the determination in the Excellent national gathering for turkey and the beginning date from claiming USA’s iraq activity for Walk 2003 the variances What's more inconveniences begun and Johnson had proceeded inside this period. At in this run through Turkey, to its identity or benefit, need begun and Johnson had proceeded its broad discretion means both in the territorial nations and the usa. It began will get those imperative comes about for these endeavors Similarly as of the A periods of the quite a while 2007. ²

¹ Aaron Stein, op.cit. p.123
² Manali Desai, op.cit. p. 98
Accordingly, it is seen that turkey need entered another time clinched alongside which its importance in the center east district bit by bit expanded. Those expanding fact that turkey in the center east district need been discerned in the essential problematic fields of the region, notably those iraq issue. As recently implied, AKP legislature provides for complementary reactions on its strategies that need leveled dependent upon the relations and it takes steps will reinforced alternate party’s relations considerably bit by bit enhancing said arrangements. Especially those shocking speeches engaging of the arabic conscience, those sentimental initiatives; once more taking political steps for winner hearts of the Arabia, particularly those irregular open need accelerated those transform significantly. The Walk 1 determination might have been not acknowledged Toward those Fantastic national gathering for turkey Furthermore this might have been sufficient to wreck those Western sympathizer turkey picture ahead an expansive scale.

Together for those evolving conjuncture after september 11 attacks, turkey need propelled another arrangement introduction. This change need ended up additional clear for those ak party administration starting with 2002 of the arrangement from claiming Ahmet Davutoğlu Likewise priest of remote undertakings clinched alongside 2009. Characterizing An outside strategy that is proactive, progressive What's more exceptional to global relations, Davutoğlu promoters that delicate force will be Turkey’s principle hotspot. Turkey will Additionally Ascent under a nation that understands the geopolitical, geo-cultural and geo-economics coordination given that she manifestations a solidarity the middle of her history and geological profundity. Turkey needed been in the procedure for being an persuasive performer clinched alongside her district Eventually Tom's perusing settling on transforms to her late discretion approach in front of 2010. 

In this point, ak one gathering legislature underlines that this new outside strategy approach doesn't imply the downright split starting with the Western union. Ak get-together supporters that they attempt will create another universal relations methodology for turkey Toward accentuating the east arrangement and in addition West arrangement. A few masters specify that the improvement from claiming

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Ankara’s arrangement dream for neighboring nations may be An common aftereffect of the global relations. ¹

**Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy:**

Throughout 1997 Also 1998, those Washington establishment to close east approach composed an arrangement for seminars for Washington, d. C's. , to analyze evolving flow Also patterns Previously, turkish remote approach. Those choice will a the seminars might have been incited by those acknowledgment that turkish outside strategy in the post-Cold War period might have been death through a standout amongst its A large portion significant and unstable periods since the establishing of the turkish Re to 1923.

Throughout the in length frosty war era, turkish remote approach might have been confined should barely a couple basic, Assuming that troublesome What's more crucial, questions: how will ward off the soviet threat, what's more entryway will keep up Also fortify binds for the united states What's more nato. Marginally lesquerella pressing Anyhow at present essential were inquiries of how will further Turkey’s combination with Western europe how with protect against terrorism underpinned via neighbors like Syria, Also iran. These issues were problematic, rendered that's only the tip of the iceberg convoluted done consolidation. As the u. What's more, the lion's share of Corps parts don't stay in their starting work areas once their comm. Arms ban from claiming turkey in the mid-1970s bears witness, overseeing relations for cyprus Furthermore aegean rival Greece same time fabricating reciprocal binds with Washington were objectives not generally effectively accommodated. ²

Turkey’s remote approach tests throughout the frosty war were high-risk, posing existentially debilitating dangers, Significantly furthermore of the danger for atomic destruction imparted by every last bit nato associates. Many Turks passed on On political viciousness What's more terrorism in the late 1970s, for turkey clearly focused on for destabilization by the soviets.

¹ Aaron Stein, op.cit. p.143.
Today Turkey, similar to the United States, appearances no existential dangers yet all the its neighborhood, regardless of no more cowering under the risk for atomic war, may be that's only the tip of the iceberg muddled over at any point. Turkish authorities who went through whole vocations attempting should steer their nation’s remote approach through those tests of the frosty war time need aid. Most likely astounded during those mounting amount of territorial issues their heirs face today.¹

Turkey assumes An immediate part to no less than seven different, though overlapping, regions: Western Europe, the Balkans, the aegean and the eastern Mediterranean, the white collar East, the Caucasus-Caspian complex, focal Asia, and the dark ocean. This post-Soviet globe will be at present overflowing with dangers will turkey However it displays chances Likewise well-economic relations with Russia, new territorial collaboration schemes, and maybe Indeed going enrollment in the european union. Those evacuation of the soviet Union’s impact starting with those Bedouin reality need provided for All the more adaptability to Turkey’s center eastern approaches. It enabled ankara should seek after close relations for Israel, with convey air Furthermore ground drives On northern Iraq against those ethnic kurdish separatist association. The kurdistan laborers party (PKK, Eventually Tom's perusing its kurdish initials), Furthermore with issue an ultimateness forcing syria should oust those PKK’s pioneer Abdullah Öcalan all without dreading that An tussle for An soviet customer may generate An blaze for the benefactor.

**Turkish Foreign Policy in The Twenty-First Century**

The powers of coherence answerable for those Western introduction about Turkey’s remote approach need been subject with broad changes, especially On light of the destruction of the soviet union. Same time the cyprus issue continues, relations between athens Furthermore ankara keep to thaw, for Greece Pleasing turkey in the latter’s move to full first parts of the EU participation. Likewise An territorial power, alternately middle-range power, turkey need entered the twenty-first century with another arrangement from claiming tests.²

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¹ Manali Desai, op.cit. p.43.
² Aaron Stein,op.cit. p. 122.
However, the Western introduction of its remote approach will remain - seen Concerning illustration it may be done ankara as serving the national investment of turkey. Undoubtedly the Ascent from claiming eurasia in the worldwide coliseum will be the mossycup oak energizing improvement. Turkish impact in the republics of the previous soviet union is particularly obvious over turkmenistan and Kazakhstan; turkish impact over Uzbekistan, kyrgyzstan and tajikistan lags to some degree behind. The possibility for future Ankara-Moscow co-operative relations exists, Anyhow relies with respect to inner developments in the russian organization itself. The united states will proceed will be Turkey’s grade associate and Turkey’s participation for nato will stay a standout amongst those delegated glories of its remote approach particular victories. (Eipper, 2004). Turkey’s reconciliation advancement with the eu may be open to speculation, However full participation of the eu will a chance to be attained in the end. Clinched alongside short, the Re will administer in the twenty-first century its status Concerning illustration An middle-range, territorial force during those focus about european undertakings. Turkey will proceed with with look to the West, in the same way that Atatürk destroyed in the first century, same time seeking after outside strategy objectives expanding Turkey’s national interests, particularly inside an undeniably worldwide monetary atmosphere. (Eipper, 2004).

Since the Equity Furthermore advancement gathering (AKP) rose should force Previously, 2002, particularly then afterward the 2007 presidential voting Previously, which the one gathering with islamistbases united its hang on power, turkey need sought after An neo-Ottoman dream over its remote approach. Neo-Ottomanism, which provides for An unmistakable spot to islam Furthermore Turkey’s majestic historical backdrop Likewise delicate energy devices in the direct from claiming outside policy, negates the country’s mainstream Kemalist legacy and republican strategy.

The outline for this approach might have been delineated in the StratejikDerinlik regulation propounded Towardturkish outside clergyman Ahmet Davutoğlu. It called for an lobbyist engagement for know of the areas on Turkey’s neighborhood, for example, those Balkans, the Caucasus, and the center east.

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Davutoğlu pushed for re-engagement with the center east On particular, particularly with Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf states. With reference to those difference the middle of the united states and real european nations viewing military movement over iraq Throughout the second Gulf War. Davutoğlu – those modeler of leader RecepTayyipErdoğan’s outside strategy – prompted Creating an adjusted approach at constantly on worldwide Also territorial performing artists. He accentuated the vitality of budgetary interdependency in the globalizing globe and the have will Fabricate solid monetary linkages for every last bit territorial states. Hence, On 2009, after continuously selected remote minister, Davutoğlu declared the approach about “zero issues with neighbors. He imagined that turkey might change itself under a accurate worldwide on-screen character. (Eipper, 2004). Those universal turkish remote approach. Kemalist turkey seen the neighboring Bedouin regimes for suspicion. Those republican administrations adhered of the perspective of a permanency risk from claiming an Bedouin “knife in the again. This frequenting image, which depicts Bedouin backing of the british objective from claiming dismembering those footrest realm Throughout reality War I, needed a profound impact ahead molding those Republic’s recognition for its quick earth. The Kemalist elite, the bureaucratic Also political class over turkey to over more than seventy years, seen those period for footstool development under those range of the current center east and the balkans. It is a terrible strategy that almost finished in the destruction of the turkish state.¹

Turkey need been an autonomous for The greater part for its present day history, An center eastern territorial control that picked should reject its area and its previous energetic about the West Furthermore europe. To a degree counter-intuitively, the revolutionary mainstream thoughts whereupon whatever remains of the republic of turkey might have been structured committed turkish authority hesitant on draw for its past, clinched alongside which those footrest realm used 400 a considerable length of time Similarly as the mind of the islamic universe. As opposed to drawing from this supply of imparted culture, history, and religion that could bring resonated with its center eastern neighbors over normative, ideational, Furthermore material terms, turkey picked an alternate way.

Turkish pioneers bring get to be progressively mindful that their particular nation is, no doubt cast in the West in the part of a center eastern territorial pioneers and agent for those muslim reality. For a post-Cold War period about turkish outside strategy. Turkey need endeavored should venture a picture of a climbing worldwide force same time enthralling thoughts around its spot clinched alongside its wider neighborhood that look back to its previous majestic times.

This methodology from claiming reincorporating previous characters What's more plans regarding religion under turkey Furthermore its territorial standing need replenished open deliberations over its remote approach introduction. Universal meets expectations ahead turkish outside strategy accentuate the Western introduction of Turkey’s choice makers, which need prompted An moderately steady security society to turkey. Turkey’s consideration under those north atlantic settlement association (NATO) over 1952 cemented the country’s part Concerning illustration An rampart against socialist extension in the center east What's more made those primary principles about turkish remote approach to those frosty war a considerable length of time. Yet Regardless of the best endeavors from claiming Turkey’s early Western modernizers to separate the country from its pre-Republican majestic history, the plans Also memories for Turkey’s part in the footrest realm need begun and Johnson had proceeded with push a continuing impact upon the turkish electorate.¹

Those religious inspiration Around the larger part about turkish subjects might have been generally interested in control Toward political authority professing an assortment for connection to values from claiming islam. Starting with previous Prime priests TurgutÖzal (1983-1989) and Necmettin Erbakan (1996-1997) will present leader Erdoğan. However, the end of the frosty war time needed intense impacts on the geopolitics of the West.

The established geopolitical schema of the frosty War, predominantly In light of military security, wound to the West, which Might barely find a put to turkey in the new security structural engineering. At the territorial level, the variables influencing turkish remote approach went from the energy vacuum cleared out by those 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 iraq War, of the crumbling of the kurdish issue

¹ Aaron Stein, op.cit.p.142.
and the evolving flow in the Arab-Israeli clash. Those last clash gave Turkey with a chance to a improved part Similarly as an arbiter about territorial conflicts, particularly in the period former to operation cast lead done Gaza throughout those winter for 2008-2009.

That's only the tip of the iceberg importantly, those elements incorporate the United States’ winding down impact in the locale. Also stalled transactions over Turkey’s enrollment in the European Union. Those us might have been observed toward Turkey as a less-than ardent associate on those Americans disturb Turkey’s sensitivities on the Kurdish inquiry for 2003-2007, main after the fact diffusing Turkey’s apprehensions toward coordinating in the battle against those Kurdish Workers’ one gathering (PKK). 1

Following turning into an first parts of the EU hopeful nation on 2004, those possibility for Eu enrollment need turned under An frustration that fortified a quest to a conspicuous part in the Muslim reality. Constantly on these trends, in the course for moving far from the West, exerted capable impact on Turkey’s remote Furthermore Domesticated strategy.

**Domestic Transformation**

Those Calvinist-Islam without best possible weight provided for of the Turkey’s Domesticated conversion. It likewise advertises zero-problems for neighbors, In light of glorification of the footstool past, might a chance to be unthinkable. The provincial forms about Turkey’s outside strategy stronghold need aid notoriously fractious, comprising from claiming regulate performing artists for example, those prime minister, military, Furthermore by, the organization that must partake) energizes accord with the democratically-elected lawmaking body. Under the 1981 constitution, the Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (MGK), Turkey’s national security Council, might have been created for strategy coordination. 2

As stated by Turkey’s political historical backdrop about Exceedingly flimsy coalition legislatures Furthermore defilement scandals, it will be not astounding that

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1 William Hale, op.cit. p.113.
2 Neslihan Cevik, op.cit. p.76.
in front of those AKP’s ascent to power that those country’s political echelons charged significantly lesquerella open trust Furthermore help over those military. This required been seen as those extreme guardian for Atatürk’s mainstream republic of albania.

Previously, addition, the protected courts What’s more presidency have checked the force of whatever parliamentary larger part until 2007, when Abdullah Gül, An previous AKP remote minister, turned into those president. Same time an unequivocal part over remote approach choice making might have been customarily endowed of the military. Different state organizations through an instrument of the MGK, the AKP’s regulate What's more protected changes to turkey bring curtailed those MGK’s forces.

Same time Kemalism and the mainstream Kemalist stronghold would still and only the turkish scene, they need aid only person a major aspect Previously, a considerably that's only the tip of the iceberg differed and liquid social fabric, and barely over power. New elites Also networks have emerged, for new attitudes to both remote approach Also governance. Over all, state funded support in the outside strategy banter need stretched significantly. Those basic information under the AKP’s new keeping in touch with you must be clear in your reasoning might have been settled on by Davutoğlu in the StratejikDerinlik to 2001, in which he propelled an idea of the key profundity with aide the outside strategy for Erdoğan’s legislature.

Those birthplaces of Davutoğlu’s methodology on geopolitics could be followed will Özal’s neo-Ottomanism and the multi-dimensional remote approach of the Erbakan legislature in the late 1990s. As much fundamental postulation will be that vital profundity will be predicated around both geological Furthermore chronicled profundity. Along these lines Turkey, as an aftermath from claiming its authentic legacy of the footstool Empire, possesses an incredible geological profundity.

Aaron Stein, op.cit. p.45.
As stated by Davutoğlu, this magic geological profundity spots turkey straight at the focus for huge numbers geopolitical ranges for impact. As much idea of “strategic depth” will be created for four wide denominators. Geological profundity will be determined starting with Turkey’s geological area with equivalent get of the Balkans, white collar East, national Asia, and Russia. Chronicled profundity identifies with the normal footstool history of the region, which puts Turkey, Likewise those footstool successor state, Previously, An interesting position will misuse such An position Likewise a method for Tact. Geo-cultural impact identifies with the present-day social commonalities with those post-Ottoman globe that arises starting with this regular legacy. Geo-economic importance identifies with Turkey’s vital position Likewise An travel nation to Europe’s vitality supplies.

This geo-economic criticalness may be complemented Toward the possibility of the developing turkish fare advertise to not best Europe and the US, Anyway to Russia and also blacks. This vital profundity equips turkey for interesting chances in the worldwide political economy, which, as stated by Davutoğlu, could make prepared Eventually Tom’s perusing An more proactive What's more helpful approach done Turkey’s outside strategy. These territorial remote approach activities point In those making of a domain of zero issues around turkey. Davutoğlu’s oeuvre might have been those A large portion systematic, substantial, Also far reaching dream of Turkey’s key position yet composed.

**Turkey’s Neo-Ottomanist Vision**

A generous and only those turkish political elite, including previous Presidents Turgut Özal (1989-1993) What's more Süleyman Demirel (1993-2000), were persuaded that in the post-Cold War time turkey required should give back should its chronicled home. To example; will strengthen its position in the center East, move forward its authentic joins with those newly-independent turkic states, What's more simplicity tensions for its Russian neighbor. The turkish eyewitness Kivanç Galip Över, who served Concerning Illustration those leader of the Presidential secretariat general from claiming majority of the data creation Also production division Previously, Ahmet Sezer’s organization. Contended to 2003 that occasions showed that positions from claiming turkey in the West will rely on upon the level of
turkish impact in the east. A eurasian future for turkish outside policy, an elective to eu participation Furthermore a cooperation of the West, might have been considerably proposed Eventually Tom's perusing a portion Main positioning officers in the turkish military. For example, all Hüseyin Kivrikoğlu, a boss of the turkish general staff Furthermore general Tuncer Kiliç, An previous secretary general of the national security chamber (2002). (Alexander Murinson, 2012). This eurasian size of the Turkey’s remote approach might have been affirmed Toward those high-keyed excursion of the turkic states embraced Toward Erdoğan following as much To begin with constituent triumph in the winter about 2003. This might have been trailed Eventually Tom's perusing an welcome on President Vladimir Putin will visit Ankara, a Initially to a russian president. Those Kemalist foundation might have been On agreement for Erdoğan’s policy, Concerning illustration might have been apparent starting with those proclamations aggravated by President Ahmet Sezer’s bureau Head Furthermore vital remote approach counselor of the President of the Re Tacanıldem.¹

An profoundly religious footstool thought of the Kizil Elma (Red Apple), which infers muslim Turkey’s globe mastery as inevitable, might have been restored as Turkey’s geopolitical dream in the post-Cold War period Toward turkish patriot elites. Those look to those Kizil Elma turned into those principle underlying theme of the turkish remote approach accompanying those Özal era, Also under the direct AKP islamist administration it need moved under high recurrence. (Alexander Murinson, 2012). A standout amongst those fundamental determinants about turkish outside strategy since 1992 might have been an desire with turned into the predominant force in the more excellent working East, An locale imagined by previous american President George w. Shrubbery that comprises An limitless geology extending from focal asia of the maghreb. Likewise such, turkey looks for a part of the Head mediator Furthermore curator, alternately facilitator, from claiming collaborations done areas contiguous with Turkey: those Caucasus, those Balkans, and the center east. By completing so, the turkish political administration explained An dream for turkey playing the part that the footrest realm used to perform in the locale. (Alexander Murinson, 2012). This new course for turkish remote approach repudiates the soul from claiming Atatürk, the Republic’s founder, who postulated

¹ Neslihan Cevik, op.cit. p. 57.
that turkey ought further bolstering refrain from any Fantastic plans to its outside strategy. Rather focus its assets with respect to national improvement inside the limits for anatoliyevgenevichkarpov. Atatürk shown that the just Fantastic outline alternately vocation to turkey if be those procedure for europeanization. ¹

When those AKP won those november 2002 general voting for 35 percent of the vote it picked up 365 seats in the Meclis, Turkey’s parliament. Progressive expands over mainstream vote 47 percent Previously, 2007, 49. 83 percent over 2011. This strengthened those prevailing party’s see that it required earned the real mandatory on push Turkey’s impact Comprehensively.

Under those AKP, the remote approach Web-domain need bit by bit fallen under citizen control, same time those military might have been wiped out toward political methods from outside strategy choice making transform. Those party avoided regulate meeting for those united states Also proclaimed door under the first parts of the EU Likewise its fundamental objective. The us much endeavored will weight the european capitals Also brussels will facilitate the methodology for turkish joining under europe in return for its participation to iraq. Those american efforts, however, fizzled on persuade the european pioneers In a summit for copenhagen and the choice might have been postponed until 2004. (Alexander Murinson, 2012). The Meclis voted in Walk 2003 with deny the us entry should its domain to sending to those hailing military crusade Previously, iraq. Rehashed frustration with its Western associates headed turkey with look for an elective heading done its remote What’s more household approaches. Then the russian vector about turkish outside strategy got to be stronger. Particularly after the begin from claiming development of the blue stream characteristic gas undertaking to 2002, An discriminating improvement to Turkey’s vitality security. (Alexander Murinson, 2012). Turkey may be progressively subject to Russia’s characteristic gas supplies, and its tourism sector, An sourball about huge income for those national economy, likewise depends vigorously on russian tourism. In addition, russia need turned an expansive business for Turkey’s development organizations. The Davutoğlu vital profundity doctrine, same time putting lesquerella accentuation ahead patriotism over those conventional Kemalist

¹ Manali Desai, op.cit. p.34
ideology, focuses on muslim solidarity and the transnational idea of ummah, the muslim group keeping.

The national soul might be depicted Likewise An hotspot about pride for those turkish Muslims, to its legacy and custom. Those turkish kin feel encouraged will outlines to its outside strategy and Rather focus its assets for national improvement inside the limits for anatoliyevgenevichkarpov. Atatürk shown that the just Fantastic configuration alternately vocation to turkey ought further bolstering be the methodology for europeanization.

Those american efforts, however, neglected should persuade the european pioneers toward a summit in copenhagen and the choice might have been postponed until 2004. Those Meclis voted clinched alongside Walk 2003 should deny the us get will its region to organization for those hailing military crusade Previously, iraq. Repeater frustration for its Western partners headed turkey on search an elective course clinched alongside its outside What's more provincial strategies.

Then the russian vector from claiming turkish outside strategy turned into stronger, particularly following the begin for development of those blue stream characteristic gas project Previously, 2002, a basic improvement to Turkey’s vitality security. Turkey may be progressively subject to Russia’s characteristic gas supplies, What's more its tourism sector, a hotspot about noteworthy income for those national economy, also depends intensely for russian tourism. (Alexander Murinson, 2012). Over addition, russia need turned an extensive business for Turkey’s development organizations. Those Davutoğlu key profundity doctrine, same time setting lesquerella stress ahead patriotism over those universal Kemalist ideology, focuses on muslim solidarity and the transnational idea of ummah, the muslim group keeping. Those national soul might be portrayed Concerning illustration An wellspring of pride for those turkish Muslims, for its legacy and custom for craftsmanship Furthermore tricky worth of effort. Those turkish people feel encouraged with lead different muslim countries on the way of the Western standard from claiming living, delegate test democracy, and advancement. (Alexander Murinson, 2012). These wide ideas rundown the soul for neo-Ottomanism. The politicians, spoke to Eventually Tom's perusing those inward ring of the AKP who grasped this vision, have a long haul worldwide motivation for the objective from
claiming settling on turkey a significant worldwide control Toward 2023, the centennial quite a while of the republic of albania. This new turkish world class is actualizing this system with zeal, dedication, and modernity.¹

If, in the period in front of the merging about energy by those AKP (2002-2007), none of these approach makers announced those mottos around the “restoration of the empire” alternately “the new great empire,” as of late Davutoğlu uncovered as much neo-Ottomanist vision: “Turkey Might get An Uni about countries simply such as Britain’s Uni for its previous colonies,” he said. “Why shouldn’t turkey modify its administration clinched alongside previous footstool terrains in the Balkans, white collar East, Also national Asia?” (Alexander Murinson, 2012) An crucial to this restoration of footstool legacies need been those Extending investment hobbies Furthermore territorial dynamism spoke to by the Ascent of new provincial anatolia organizations headed Toward dedicated Muslims contending with universal metropolitan aegean organizations. These anatolia organizations bring developed as solid supporters to further turkish extension under rising center eastern instead of european business sectors. (Alexander Murinson, 2012). It might be difficult with bode well for turkish outside strategy towards nations for example, the united Bedouin Emirates, Iran, Iraq, and syria without taking under thought these new benefits of the business premium bunches. Subsequently those monetary diversions about these gatherings have assumed a paramount part in the government’s exertions on Push more amazing profession Furthermore budgetary collaboration with those center east. Between 2002 What’s more 2008, turkish fares of the Bedouin universe expanded five times, arriving at $25 billion. For An critical build Previously, modern preparation. (Alexander Murinson, 2012). Turkey need looked for vast scale aggressive business sectors "around her Bedouin neighbors clinched alongside such parts Concerning illustration construction, steel, food, and chemicals. As the come about about its vital anatolia roots Also more preservationist muslim outlook, those AKP need concentrated on the binding together character of the footrest realm and the muslim qualities inherited Eventually Tom's perusing those

¹ Alexander Murinson, *Turkish Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century*, September 2012, p. 118.
Articulating another dream to turkey that is not indigent upon the West, same time actively looking routes will parity its associations What's more alliances inside its neighborhood, the AKP harkens back of the days of the footrest realm Also tasks those picture of a fearless territorial force. 

Looking into June 12, 2011, Erdoğan utilized as much neo-Ottomanist talk on an alternate essential event. At he conveyed An triumph discourse on the night of as much third successive national race win, he said that “Sarajevo won today to the extent that istanbul. Beirut won to the extent that izmir. Damascus won to the extent that ankara. Ramallah, the West Bank, and jerusalem won to the extent that Diyarbakir. Leader Erdoğan Also President Gül would keen government officials Furthermore alarmed diplomats who have situated a frantic pace to their discretionary movement which they call the cadenced discretion alternately zero issues with neighbor's strategy. It might make a terrible oversimplification, however, will quality this real change Previously, turkish outside policymaking to particular personalities.

Those present turkish administration understands that in the prompt future it is unable for projecting its tough force in the entirety footstool neighborhood. Those AKP’s heading need consequently opted to a delicate control approach in the between time. Turkey’s mid-term objective is will win Domesticated Also worldwide authenticity Toward joining the EU, fortifying those Creating 8 alternately D-8, an aggregation from claiming creating nations with substantial muslim populaces (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, What's more Turkey), and seeking after those heading of the association from claiming islamic meeting.

Those turkish administration need embraced deliberations on get the mediator Also arbiter of huge numbers territorial clashes in the Balkans(Kosovo, Bosnia, and Macedonia, the caucasus Abkhazia, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Also south Ossetia, and the working East: those Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Syrian-Israeli

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1 William Hale, op.cit. p. 234.
transactions through investment for inter-governmental associations for example, OSCE, BSEO, Furthermore president What's more enrollment clinched alongside nato and in addition An Un-sponsored collusion for Civilizations UNAOC.

Those investment to these structures permits turkey a considerable measure from claiming adaptability Furthermore glory on the planet stage. Same time those old English saxon Also nordic states, alongside the european administration in the european Commission, embrace turkish participation in the EU, the All the more inward-looking mainland social orders contradict the consolidation of its long-standing definitional other, particularly at once of inward emergency. Interestingly, however, both bunches show up will embrace the Turkey’s neo-Ottomanism, albeit for inverse reasons. (Alexander Murinson, 2012). Those neo-liberal european states for example, those united Kingdom, Sweden, and the netherlands need aid especially pulled in Eventually Tom's perusing Turkey’s spreading for Gülen’s Comprehension of the association the middle of islam Also free enterprise. It determinedly emphasizes the discerned geostrategic need from claiming Turkey’s rising of the eu.¹

The mainland conservatives over france What's more Germany welcome the thing that they perceive as Turkey’s float of the east Concerning illustration an understood acknowledgement for Turkey’s having a place on an alternate human progress alternately society. Since the end of the frosty War, Turkey’s neighborhood What's more its relationship for Washington have drastically changed. Endeavors to ended up the pioneers of the Turkic-Central asian planet or An european force need fizzled so far, and the Turks would gazing in distinctive directions for chances.²

Those iraq war need turned out that american Furthermore turkish security worries are never again for lockstep, heading turkey on reexamine its cooperation of the united states. Us President Barack Obama need been compelled should accept Turkey’s distancing itself starting with those West Since it may be On as much best hobbies on stay end for the direct islamist country.

Regardless Obama’s vivacious expressions of kinship for leader Erdoğan, the present discretionary difficulties for the united states need aid an alternate pointer of

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¹ Alexander Murinson, op.cit. p. 87.
² F. Tayfur and K. Göymen, op.cit. p.213.
a profound movement On turkish outside strategy. A number in the West address if turkey will be even now an associate.

Turkey will be seen Likewise a problematic However key accomplice over a district Eventually Tom's perusing Numerous capable voices over Washington Also parts of both houses of the us congress. While those Obama organization wishes should venture another picture for american openness instead of unfriendliness of the islamic globe after those military crusades for iraq Also afghanistan. President Obama formed a solid individual connection for leader Erdoğan Also advertises the thing that he calls An “model partnership” with turkey.

A standout amongst those effects about this approach might have been Turkey’s choice should build An Raytheon-produced AN/TPY-2 X-band Similarly as a and only An nato anti-missile guard framework On september 2011. By those same token, An possibility clash between two way american partners in the center East, turkey What's more Israel, turned into an real wellspring for worry to those Obama organization.

On september about 2011, the turkish leader debilitated that he might send those turkish naval force on secure future support flotillas for gaza. The us state office issued a cautioning for both sides will cool it. Turkey Additionally tested Israel’s characteristic gas investigation privileges What's more delimitation of selective monetary Zones for the neighboring cyprus. These continuous Turkish-Israeli tensions urged the united states will set turkey for notice that those country ought further bolstering stop its debilitating talk and conduct technique.

Similarly as another sign for not kidding american worries around those turkish debilitating posture in the eastern Mediterranean, those us Navy, clinched alongside april 2012, took an interest for a Greek-Israeli maritime exercise which mimicked an engagement for an foe power with comparative competencies with the individuals from claiming turkey. Previously, in turn unpleasant gesture to Israel, turkey effectively lobbied the nato committee not will welcome an israeli assignment of the nato summit which occurred with respect to might 20-21, 2012 Previously, Chicago, and the us organization went along for Turkey’s a. (Alexander Murinson, 2012). It also objected to Israel’s investment in the alliance’s new organization
collaboration menu (PCM), notwithstanding those reality that israel is a part for NATO’s mediterranean dialog one assembly. By Obama proceeds to help turkey.

**Turkey and the “Arab Spring”**

This keep going segment examines the turkish trusts Throughout those Bedouin spring to position itself as those model for the new Bedouin yearnings on majority rules system. Turkey a whole lot needs those Bedouin globe to set for itself the objective for emulating Turkey’s equitable framework. Over addition, those Bedouin spring made new dilemmas to Turkey’s remote approach including a disappointment of the zero issues strategy. Those turkish model former of the “Arab Spring,” Islamists for Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Also tunisia seen those AKP as a model to those task for Islamization. (Alexander Murinson, 2012). Since the AKP will be an beneficiary will An chain of Islamist, religiously preservationist turkish political parties, Bedouin Islamists regularly seen Turkey’s controlling party Concerning illustration locked in in the starting phases of a long haul “stealth” project for the reason for reclaiming turkish particular social order and bringing it once again will islam. For course, those AKP rejects this characterization, demanding that is not aislamist development Anyway instead an monetarily liberal Also socially preservationist centerright get-together that is demonstrated upon christian equitable gatherings clinched alongside europe.

Trying a chance to ride those tide of the “Arab Spring,” leader Erdoğan guaranteed that the impulse to mainstream uprisings in the Bedouin universe might have been turkey What's more its propelled vote based system. Erdoğan accepted he Might take credit for the wave of challenges clearing the Bedouin reality. Previously, fact, Throughout the challenges in Egypt, Erdoğan might have been Around the primary who known as once hosnimubarak will leave voluntarily.¹

However, it might have been those protest developments that inundated libya and syria that put turkey In the horns of a not kidding dilemma; turkey battled for its part as those promoter of democracy, losing its “clarity for vision” Furthermore moving its position looking into almost a Every day premise from supporting those

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gaddafi and Assad regimes to supporting the protesters. Turkey proceeded will relegate its outside strategy necessity should its national venture toward oneself Also financial interests, not of the advancement from claiming popular government. This got to be clear The point when turkey backed utilization of military intercession to bahrain on smother shiite well known protests, presumably supported Toward iran.

When those iranian Restriction showed on the lanes for backing of the Tahrir square protesters to Cairo, turkish President Abdullah Gül might have been coolly negotiating new Agreeeme with iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to extend trade between the two nations. To At whatever case, the constituent particular victories about muslim Brotherhood-affiliated gatherings Furthermore groups, for example, An-Nahda for tunisia and the opportunity What's more Equity one gathering for Egypt, given turkey with a chance for making An cinch about moderate islamist regimes in the district. An-Nahda’s leader, Rached el-Ghannouchi, stated that he might have been intrigued by those turkish model, which permitted to an islamic legislature on work Previously, An mainstream social order. ¹

Bedouin Islamists, on the other hand, saw an alternate chance. They observed the AKP’s restoration of the footstool legacy, out and out help for Hamas, and vitriolic feedback of israel to various outside strategy pronouncements Likewise an acceptable pointer of the certain Furthermore unstoppable methodology of the Islamization of turkey and the idealistic triumph of their result in.

This transform likewise restored prospects of the turkish model quell Toward the AKP Likewise those lead about its neoOttoman ambitions, fuelled Toward Turkey’s developing financial control and also its recently discovered universal eminence. Turkey’s developing territorial initiative part likewise advertised those Bedouin Islamists Ansunni elective to iran. At this observation place turkey under a intra sunni clash with those Saudis, who for a long time guaranteed the position of the pioneers of the Sunnis, An rich kingdom that is home of the islamic blessed destinations from claiming mecca Furthermore medina. In the connection of the Bedouin Spring, inside the inter-Arab political world, ankara might inescapably conflict for riyaadh in light of turkey helps political strengths Furthermore gatherings subsidiary with those muslim Brotherhood, same time those Saudis back the Salafis.

¹ Graham E. Fuller, op.cit. p.47.
(Alexander Murinson, 2012). However, Likewise sunni countries participate on fill in against those Alawi (and Shia) administration from claiming syrian President Bashar al-Assad, an iranian ally, Actually turkey What's more saudiarabia bring found themselves on the same side, In spite of their objectives in the locale contrast. 64 in the fallout of the Bedouin Spring, the Arabs recognize turkey Concerning illustration exhibiting An voracious craving to self-aggrandizement, Also positing turkey under those AKP tenet as a model to improvemen by those turkish leader displays An quandary for those Bedouin universe. (Alexander Murinson, 2012). The preservationist Bedouin regimes plainly don't recognize those encounter of present day pluralist conventions of turkey Concerning illustration a good example. Exactly Bedouin neighbors, such Iraq, saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the Gulf States view turkish backing of the mainstream uprisings Similarly as threatening, same time the egyptian administering world class can't endure turkey displacing egypt Concerning illustration the pioneer of the muslim reality.

Those move to popular government On Tunisia, Egypt, Furthermore libya will take after its identity or script with an acceptable possibility of long haul political unrest, fragmentation, Furthermore apprehensions. Those occasions of the purported Bedouin Spring, right away glance, have prompted two effects. Those principal is an topple of the authoritarian, whether pro-Western, Bedouin regimes that bring upheld An similarity of Strength for more than forty A long time. Those second may be the vulnerability and advertise uneasiness that this procedure engendered, past the pattern for Islamization (or getting of control Toward the muslim fraternity Furthermore their subsidiary political developments On Tunisia, Egypt, Also Libya) Also discontinuity of the state along ethno-religious lines clinched alongside libya Also Syria, and, on account of Egypt, An developing gap the middle of those christiancoptic minority Also muslim greater part.

Therefore, Ankara’s trusts that Bedouin nations will recognize turkey Concerning illustration An hotspot from claiming impulse need aid best case scenario dubious. A lot of people assumption authority in the Bedouin states officially recognize in the Turks’ endeavors should embed themselves in the Domesticated governmental issues of iraq Also syria Likewise neo-Ottomanist interfering. In this
late pattern for captivating the Bedouin world, turkey officially encountered expressions of the notable hostility What's more pan-Arabism.

Turkey’s drive with turn into a linchpin of the result from claiming Al-Assad’s administration emergency in syria Also endeavors will cut out a range of prominence clinched alongside northern iraq would observed Similarly as interruption under intra-Arab undertakings by Turkey’s Bedouin neighbors. In An typical discretionary gesture, reflecting the current temperament Around Bedouin leaders, turkey might have been excluded from the baghdad meeting of the Middle Easterner association On Walk 2012, which esteemed turkish cooperation An non-Arab impedance in the emergency. ¹

Previously, fact, turkey might have been openly derided Toward those iraqi remote minister, who expressing as much government’s worry In the developing impact of territorial forces turkey and iran inside iraq. “This summit will improve our position will remained with respect to our feet vis-à-vis these territorial powers,” he said, blaming turkey What's more iran about contending should fill those vacuum On iraq in the nonattendance of an iraqi representative, strong, national solidarity administration. Since A large portion Bedouin patriot regimes rose up out of those previous domain of the footstool Empire, Bedouin elites bring predominantly negative cooperations for the footstool secret word.

The impacts of the “Arab Spring” once Turkey’s “Zero Problems” Policy

Following those onset of the “Arab Spring,” Davutoğlu surrendered that the substances of the district ought further bolstering make taken under record On drafting further span to turkey. He alluded of the “zero problems” arrangement Similarly as Turkey’s “most paramount objective. ” he elucidated that turkey “never guaranteed that there would no problems” Be that as might have been rather worried that “relations with different nations so as will make another political atmosphere can't assistance take care of issues Also make new one - the principle destination will be reintegration ”.

¹ Marvine Howe, Turkey: A Nation Divided Over Islam's Revival, 2004, p. 128.
In the meantime, there need aid developing worries Around those preservationist turkish business elites that the “zero problems” policy, joined together with the destabilizing impact of the “Arab Spring”, will be negatively influencing those turkish territorial exchange. These agents would particularly worried around the profession networks they secured in Syria, which served Concerning illustration An Turkey’s passage of the Bedouin business sectors in the final one decade, Despite the Israeli-Jordanian transportation hall might possibly serve as an elective passage purpose to turkish merchandise ordained for Bedouin businesses.¹

Those leader for A large number events promulgated as much dream about popular government done a lion’s share muslim state. Be that The point when particular case delves under the quick and dirty of the frantic turkish diplomacy, he might see An example of political coordination with Washington. Following those “Arab Spring” the turkish pioneer vocally called for An move will equitable governance in the area.

However, on account about libya (and additional recently in the event that of Syria), Erdoğan might have been equivocating for An a great deal more drawn out time. Since as much one gathering originated with force done 2002, he reveled in solid individual Furthermore political binds with Libya’s Muammar gaddafi Also Syria’s Bashshar al-Assad. These particular binds were strategically strengthened Eventually Tom's perusing turkish regulate investment, support clinched alongside multi-million dollar infrastructural projects, and the easing furnished to constant turkish unemployment upon the hiring for turkish laborers to these tasks.

Concerning illustration accounted by the turkish service for Economy, libya might have been the “most critical business sector to turkish contractors for Africa” until 2011. Until that quite a while the report card might have been that “Turkish organizations held Furthermore would considering 525 tasks to libya for an aggregate worth for $26. 3 billion. ”. The point when the civil war poor out in libya and the global group keeping called for deposing those libyan czar Also bringing him will trial, turkey took Gaddafi’s side. Turkey offered those necessity of the exchange What's more financing profits the particular nation reveled in from its relationship for

¹ İdris Bal, *Turkey’s relations with the West and the Turkic Republics: the Rise and Fall of the 'Turkish model*, London 2000, p. 135.
Libya’s administration at the expense of continuously discerned Concerning illustration steady of the bleeding tyranny.

Quickly after, turkey provided for On of the nato leadership’s requests should backing its military operation, which meant will make An no-fly zone On libya. However, Erdoğan’s legislature endured done seeking after An discretionary result to those libyan issue. In those same time, turkey furnished monetary help of the libyan rebels.

Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring

Turkish remote approach for late quite some time need been directed clinched alongside thought from claiming a few underlying standards. I need expounded once them over some length previously, for example, such that cadenced diplomacy, multi-dimensional outside policy, zero issues with neighbors, request instituting actor, worldwide cooperation, alternately proactive outside strategy. Concerning illustration we behavior our remote approach in this new era, a few of the individuals standards emerge and will keep on going to aide us alongside others. They merit closer examination here.

In same time paying most extreme thoughtfulness regarding protect national interests, turkey will Additionally seek after a value-based remote approach. We need recently communicated our availability on expect the responsibilities of a worldwide actor, What’s more set ourselves those target should make figured Concerning illustration An insightful nation on those global group keeping.¹

Particularly in times about crises, for example, the financial emergency those universe may be setting off through alternately those political conversion in the region, the necessity to insightful nations to convey such vital capacities Similarly as clash prevention, mediation, clash determination or improvemen aid gets to be especially obvious. As a insightful country, i. E. A capable part of the worldwide community, turkey aim will upgrade its proficiency to shape those course of

developments and settle on an important commitment of the determination about territorial and universal issues.

Second, Likewise we position ourselves in this great memorable conversion process, we will go about with self-assurance to our capacity to meet those previously stated tests. When we situated ourselves those destination to turned into An insightful country, we figure it out it hails with a significant number desires Also oblige new instruments which could be forgetting done Turkey’s universal outside strategy toolkit. We will depend with respect to our capability Similarly as individuals, Similarly as a country What's more An state will earn those assets important should accomplish our remote approach targets. To territories the place we need particular instruments required to satisfy those new requests from claiming our goal of a insightful country, we will worth of effort with create these instruments for self-assurance.  

Third, our remote approach will a chance to be led autonomously. We fair from An discernment that different forces outline territorial governmental issues Furthermore we just perform those parts doled out on us. We requirement with do away with this mental sense for subpar quality which need penetrate Previously, huge numbers segments for our particular social order Also amongst political elites. Today, we focus our vision, set our objectives, Furthermore execute our remote approach in line for our national necessities. We could succeed or fizzle in our initiatives, yet the urgent purpose may be that we execute our identity or approaches. We don't get educational from whatever available powers, or are we and only others’ Fantastic schemes. On particular, our strategies towards neighbors need aid concocted with cautious attention of our own assessment of the circumstances. As need been those situation Along these lines far, we will proceed with will direction our approaches with the individuals from claiming our Western accomplices Likewise we see fit, Be that will never tell such organization negatively influence our relations for neighbors. Fourth, we will seek after An vision-oriented remote approach.

The insightful nat part obliges us on secure a sound harmony between emergency management What's more dream administration. Today, the reality will

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be setting off through An significant worldwide financial emergency same time our area will be encountering a troublesomeness political conversion. We have stepped done should assume an animated part over these conversion courses executing or neglecting at work our emergency oversaw economy benefits What's more our multi-dimensional strategy. Likewise we battle until handle those theoretical tests in the center East, Balkans, Caucasus What's more Europe however, we will never lose sight of the more extensive patterns keeping in brain our comprehensive approach.

**Conclusion**

Embarking upon the neo-Ottomanist outside strategy course, the AKP administration, done a sharp takeoff starting with those Kemalist standards of remote policy, checked another phase in the Republic’s historical backdrop. Under the tenet of the AKP since 2002, turkey need attempted will actualize all the an adjusting act previously, its outside strategy same time continually growing its impact in the center East, those Caucasus, and the Balkans. On the one hand, turkey need assumed those part of hesitant associate of the West, Concerning illustration An part for NATO, What's more will be accordingly profoundly included in the military and vital hobbies of the Western associates. On the different hand, it need stretched a “good neighbor” strategy towards the Bedouin world, the place developing protest developments need turned under armed confrontations and a topple of the administering regimes. The new outside strategy activism about turkey need overstretched the country’s discretionary capabilities, same time its misrepresented pretentiousness need brought up feedback in the West Also worries Indeed inside the turkish discretionary corps. Concerning illustration those inheritor of the footstool custom Similarly as An real exchanging nation, turkey under the AKP caught the soul of the end of the frosty war What's more globalization. The AKP’s outside strategy task might have been outlined on profit from Turkey’s developing worldwide political impact and the greatest inclusion from claiming every last one of neighbors On cross-border exchange. This heading reflects those drive of the Anatolia Tigers, young, yearning industrialists who fast figured out how with demonstrate that they camwood use those Awhile ago undiscovered business chances in the region,
including blasting exchange with israel. Those “Turkish model” about democracy, based upon the AKP’s “moderate” Islam, doesn't match the social Also monetary trajectories which the Bedouin nations have trailed since putting on freedom then afterward reality War ii. The chronicled experience What's more political developments Previously, turkey need aid altogether unique in relation to those way about advancement in the Bedouin countries, settling on it an unviable model to those neighborhood. Westernization, An transform that started long back Throughout those late footstool period, will be recognizing Turkey’s way starting with mossycup oak different muslim nations in the center east.
Chapter II

Justice and Development Party and Its Foreign Policy Concept

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Historical Background of Justice and Development Party

The main organization of Political Islam was realized, thanks to the initiatives of Prof. Mehmet Zahit Kotku. As a reaction to never ending struggles and political intrigues at right wing parties and in order to express the ideas of Islamists more explicitly decided to establish a political party. It can stand itself with an Islamic orientation. Kotku favored the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan as a promising and outstanding personality of first Islamist political party in Turkey. Thus, Necmettin Erbakan thereafter undertook the indisputable charismatic, traditional Islamist leadership that made him as the most notable figure of Political Islam in Turkey.

Necmettin Erbakan was born in 1926 in Northern Turkey. His father, who came from a long-standing family, was a civil servant worked in different places of Turkey while his mother was a member of a reputable family. Being a bright student during his initial learning life, he studied mechanical engineering at Istanbul Technical University which is the most prestigious and oldest university of Turkey in the field of technology and earned his PhD degree from Aachen University, Germany. After his return to Turkey, Erbakan worked on the project of producing Turkish cars, which increased his popularity and constituted a national, conservative, reference for his political activities. Inspired by Kotku along with the support of many religious groups and communities Necmettin initialized —National Vision Movement which was also published as a manifesto aftermaths. ¹

Political Islam in Turkey

Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) went through five incarnations before it found a balance that voters would embrace but the military would also accept, albeit reluctantly. Its evolution reflects how democratic traditions and institutions can both interact with and moderate political Islam, at least in one geostrategic country. In Turkey, a tradition of free and fair elections and capitalism has encouraged Islamic parties to play by the rules. Turkey’s radical secularism, enforced by the military, has also tamed the strident religious dogma that once landed Islamic politicians in trouble and even in prison.

The AKP is a political party with clear Islamic roots. It pragmatically moved to the center-right over a decade, mainly to escape the fate of its defunct predecessors. The party’s success, however, has had little to do with ideological factors. Turkish voters have been primarily concerned with bread-and-butter issues. In June 2011, they once again voted for political stability and rewarded Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for the country’s growing prosperity and better social services, particularly in health care and housing. (Taspinar)

The victory for the AKP was historic. It was only the second time since the beginning of Turkey’s multiparty democracy in 1946 that a political party had won three consecutive elections. And it was the first time that a party actually increased its percentage of the vote at each succeeding election. The AKP received 34.28 percent of the vote in 2002. It won 46.58 percent in 2007. And it scored 49.90 percent in 2011.

It was a striking reversal. All previous Islamist parties in Turkey had been shut down by either military intervention or rulings by the constitutional court: The National Order Party, founded in 1970, was banned by the Constitutional Court in 1971. The National Salvation Party, founded in 1972, was outlawed after the 1980 military coup. The Welfare Party, founded in 1983, was banned by the Constitutional Court in 1998. The Virtue Party, founded in 1997, was banned in 2001. (Taspinar)

Turkey is notable because its Islamist parties have reemerged, more moderate and pragmatic, after each closure. “Autocratic regimes in the Muslim world often ban religious parties, which then go underground and turn violent. Turkey’s Islamists have taken a different path. Despite being repeatedly outlawed and ejected from power, pious politicians have shunned violence, embraced democracy, and moved into the mainstream,” The Economist noted in 2008. “No Islamic party has been as moderate and pro-western as the AKP, which catapulted into government in 2002 promising to lead Turkey into the European Union.” (Taşpinar, 2012)

Erdoğan, who founded the party, actually rejects defining the AKP in religious terms. “AK Party are not an Islamic party, and AK Party also refuse labels such as Muslim-democrat,” he said in 2005. The AKP leader instead calls the party’s agenda “conservative democracy.
The AKP’s journey from political Islam to conservative democracy is not just the result of political expediency or respect for the red lines of Turkish secularism. The evolution of Turkey’s capitalism under the leadership of Turgut Özal in the 1980s created an entrepreneurial Muslim bourgeoisie in the conservative heartland of Anatolia. The new Muslim bourgeoisie had a greater stake in politics—and became more engaged. (Taşpınar, 2012)

These “Islamic Calvinists” have been more concerned about maximizing profits, creating access to international currency markets, and ensuring political stability than about introducing Islamic law or creating a theocracy. Turkey now has thousands of such small and medium-sized export-oriented businesses, often referred to as “Anatolian tigers.” Most support the AKP. Beginning in the 1990s, the party’s assumption of political power gradually moderated the radical elements within Turkish political Islam.

The AKP leadership clearly views the party as a model for other Muslim countries. On June 12, 2011, Erdoğan told thousands who had gathered to celebrate the AKP’s landslide victory, “Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul. Beirut won as much as Izmir. Damascus won as much as Ankara. Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, and Jerusalem won as much as Diyarbakır.” (Taşpınar, 2012)

**Political Islam and National Visions**

The rise of Islamic politics in Turkey was in large part a reaction to the traumatic birth of a modern state after the Ottoman Empire collapsed following World War I. Since the 1920s, Turkey’s official ideology has been Kemalism, which grew out of the ultra secular views of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic. The Kemalists pursued a top-down project of radical modernization. In an ambitious drive to import European civilization, the republic disposed of the governing caliphate, the Arabic alphabet, Islamic education.¹

Kemalist Turkey adopted western legal codes from Germany, Italy, and Switzerland, together with the Latin alphabet and the western calendar, western holidays, and western dress. The country’s official history and language were

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reworked. A new education system glorified pre-Islamic Turkic civilizations at the expense of the country’s more recent Ottoman past, and many Arabic and Persian words were purged to create an “authentically” Turkish vocabulary. Even the Arabic *adhan*, the call to prayer, was no longer allowed in its original form and had to be chanted in modern Turkish, to the dismay of pious Muslims.

Yet despite massive reforms, secular Kemalism barely infiltrated Turkish society at large. The rural and pious masses of Anatolia remained largely unaffected by the cultural reengineering in Ankara, in contrast to the military, the bureaucracy, and the urban bourgeoisie, who embraced or adapted to Kemalism’s superficial westernization. The cultural gap between the Kemalist center and the Anatolian periphery soon became insurmountable. A Kemalist slogan in the 1920s acknowledged that the Turkish government ruled “For the people, despite the people.” (Taşpınar, 2012)

Religious conservatives and ethnic Kurds actively opposed the Kemalist mission to create a westernized, secular, and homogenous Turkish nation-state. Between 1923 and 1938, the new Kemalist government unleashed its military to suppress a series of Kurdish and Islamist rebellions.

Turkish politics entered a new era after 1946. When the Cold War divided up the world, Turkey’s decision to turn toward the West and join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) fostered a transition to multiparty democracy and a realignment of political forces between left and right. Kurdish discontent found its place in the socialist left, while political Islam was part of the anticommunist right. Behind the scenes, the military remained a powerful force. It intervened in 1960, 1971, and 1980 to restore a sense of Kemalist order against both leftist and conservative parties.¹

But in 1991, after the Cold War ended and communism collapsed, Turkey’s identity problems rapidly resurfaced. The right and left AK were no longer able to absorb the passions of Kurdish and Islamic dissent. Turkey was polarized along two axes: Turkish versus Kurdish identity on the one hand, and Islamic versus secular identity on the other. The result was the “lost decade” of the 1990s, a decade of war

¹ Michael Wuthrich, op.cit. p. 154
with Kurdish separatists, polarization over the role of religious values, economic turmoil, and unstable coalition governments.

In 1994, the Welfare Party shocked the Kemalist establishment by winning local elections nationwide and capturing control of Turkey’s two largest cities, Istanbul and Ankara. The party was headed by Necmettin Erbakan, who had close connections with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. After seven decades, Turkey’s secular tide was ebbing. A year later, the Welfare Party won the largest bloc in parliamentary elections, putting an Islamist-led coalition in charge of the entire country.

The Welfare Party’s victory was short lived. Alarmed that the new government would adopt an overtly Islamic agenda, the military stepped in. Turkey’s generals feared that the government would suppress secular opposition, allow Islamic dress in universities, and abandon Turkey’s western alliances. In fact, however, the Welfare Party actually adhered to most mainstream Turkish political practices. It did try to plant sympathizers in ministries it controlled, but so had many previous governments. Still, the secular press warned of an imminent Islamist revolution.¹

On February 28, 1997, the military forced Erbakan and his party out of power. The bloodless coup had major unintended consequences. It spurred serious soul-searching among Turkey’s Islamists, eventually sparking a generational and ideological rift within the movement. The Welfare Party’s pragmatic young leaders notably Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül recognized the red lines of Turkish secularism. Erdoğan, then mayor of Istanbul, learned the hard way. In 1999, he spent four months in jail for reciting a poem with Islamic undertones. After participating in democratic politics for more than three decades, Turkey’s Islamists had already tempered their views to win a wider following at elections. By the late 1990s, political Islam was ready to fully integrate into mainstream politics.²

In 2001, Erdoğan created the Justice and Development Party, the fifth and final incarnation of the pro-Islamist party, from the ashes of the dissolved Welfare Party and the Virtue Party. He crafted the term conservative democracy rather than an

² Simten Cosar, op.cit. p. 110
Islamic reference to explain his political agenda. He understood that political liberalization would consolidate the AKP’s power base.

To achieve two crucial objectives, Erdoğan put democratic reforms at the top of his agenda, seeking to comply with European Union (EU) membership guidelines. The move earned him the support of Turkey’s business community, liberal intellectuals, and pragmatic middle class. It also won him political legitimacy in the eyes of the military. After all, European recognition had long been the ultimate prize in Atatürk’s vision of a westernized Turkey. And by giving priority to social services, the AKP also appealed to the impoverished underclass. Erdoğan’s strategy paid off. In November 2002, the party won the largest bloc of seats in the parliamentary elections.

On foreign policy, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s willingness to compromise on the question of Cyprus also polarized Turkish politics. The AKP backed a United Nations plan to reunify the island; the military adamantly opposed the plan. The deadlock was an important obstacle to EU membership and the pro-Islamist party actually appeared more willing to compromise than either the secularists or the military. A subsequent investigation revealed that a military coup over the Cyprus question was barely averted in 2004 because of divisions among the Turkish generals.¹

The AKP crowned its victory when parliament elected Gül to the presidency. But the military shadow still loomed over Turkey. The top brass stayed away from the inauguration. And in 2008, Turkey’s chief prosecutor tried to have the AKP closed on grounds that it pursued an Islamist agenda to subvert the secular republic. The party survived this “constitutional coup” attempt by a whisker. The court voted against closure by just one vote. (Taşpınar, 2012)

Consolidation

Between 2008 and 2011, the AKP consolidated its gains. Despite the political turbulence, Turkey weathered the global financial crisis of 2008 with remarkable success. The economy continued double-digit growth rates in 2009, after a brief recession. By 2012, Turkey’s unemployment rate and budget deficit were at record lows.

¹ Ibid. p.155.
In June 2011, the AKP won its third consecutive electoral victory with nearly 50 percent of the vote. The country’s global stature also reached new heights. As uprisings shook the Middle East, reformers in Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia often cited Turkey and the AKP as models. The AKP also consolidated its supremacy over the military a first since the creation of the modern state. On July 29, 2011, the military’s chief of staff resigned after a disagreement with Erdoğan about staff promotions. The same day, the heads of the army, navy, and air force requested early retirement. By early 2012, half of all Turkish admirals and one out of ten active duty generals were in jail for plotting against the government. It was a paradigm shift for a country that had experienced three military coups and constant military meddling for almost a century. (Taşpınar, 2012)

AKP Foreign Policy

AKP leaders claim that membership in the European Union is their strategic priority. Yet the AKP has demonstrated growing self-confidence by expanding Turkey’s reach and diplomatic relations beyond the West. The EU’s reluctance to embrace Turkey formally and the European economic crisis have also led the AKP to look to the Middle East, Africa, Russia, and Central Asia as areas where Turkey can exert soft power what Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu called Turkey’s “strategic depth.” Analysts dubbed the activist Turkish foreign policy “neo-Ottomani.” (Taşpınar, 2012)

Yet the AKP had almost no problems in Turkey’s relations with the United States. “Americans used to ask: Who lost Turkey? Now they are busy asking questions about the success of the Turkish model,” (Taşpınar, 2012) a senior AKP official quipped. The AKP even decided to host NATO radar installations needed for the new U.S. missile-defense system against Iran.

For decades, Turkey had the closest relations of any Muslim state to Israel. Under the AKP, Erdoğan even mediated briefly between Israel and Syria during 2007 and 2008. The AKP foreign policy generally sought “zero-problem with neighbors.” But as the AKP deepened Turkey’s ties to Iran and the Hamas government in Gaza—including AKP efforts to facilitate humanitarian aid to Gaza—tensions deepened with Israel. Erdoğan also once called Syrian President Bashshar al-Assad his “brother,” although after the Syrian uprising began in 2011, Turkey called for Al-Assad to step
down. Erdoğan also opened Turkey for Syria’s opposition summits, defecting soldiers, and refugees.  

The Persistence of Islam

It is worth mentioning that the Islamic beliefs, customs, and social structures persisted among the bulk of the Turkish populace although Turkey’s considerable progress in social and economic issues during the twentieth century. Although official lailik, Islam was limited in political aspect. In 1950, the Democrat Party was able to defeat the Kemalist Republican Peoples Party through national elections and its leader Adnan Menderes was selected as the prime minister.

Menderes dealt with Islam in a more tolerant attitude, the matter which worries his Kemalist opponents, who felt the prime minister was threatening Atatürk’s legacy. In addition, Menders dealt with policies related to economic stagnation and also took repressive measures against his critics and political opponents. In May 1960, a military coup (Turkey’s first) removed Menderes and at the end of his reign, took intensive procedures against his political opponents. In May 1960 A military coup (Turkey’s first) stopped Menderes and terminated the Democrat Party. The following serious Islamic project into party politics took place in 1970, when Necmettin Erbakan set the National Order Party. The MNP supported the reformation of good manners and limited the economic relations with western countries, in spite of establishing small enterprises, independent craftsmen, local traders and economic issues.  

After the military coup in 1971, the MNP was banned, while the generals claiming it to be a combination of politics and religion. Although, it was embodied as the National Salvation Party in 1973 (Milli Selamet Partisi, or MSP), again chaired by Erbakan and presenting more the same plan. For a time, the Kemalists supported Erbakan’s movement as a symbol to the radical left and National Salvation although having participated in three coalition governments in the 1970s. However, at the end of the decade Turkish society was almost on disarray and another military coup was

1 Neslihan Cevik, op. cit. p.85
2 Kerem & Kadioğlu, Another Empire a Decade Of Turkey's Foreign Policy Under The Justice And Development, 2012. p.98.
indispensable. In September 1980, the generals took an action in declaring martial law and ostracizing all of Turkey’s political parties, including National Salvation.

After the coup, the generals supervised the script of another constitution, considerably less liberal than its predecessor. Not surprisingly, it included obvious constraints on religion. From another side, the generals additionally released that religion was a fixed social force and barrier to Communist impact. In an effort to evade a replay of the massive violence and civil disorder that plagued Turkey in the tardy 1970s, the junta introduced indispensable religious studies in the public school system. If adolescent people had a substructure of religious values, the generals reasoned, perhaps they wouldn’t gravitate into political radicalism that had so shredded the gregarious fabric in the anterior decade. The time was ripe for a re-evaluation of the place of Islam in public life. ¹

The first stirrings came with the elevate of Turgut Ozal, bellwether of the conservative Motherland Party (ANAP) and Turkey’s first prime minister after the 1980 coup. Both Turgut and his brother, Korkut, were struck by the American model of church/state disunion, in which religion is free of regime control. Korkut lived for a time in Utah and was affected by the Mormons. He felt them as modern, affluent, and prosperous, while at the same time drawing vigor and convivial cohesion from their vigorous religious faith. In a fascinating encomium to his Mormon inspiration, Özal called the beehive as the symbol for his Motherland Party.

At the same time, Welfare Party was instituted by Erbakan, the successor of the proscribed National Salvation. It has unremarkable political effect in the beginning. Welfare was incompetent by the junta from participating in the 1983 parliamentary elections. Four years later, it achieved about 7% of the vote in parliamentary elections, short of the 10% the percentage required to have more seats.

However, Welfare’s concentration on economic fairness, convivial equity, small projects, and a public ethic of mundane provision commenced to engage more support as the public grew weary of regime incompetence, graft, and political deadlock. Its endeavor to bring humane religious traditions to bear on contemporary economic and

¹ Graham E. Fuller, op.cit, p.156.
social difficulties was not unlike the Christian Socialist Kineticism in Great Britain, or the 'distributives’ economic philosophy of Catholics like G.K. Chesterton. During the early 1990s, the party became the culture ground for an incipient generation of competent and pragmatic activists and commenced to make inroads into territory traditionally held by the Turkish left. Moreover, Welfare’s concentration on the people’s common religious thoughts (rather than nationalism) appealed to Kurds who had grown disillusion with the radical secessionist.¹

By 1991, Welfare Party achieved about 17% of the patriotic vote and won sixty-two parliamentary seats. In the 1994 local elections, Welfare nominees for mayor captured 28 out of 76 governorates, among them Istanbul and Ankara, with 19% of the popular vote. In public elections of 1995, were captured 158 parliamentary seats, in publicity. After that, Erbakan was selected as the prime minister in a coalition government.

However, Erbakan’s tenure was ephemeral. His efforts to establish warmer cognations with Iran, Libya and Iraq; open inspiritment of women to wear veils, and opposition to Turkish membership in the EU steadily alienated secular political elites and his coalition regime crumbled in June 1997. The following year, Turkey’s Constitutional Court ostracized the Welfare Party. Albeit Erbakan expeditiously organized its reincarnation as the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi), his political star had fallen. In the 1999 parliamentary elections, Virtue placed third abaft the Democratic Left Party (DSP) of Bulent Ecevit and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) of Devlet Bahceli.²

When the Virtue Party was prohibited in 2001, Erbakan composed yet another metempsychosis, the Felicity Party Saadet Partisi, but this time the caducity politician faced a revolution against his command by a modernist section of younger Islamist protesters, led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül. This "incipient Guard" had long pushed for a more democratic, decentralized, and transparent party structure, but encountered stiff opposition from Erbakan and his cohorts. They additionally remonstrated to Erbakan’s anti-Western policies. While the old sentinel verbalized

¹ Aman, op.cit. p. 78.
about international Muslim solidarity, Erdoğan and his allies were interested in encouraging Turkey’s economic integration with the West.

Justice and Development leadership has stopped acts of self-identification since the party’s foundation in August 2001. Having been forcibly abstracted from power during the post-modern coup of February 28, 1997 and losing a series of closure cases over the years, the political movement that established the AK Party as a way out of crisis long sought to explicate which principles it did not advocate in exchange for describing what precisely its platform entailed.

The AK Party’s early years demonstrated an effort by the movement to shelter itself from the perpetrators of the 1997 military coup who limpidly did not intend to retire just yet. Concurrently, the party reached out to social groups that, in line with the foundation explanation, had determined the Islamic movement as an intimidation to society. During this period the primary objective was to receive support from the majority whose quest for reliable political actors had transformed to an ideology by itself.

It was this set of advantages which forced the AK Party to ignore the question of political identity for several years – to such an extent that it even separated from its self-proclaimed concept of conservative democracy which was the product of an accelerated search for a way to move away from the tradition of national perspective. The AK Party’s credentials as a mass party, additionally, raised the question of identity to the background. Determining the need of a great number and multiple audience, the AK Party leadership strived to ascertain adequate representation for all social groups with whom they could work on the substratum of democratization.¹

Although the AK Party has stopped developing a stringently defined identity as a result of its core political incorporation and its objective to be a broad-predicated political impact, it has always had certain political missions such as bringing the state and society together, activating politics by getting rid of illicit power elites that have subsided in politics and normalizing the cognations between the public, politics and state.

¹ Evan F Kohlman, op.cit. p.22.
The AK Party has established vigorous bonds with society throughout this time while it has abstained from defining a certain identity. The AK Party’s mission to struggle with tutelage has provided it with a convivial grassroots predicate that has fortified it with political priorities. The AK Party has superseded its desideratum for identity with political mission, and thus, it has given political responsibility to its base and has dispensed the jeopardy of constricting its gregarious base by confining itself to an absolutely determined identity.

After the constitutional referendum in 2010, the severe attacks against the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AK Party caused the party’s mission to be converted as a form of identity in the course of time. Erdoğan and other senior officials of the AK Party refused this offer for a political shaft as they were determined on establishing a “new” Turkey. In addition, the party’s ground held rigorously to this decision. All of these developments allowed the opportunity for the AK Party to determine its identity. As these lines emerged in a state of struggle, they had a characteristic that limited the AK Party’s political prospects. ¹

While conducting the presidential election, the AK Party congress and presenting ceremonies are all consummated in favor of Erdoğan and the AK Party, it is possible to say that this conflict has arrived at an ending. What the AK Party needs now is a new definition of identity accompanied by the need to establishing the “new” Turkey to complete its political prospects.

In contrast to the settlement politics, constructive politics entails a negative political vision that is independent from conjuncture. This requires a limpidly defined political vision. The message that Erdoğan and Davutoğlu distributed at the AK Party congress gave pleasant clues to determine the measures of the AK Party’s identity. One of the advantages of the AK Party for the next period is to give meaning to its political identity in accordance with the foundation of a "new" Turkey. ²

The AK Party, which commenced the most inclusive democratization and transmuted process in the history of the Turkey, has been prosperous at five elections since its substructure in 2001. AK Party has incremented its votes in three consecutive elections and has been in office during these terms. The “conservative democrat”

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² Ibid. p. 330.
political identity that AK Party developed has now been completely funded and become a political character. It is a source of inspiration for regional countries.

The conservative-democrat political identity that AK Party has been attempting to develop has engaged characteristics with other activities of conservatism in the world. That said, this political merit has been structured by Turkey’s socio-cultural characteristics and has a political style that has been formed by Turkey’s local dynamics. In most parts of Muslim country, this conservative-democrat understanding participated significantly to the expansion of democratic experience and set a precedent in its region.

Conservatism argues for prohibited regime against all sorts of despotism, leaves alteration to social variables, underscores that liberation will only have meaning in its concrete form and borrow credit to moderate mechanisms such as the family, NGOs and foundations. This political outlook can be accommodated only with democracy. Critical conceiving, ideational and behavioral pluralism, fundamental rights and freedoms as well as a political conception that accounts civility and tolerance have redefined conservatism in a democratic form. AK Party has opted for an incipient type of politics by predicing her civilization values and thus has introduced a variant of political methods in Turkish politics.¹

Reasonable democracy which is in favor of constrained and defined political regime views totalitarian and authoritarian approaches as enemies of democratic politics. Conservative democracy values political legitimacy predicated on the will of the people and the mundane values of humanity.

The rule of law requirements circumscribing regimes and institutions according to objective rules and laws emanating from general values. Additionally, it is not acceptable that the state limits itself to a taboo-like space due to ideological predilections and dictates unduly onto the people. The state should recede to its authentic functions and should be minute, dynamic and efficacious. It should not determine, configure or force its affection on its residents but should be an entity that is determined, controlled and configured by the people.

AK Party has been able to preserve its entity, keep Turkish democracy functioning and take it even further. The fact that the AK Party won consecutive

elections and became a permanent sign of Turkish politics although it had been established just before its first election explain that settlement has been accomplished.

Pro-change politic

AK Party has initiated the most inclusive transformation campaign in Republican history and affected on improvement that has crowned Turkey Republic as an advanced democracy. AK Party does not think conservatism to be opposed to transmute. However, it views conservatism as being opposed to authoritarian and radical change. It has thus consummated “silent revolutions” predicated on a construal of gradual change and social variables.

AK Party has been able to simultaneously execute authentic and standard politics and followed principled and convenient politics. It has been able to found correct relation between principles, traditions, events and authentic politics and made value-predicated policy culls and maintained its principled stance in the face of regime erosion. AK Party has not abstained from entering systemic quandaries in a comprehensive method. The prosperous fight against the mafia and other unlawful organizations, progress on issues extend from the Cyprus issue to the Armenian question, from the democratic view to civilian-military cognations explaining AK Party’s prioritization for high politics. AK Party concentrates on micro quandaries while completely attracting in macro aspects. ¹

Analysis of AK Party’s Foreign Policy Concept

AK Party explains advanced democracy as an institutionalized and free democracy in which an individual’s necessary, non-transferrable, impervious rights and freedoms can be consummated and forfended against all kinds of the ascendancy of the state. Advanced democracy is one in which the will of the denizen has a direct impact on state institutions not only through elections but additionally through resolitions and controls practiced by inhabitants in every part of public life. ²

AK Party views democracy as an approach that enhances and advances with the wide collaborations of the people. Democracy is a system of tolerance, dialogue and negotiation where the rule of law and principles of administration are formed by the

² Ibid, p.220.
assent and will of the people. In democratic governments, the will of the people is reflected through free and fair elections where the utilization of final ascendancy and implementation power is exercised by institutions composed via elections. All sorts of variations and minority views are bulwarked. 

In democratic governments, the majority cannot impose its will on the minority and vice versa; a pluralist understanding is the criteria where the execution and practice of potency is inspected by objective criteria predicated on macrocosmic judicial norms. NGOs, the media, opinion makers, professional organizations and other identical organizations play a vital role in this process.

Since 2001, AK Party has commenced the most intensive democratization campaign in Republican history and has led many diverse social groups so that democracy can be practiced with all of its institutions and rules in its ideal form. By fracturing the political guidance, AK Party has made it possible for the will of the people to be reflected in institutions and organizations. AK Party has consummated many reforms so that an open and regular society can feature.

AK Party considers in the desideratum for the whole body politic to be converted into a technique which solves quandaries. This perspective has widened the space of politics and incremented the effect, truthfulness and power of the body politic. The misguided notion that labeled the reflection of the will of the people as “ politicization” in a negative view and aimed at eliminating through interest groups bureaucratic oligarchy has lost its power due to the definitive conflict led by AK Party. The development of politics has thus been comprehended as the development of democratic administration that reinforces the will of the people.

With regard to AK Party’s concept of politics, the will of the people is the eventual source of legality. Any other option that could obscure the will of the people cannot be afford. Since 2002, AK Party has consummated leading legislative reforms which were specified in its program. It has taken major steps to extend the rule of law, to improve democracy and human rights, and to expand political freedoms in order to reach proceeding democratic measures. 

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1 Öktem, Kerem, op.cit. p. 224.  
Regarding our perception of contributory democracy, referenda as a medium were given due significance; the will of the people became not only restrained to voting in elections but became a medium for participation through referenda. In order to simplify a felicitous reflection of the will of the people rules, principles and regulations concerning election propaganda, election constraints as well as election security, vote counting and documentation were redesigned with a view to raise transparency. Polling boxes and voting cabins have been amended to modern standards; colored votes have been introduced for parliamentary elections. Political parties and candidates have been accepted to campaign with their local language and accents.¹

Under AK Party regimes Turkey has become a signatory to international anti-corruption conventions. By virtue of these standards Turkey has taken a progressive position in anti-corruption efforts. As a result politics, economy and society have been positively affected. AK Party will further its specified contest against corruption in the path to 2023.

**Political Parties**

Political parties are substantial factors in a democracy. That said, the current constitution and laws provide certain circumscriptions on party regulations, organizations, programs and activities. It seems that political parties are described as if they are mundane bureaucracies, their programs and regulations routine regulations and their activities mundane state activities. A uniform political understanding has been made superior in politics.²

This concept of politics contravenes the idea of political parties as an institution for the people. This is additionally the product of a perception that does not believe politicians can carry the responsibility of the people and thus mistrusts and discredits politics and politicians. AK Party has struggled this concept of politics since its founding. Conserving the will of the people as reflected in the ballot box was visually perceived as sacred. The Party has improved democracy and the will of the people and consummated consequential reforms that have underlined the will of the people.

¹ Error! Bookmark not defined.
It has widened the realm of civic politics and reinstituted reverence for politics and politicians.

AK Party has facilitated the conditions to compose an incipient political party. While prior to these transmutations only individuals who had qualifications obligatory to run for Parliament were sanctioned to compose an incipient party, changes have been introduced to sanction qualified individuals to become members of a political party to establish an incipient party. AK Party aims at transmuting and liberating inhibiting, penalizing and authoritative provisions in the constitution and germane laws dealing with founding an incipient party, preparing party programs and bylaws, party organizations and intra-party democracy. Thus, AK Party wants to further improve and free the political space.¹

One of the most paramount quandaries challenging politics is the provision pertaining to the eligibility of party members. In a democratic country there could be nothing as mundane as denizens seeking to solve their quandaries via political denotes. Keeping denizens out of politics betokens that AK Party debar them from quandary-solving mechanisms determined by the rule of law.

Consequently, penalties which constraint political participation and exercising politics will be abolished. Except for the judiciary, security bureaucracy and convicts, AK Party aim at repealing inhibiting arrangements for all people who want to become a member or administrator of a political party.

In the Constitution and the Political Parties Law, there are many circumscribing stipulations. Most of these penalties are infeasible to implement and reflect a mentality that aims at cutting the voice of politics. Such penalties narrow the scope of politics. These penalties and inhibitions which are not in accordance with democracy and the rule of law will be eliminated.

**Elections**

AK Party aim at eliminating problematic legal provisions which pertain to election system and elections, constraints to the right to be elected and elect as well as adjustments that would make representation more just. AK Party will make amendments and transmutes to the Constitution, Law 298 on Fundamental Precepts of

¹ Stephen Vertigans, op.cit. p.198.

AK Party abolished all anti-democratic barriers and circumscriptions to the right to elect and to be elected. Legal amendments will be introduced that will ease better democratic representation, and increment democratic measures, facilitating closer cognations between MPs and the people. Legal changes will be commenced that will permit the Higher Election Council, responsible for the administration and inspection of elections, to consummate its obligations preponderant. In order to democratize the Higher Election Council, make it more transparent and amend its efficiency, a standing structure will be established that would sanction members of the judiciary and candidates suggested by the Parliament to become members.¹

Party Program

Turkey is experiencing a great desire for change within acrimonious times. The serious problems in politics, economy and social life are adversely affecting the daily lives and futures of citizens. Turkey is yearning for a dynamic 'political formation', having the vision to overcome these problems, to provide peace, security and welfare for its citizens, to allow them to look securely to their futures.

In the meantime, when concepts are vacated of their substance, when values are wizened, when words lose their content, Turkey exigently requires an incipient and fresh understanding; a determined activity able to optically discern the present and future limpidly; an honorable conflict; a domestic and authentic cadre equipped with contemporary recognition; and, authentic programs and projects opening new scopes.

All of these goals can be achieved through an incipient and dynamic political will to commence the economical development movement; to redress the incongruous distribution of income; to eradicate penuriousness; to eliminate disgruntlements; which is amalgamating, embracing, ascertaining convivial placidity, providing trust between institutions and the denizens. With all its colors, homogeneous attributes and differences, briefly with its unique wealth, Turkey has the potential of a candidate to be the pioneer within its own borders, in its region and the whole world, of

innovation, development, tranquility and welfare. To accomplish all of the above, Turkey needs to be governed by cadres possessing political will and determination.

- Turkey’s problems can be fixed.
- Turkey has valuable surface and underground natural resources.
- Turkey has a young and active people.
- Turkey has a very rich historical and cultural background.
- Turkey has an inveterate and rich tradition of government.
- Turkey has a high entrepreneurial potential with a high amplitude for international contest.
- Turkey has a geo-strategic position, which may help it to play an effective role in its region.
- Turkey is an attractive place for tourism with its unique natural beauty and historic structure.
- The qualities of social coherence and mutual assistance, which are terms of public’s national and religious character, are very important assets.
- Nation has achieved prosperity in many impossible situations throughout history.

Subsequently, AK Party is not incompetent. They absolutely must get this astronomically immense potential in motion. This is the reason for the subsistence of the party in the political scene. AK Party is tenacious to mobilize the immensely colossal potential of Turkey, in order to make people delighted and renovate the respectability of the country.¹

Established along the lines of a common social desire, in order to react with this requisite, the Party is the Party of all Turkish people, living within the same geography for millennia, in placidity, harmony and brotherhood, sharing a joint capacity, whose bliss, dolefulness and pride is prevalent.

With its veracious, dynamic, high-principled cadres and a political view to open the scopes of our country, AK Party’s objective is to put a cessation to the

¹ Cross Nur B., Parameters of Turkish Foreign Policy Under the AKP Governments, UNISCI Discussion Papers, p. 23.
troubles suffered by Turkish people for several years, to develop the problem solving and decision making ability of the political system, to extract all the barriers prohibiting the development of Turkey, to bring it into the progress it deserves.\footnote{Jenny B. White. \textit{Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics}. University of Washington Press. 2003. p.299.}

AK Party aims to provide authentic and persistent solutions to the country’s quandaries, parallel to the world’s realities, with the accumulation of the past and tradition, making public accommodation its rudimental purport, conducting political activities based on the recent democratic values, rather than ideological platforms.

Because of this singularity, the Party includes without discrimination, all of our citizens, regardless of their sex, ethnic origin, faith and opinion. On the substructure of this pluralistic concept, it is one of the Party’s essential objectives to improve the consciousness of citizenship and to apportion with all our countrymen, the pride to possess and belong to the country where AK Party lives. (AKP Party)

One of the main principles of the Party is the prudence, 'Unless everyone is free, no one is free’. AK Party considers as one of its most consequential tasks, the assurance of democratization by placing the individual at the center of all its policies, and to provide and protect fundamental human rights and freedoms.

AK Party represents a ground where the unity and the solidity of the Republic of Turkey, the secular, democratic, social State of law, and the processes of civilianization, democratization, liberation of credence and constancy of opportunity are considered fundamental.

Insufficiency destroying societies and regimes, such as decadence, corruption, irregularities, exploitation, inequality in front of the law, inequality of opportunities racism, partisanship, despotism are the areas where the Party will fight against most intensely. Our public is not helpless. The solution reposes with the people itself. As Great Atatürk has commented, the intensity to preserve the country is in its own resoluteness and tenaciousness.

Identifying with the people, The Party before everything else will definitely reestablish the sense of trust, which disappeared in society. AK Party are resolved and determined to ensure that everyone can look at the future with security, and that everyone can feel as a respectable and properly treated member of this society.

AK Party has a concept of governance, which facilitates, rather than make things more exhausting; embraces rather than push away; integrates rather than
divide; protecting the fair impotent against the inequitable potent. In order to achieve all of the above, AK Party present a political program to:

- Spread a construal predicated on macrocosmic rights and freedoms to all areas,
- Eliminate entirely all the chronic quandaries faced by Turkey,
- Mobilize the human and physical resources left dormant for years, and make Turkey a country which engenders perpetually and which grows by engendering. Eliminate the gap in the distribution of income, thus raise the welfare level of our people
- Involve denizens and nongovernmental organizations in the public administration and engender synergy within society,
- Make the concept of full transparency and accountability prevalent in every area of public life,
- Provide contemporary, rational, and authentic and facile to implement solutions in areas such as the economy, peregrine policy, culture, arts, inculcation, health, agriculture and animal husbandry. ¹
- AK Party believes firmly that this program will solve Turkey’s problems and open the way for its advancement. AK Party expects that this program, which AK Party present for the assessment of our public, will be a brand new start for Turkey. AK Party perceives democratization as furnishing Turkey’s democracy to the full extent with all of these characteristics. The party has some policies; in light of the following principles considered as crucial in contemporary democracies, but which are before all else, the fundamental conditions of respecting the choice of citizens:
  - The field of movement and action of political parties which perform the essential function in the participation of citizens into politics, and which are crucial elements of democracy, shall be expanded.
  - The party impart to its provincial branches a concept of governance based on dialogue, to meet the demands of local administrations, local civilian formations and citizens.

Taking as a basis the principles pertaining to the democratization of the Copenhagen Criteria which constitute the minimum standards to which members of the European Union must conform, amendments which must be made in our national judicial system shall be carried out in the shortest possible time.

- It shall be made easier to have access to information and documents in order for citizens to participate in the administration and to inspect the administration, thus arrangements shall be carried out to allow citizens to effectively use their right to access to the information.

- Local administrations are the foundation of a participatory and highly representative democracy. All the required constitutional and legal arrangements shall be carried out and functional new administrative units shall be created with a view to strengthen the local administrations which will establish a link in daily life between citizens and the administration.

- Mechanisms shall be engendered with a view to assessing the opinion, complaints and suggestions for solutions of the denizens on subjects cognate to their own villages, districts, provinces, and institutions whose accommodations they utilize or where they are employed and to take action on such suggestions.

- Opinions of the non-governmental organizations shall be obtained in order to modify the cognate licit arrangements and a licit framework shall be drawn up to raise the civil society organizations to the caliber at contemporary democratic countries.

- Central and local regimes shall engender joint boards, commissions, crisis management desks and all types of platforms where the views of non-governmental organizations, professional sodalities, trade amalgamations and representatives of the private sector shall be taken.

- The law of the civil servants shall be determined; their right to organize in trade amalgamations will be re-examined.
• With the lowering of the age to be elected to 25, adolescent people will actively participate in democratic processes and the puerile population will be enhanced to take responsibility in the running of the country.¹
• Required licit arrangements shall be carried out for the more efficacious utilization of the right to organize meetings and demonstrations, which is one of the fundamental features of democracies.

Political System

For about 200 years, a live dispute over administrative and political systems has been perpetuating. Although Turkish political history has had at times vigorous and stable regimes, overall AK Party has had unstable, impotent and ineffective coalition regimes.

Turkey always grew and developed during times of political steadiness and vigorous regime. The Menderes years, the Özal era and the AK Party era are concrete examples that prove our point. When there was no political stability and vigorous regime, AK Party have always had political, economic and gregarious crises where the country as a whole has lost. Regimes which were multi-party, prosaic, without expeditious decision-making reflexes and political will were open to all sorts of anti-democratic interventions and overshadowed by political guardianship.²

It is no coincidence that political, economic and social recession incremented during such periods. Such periods were expensive for Turkey both domestically and internationally. In light of political experiences and history, the debate to find the right recipe for a system that would engender political stability has been perpetuating in the country for years. Through political and legal reforms, AK Party has removed the barriers for a fruitful debate and thus made fundamental participations to the discussion.

For Turkey to reach its 2023 goal, it requires vigorous regimes that can create equity, trust and stability. Turkey needs operative and vigorous regimes in order to solve its current predicaments and consummate its regional and ecumenical ambitions. Following the referendum that previses the election of the president by

¹ Graham E. Fuller, op.cit. p.315.
² ZİYA ÖNİŞ, Multiple Faces Of the New Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics And A Critique, 2010. p.87.
public vote, a change in the political system has become a necessity. AK Party needs to discuss the pattern and political system which constitute Turkey’s future. Thus, the options of a party-affiliated presidency, semi-presidential system should be argued within this scope.

The aim of this argument should be to convert political stability from being a temporal phenomenon to an institutional one. It is a must for Turkey to transform to a system of governance that would not be disabled by impotent and powerless regimes open to intervention. Rather, AK Party need a political system would reflect the will of the people more efficaciously where there would be absolute dissonance and independence between legislature and executive potency, where the executive would be totally controlled by the legislature, where there would be settled, efficacious and potent executive, where there would be an ability to take expeditious and intrepid decisions to solve quandaries and avoid crises and where accountability and transparency would be paramount.¹

AK Party considers that there is a structural problem in Turkey’s political system and it is thus seeking a structural treatment to the problem. Thus, either a presidential, semi-presidential or party-affiliated presidency select should be chosen and executed.

**Relations with the European Union:**

AK Party accepts the European Coalescence project as a prosperity stage. After decades of great wars and conflicts, a project like the EU to integrate all European nations could have been possible only with a great vision for the future. Today, people refer to the EU project when they talk about tranquility, solidarity and economic development in countries.

It is AK Party that has put for the first time Turkey’s 50-year old variant relationship with the EU in a comprehensive strategic context and made it part of its strategic perspective. AK Party has taken concrete procedures to realize the EU vision in tandem with Turkey’s needs and priorities. Legal reforms and new regulations have

¹ Ibid. p. 95.
been passed as part of the EU’s settlement and they have raised strengthened Turkey’s
democratic standards.¹

AK Party’s strategic goal is plenary membership in the EU. Despite the
barriers produced from the EU itself, the political will and tenaciousness which AK
Party described in 2005 for negotiations remains vigorous and will not transferred.

Over the last seven years since AK Party commenced accession arguments, AK
Party has taken bold and authentic procedures. AK Party expect the same from the
EU, i.e., to act with the vision and leadership that engendered the EU. It is an
inconsistency of EU’s own principles to make Turkey an instrument of European
domestic politics. This posture engenders a sense of mistrust and suspicion in the
Turkish public. EU bellwethers should show fortitude and leadership and the
negotiations should move forward.

Political Vision

At this critical phase in the modern history of the Middle East, AK Party has
supported the people against the status quo and oppression and fortified the people’s
legitimate needs for change. Three principals have guided our approach to the Arab
revolutions:

- Transforming in the region is ineluctably foreordained. No regime that
  oppresses and kills its own people and omits the astronomical majority of the
  people from political participation can have a chance to continue. This
  process of change must take place peacefully and with national consensus.
- Both the switch period and the post-revolutionary phase should include all
  members of the society without discrimination and omission. (AK Party)

The first guidance refers to the desire for change, the second to the will of the
people, and the third to pluralist and overall politics. It goes without saying that each
country has its own particular circumstances and they should be put in consideration.
AK Party called for a dynamic politics in this historic period. AK Party executed

these standards while taking into account the incipient integrated dynamics and factors.¹

What AK Party said in Tunisia, AK Party said the same thing in Egypt? AK Party upheld the same position in Libya and fortified the people’s legitimate demands for change. Today, AK Party upholds the same principle in regards to Syria. AK Party firmly thinks that the Syrian people deserve equity, liberation, dignity and prosperity as much as others.

When the events commenced in Syria, AK Party insisted on the regime to implement solemn reforms and establish national dialogue and consensus. AK Party made every effort for a secure transition by holding special meetings, telephone diplomacy and through special delegates. But in lieu of heedfully aurally perceiving its people’s needs and working for tranquil change, the Syrian regime opted to kill its own people.

Against the Syrian regime’s brutal policies of killing, collective penalization and political games, Turkey took a clear stance in coherence with the people of Syria. AK Party opened borders to thousands of refugees coming from their country. As a human and moral responsibility, AK Party has accepted the Syrian brothers and sisters into country and will persist to do so until the Syrian conflict is determined.

AK Party attaches major significance to Syria’s territorial solidity, political supremacy and societal conformity. Like in other parts of the Middle East, all members of Syrian society are identical regardless of their religion, sect or ethnicity. They are brothers and sisters. As a veracious friend and neighbor, Turkey will perpetuate to work for a free, fair, democratic and flourishing Syria.

AK Party’s foreign policy is predicated on pursuing a positive agenda without precondition. AK Party declines any sort of prejudice against any country. AK Party has no quarrel with any nation, country or group of people and AK Party believe AK Party can solve political variations through dialogue and diplomacy. AK Party rejects policies that advocate distribution and stress in the country.

¹ Alev Cinar, op.cit. p.211.
AK Party refuses those approaches that seek to turn variations in the Muslim world into a source of struggle and war. They optically discern the recent events in the region as a process of normalization. Turkey is pacified with its own history and geography. As a result, the cognations with the peoples and countries in the region are additionally becoming common again.¹

This is a component of a considerable process of normalization of the social and political dynamics of the Afro-Euro-Asian region. Needless to say, Turkey is at the center of this process. Everyone benefit from normalization and the spread of equity. No one should be worried about the structural changes taking place in the most regions. Middle East conceives is predicated on a ‘win-win’ philosophy and a policy of mutual stabilization whereby everyone acquires victory. The master goal is to establish equity, parity and democracy as a principle of politics and diplomacy.

AK Party will perpetuate to embrace all the peoples and colors of the Middle East and beyond regardless of their religion, sect, ethnicity, language and culture. AK Party perpetuated to treat them as equals and as brothers and sisters. “Unity-in-diversity” remains the main standard. AK Party perpetuated to seeks to make the Middle East and North Africa a base of tranquility, stability, wealth, creativity, high culture and civilization.²

The East and the Southeast:

Some of us call the Southeastern, others call the Kurdish or the terror quandary, is regrettably a fact in Turkey. In cognizance of the negative issues caused by this quandary in our gregarious life, the Party shall follow a policy preserving the welfare, rights and freedoms of the regional population, in a manner not to cause impotency in a potential policy which transcends the identification of the authenticity the obviation of the terror menacing the region, the integrity of Turkey, as well as the unitary State structure; a potential policy which transcends the consistency of the reality respectful to the sensitivities of the entire society, efficient and strive at settlement of the

¹ ibid. p.225
problems at the root. (Turkey and Europe: English Translation of the Program of AKP (Prime Minister Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party) )

The cultural diversity in this region is enhanced by the Party. On condition that Turkish remains the official and directive language, the Party respects the cultural activities in languages other than Turkish, including transmission, as an asset which supports and fortifies the identity of our country, rather than emasculate it. The elimination of certain troubles originating from the under-development of the region, are purposed to be solved within the range of the general democratization project, rather than specific arrangements aimed at the region.

Regardless of the scare which continued for long years and was maintained with an vigorous outside support, the fact that the region’s population is appended to the unitary State structure, and the fact that the quandary did not turn into an ethnic conflict with the ordinary sense of our people, is evidence that the issue can be solved as an internal cause.

AK Party strives at preventing certain practices which are resorted to as a reaction to terror but, which transcend their pristine purport, and which perturb the region’s population. It withal aims at eliminating completely the State of Emergency practices, which have been maintained for many years. AK Party believes that our State must exhibit a deterrent posture towards malefactors and a preservative situation towards innocents and must treat inculpable people with affection. (Turkey and Europe: English Translation of the Program of AKP (Prime Minister Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party) )

After the sturdy terror, no consequential steps have been taken in our Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian Regions to eliminate the variations in development between the regions, even to decrease them. The Party shall provide the needed reconstitution by starting critical economic projects to increment employment aimed at the region, and implementations to reduce the suffering of our people who have been hurt from the terror circumference.

Lack of public services, unemployment, poorness and persecution are situations where terror can prosper most conveniently. Terror and oppression respectively victual one another. Any approach, which ignores that terror is a consequence, turns
to engendering solutions with only oppression. Consequently, this only promotes terror. Thus, the way to stop terror requires an approach by the State, reverent of fundamental rights and freedoms, and a way of mentally conceiving, which views economic development and security as pieces of the same whole. (Turkey and Europe: English Translation of the Program of AKP (Prime Minister Erdőgan’s Justice and Development Party) )

In order to recognize the region fascinating for commercial and economic activities, it must no longer look as a dead end street, a dynamic trading environment shall be engendered with neighboring countries, including border trade. Consequently, the Party shall take all kinds of precautions for the promotion of trade in the region.

Since solutions predicated on a perception of a bureaucratic and authoritarian State rely solely on the concept of security, in the long term they exacerbate the quandaries even further. On the other hand, approaches predicated on the perceptions of a democratic State; end up in reinforcing the unity and integrity of our nation in the long term, albeit they may be met with concern initially. Thus it is an indispensable step in the solution of the quandary to realize that the quandaries in the region cannot be completely solved with just economic development policies, and that above all, methods, which perceive cultural differences within the scope of the democratic State of law, should dominate. Cultural diversities do not require that what AK Party has in prevalence with the region’s population should be driven to the background. On the contrary, being a citizen of the Republic of Turkey is the cement of our society. (Turkey and Europe: English Translation of the Program of AKP (Prime Minister Erdőgan’s Justice and Development Party) )
Conclusion

Turkey is a country with a very opulent material and spiritual potential, mainly from its youth and dynamic population. The Republic is one of the most fundamental acquisitions AK Party obtained within thousands of years. Despite all the efforts and developments, AK Party believes that the dimensions taken until today for our Republic to become a democratic republic is quite inappropriate.

AK party aims at endowing Turkey with through the political standards and recommendations, which a democratic framework predicated on the distinction of the law, on human rights and freedoms this program sincerely adopts. Based on the idea, ’let the people live so that the State can live’, AK Party has placed the individuals at the center of all its policies. Led by the liberation of cerebrated, expression, credence, edification, organization and enterprise, AK Party considers all of the civil and political freedoms as the fundamental condition of pluralism, tranquility and pacifying. All these freedoms are essential conditions for everyone, to transform Turkey into a great hope for the future.

AK Party considers all people of Turkey as first class citizens, regardless of differences in religion, language, sect, regional, ethnic inception or sex. In our democratic perspective there is no obligation for differences to be transformed to one another. This is the culture of the different living together in tranquility, filtered through our experience in history. Conserving the persecuted ones from the oppressors is one of our crucial principles. Thus, our program targets the placidity and bliss of everyone, rather than the peace and bliss of just a group or section.

In the concept of regime to be executed within the scope of this program by the Party, the State shall be a vigorous State in terms of its function and efficacy for engendering high quality accommodations, rather than being an immensely colossal and slow State. The State will be in the position of an orchestra conductor, within the concept of an administration predicated on pluralism and multi voiced opinions in the framework of deference for the integrity of the country and national sovereignty. A State should adjust, control, and engender opportunities. It should support entrepreneurs and open their ways rather than imposing one way to be complied. Providing equal advantages to anyone is a requisite of the prevalent democratic
concept of the 21st Century. This is in fact what will bring our nation to the place it deserves on the world scene.

AKP program aims at mobilizing profoundly and astronomically immense economic potential of Turkey, to grow and make an incipient attack by bringing the costs brought on by globalization to the minimum. The costs brought on by globalization disciplining public spending, obviating waste at every caliber, fortifying enterprises at all directions, installing an earnings system predicated on creation rather than accumulating interest, exhibiting the maximum sensitivity in borrowing, reducing taxation rates while widening the tax base, eliminating the iniquity in the distribution of income, ending penuriousness and all types of corruption, taking productivity as a substructure, are among the economic standards of the program.

The most essential aspect of AKP program is that it does not include figurative language, which cannot be turned to action. Its correctness; realism and applicability are the salient characteristic of the Party’s policies. Our people ken very well that our word is identically tantamount to our essence. AK Party is a movement of cadres taking its power from the people. Therefore, principles rather than stringent judgments; collective sapience rather than monopolistic astuteness is prevalent.

Turkey’s greatest issue is the diffidence. When the State’s confidence towards the people, and the people’s confidence towards the State are renovated, when the people’s demands coincide with the agenda of the politics, Turkey’s walk to the summit in the international race shall definitely be realized. AK Party has an affection called the ‘Zealousness for Turkey’. AK Party is commencing an ambulation towards effulgent horizons with sincerity with fortitude. The accolade and pride at the finish line shall belong to everyone who commences out with us.

AK Party is not and shall not be a party coercing ideologies or distributing favors. The Party is a party of masses, which considers helping Turkey as in the scope of this program. AK Party rejects separation created by the Cold War period, predicated on the old political ideology. Everyone who believes in democracy, reverences human rights and freedoms, adopts pluralistic values, possesses ethical and human emotions, is affixed to the market economy, and has a place under the roof of this Party.
It is among AK Party’s most significant goals to proceed to the center of politics the masses the reverent of republican of Turkey a reverent of national, spiritual and general values. This program is a ‘democratization and enterprise’ project prepared by cadres, which are veracious, principled, sensitive in the subject of domestic values, cognizant of ecumenical dynamics, grasping very well the geography and age in which they are living, in order for our great nation to take the place it deserves in the international community and for our country to ‘promote the level of contemporaneous civilization’. It is up to us to make efforts, to get tired, to conduct principled politics and to be resolute; the appreciation is from our people.¹

¹ N. Balkan; S. Savran, op.cit. p.230.
Chapter Three

Turkey and the Eastern Direction

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The Middle East and Turkey:

For several years, Turkey has played a significant role in the rapidly changing politics of the Middle East. Recent crises in Egypt, Syria and Iraq have made Turkey a fundamental factor of stability in a region of perpetually transforming ground. While its role in the region was once praised as both positive and constructive, in the course of the last year or so, Turkey’s position has suffered.

Turkey is a significant factor in its region, even if the West is split over what region the country actually belongs to; a member of NATO and, bizarrely, (like Israel) playing football in European competitions but not accepted as a member of the EU. Nevertheless, Turkey’s geopolitical and geostrategic position means that it has interests in events affecting the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. As a result, Turkey has been trying to get involved in every issue across multiple regions as much as possible.

Palestine-Israel conflict has been an earnest challenge for policy-makers since the substructure of the State of Israel in 1948. The occupation of Palestine and the consequent flood of refugees to neighboring countries, in 1948 and again in 1967, has led to the deaths of many Palestinians – men, women and children – at the hands of Israeli soldiers and settlers. According to Turkish Peregrine Minister Ahmad Davutoğlu’s theory, Turkey has to preserve the former Ottoman Empire’s territories and use diplomatic methods to seek perpetual peace for the Holy Land. The perpetual oppression of Palestinians by the Israeli occupiers has thus posed a problem for Turkish Foreign Policy and given the Palestinian-Israeli conflict a special place therein. (Kaya, 2009)

Another significant aspect of Turkey’s vital role in the Middle East is its work towards the scenes as an arbitrator and facilitator for verbalizes between Syria and Israel; this was the position until the Israeli assault against and incursion of Gaza in December 2008-January 2009. Turkey felt that its efforts with peace negotiations were efficaciously eradicated by Israel’s aggression, and Syria withdrawn from the negotiations. Syria’s Golan Heights – occupied by Israel since 1967- are very paramount because Israel controls vital water resources originating there. (Kaya, 2009)
Turkey supposes that it has to play a more vital role in the reconciliation process between Israel and the Arab world. The regime in Ankara enhances the “two state solution” for Palestine and Israel. Ideally, Turkey would approve of Israel’s withdrawal to its 1967 borders; Jerusalem would have international status; and Israel would repatriate all Palestinian political prisoners. At the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2009, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan shocked the West by storming out after a strong confrontation with Israel’s president when he felt the latter was being given several opportunities to bulwark Israel’s aggression in Gaza. Ever since, Muslims around the world and the leaders of the Arab countries have considered Erdoğan as a defender of Palestinian rights.¹

Turkish policy is to achieve unity between the Palestinian political factions, although it regards Hamas as a problem in the reconciliation process; Ankara believes that Mahmoud Abbas’s Fatah is more open to placidity. Though, Turkey wants to unify Hamas and Fatah because a divided Palestine cannot withstand the Israeli sanctions. A unified Palestine in every aspect is fundamental for peace to be achieved.

Turkish Foreign Policy depends heavily on Palestinian President Abbas staying on in the role, although he has said that he wants to step down at the next election (which he has deferred indefinitely in any case). In terms of seeking peace with Israel, Abbas has played a significant role, preferred by the Israelis and their Western backers primarily, one suspects, because he is intended to perpetuate to talk although he never genuinely achieves anything concrete for his people. Despite this conspicuous drawback, the Turkish regime regards Abbas as a paramount player in the search for peace and his resumption as president of the Palestinian Government is a key part of Turkish Foreign Policy.²

It is possible that Palestine-Israel negotiations will perpetuate in Ankara, away from excessive pressure from Western regimes. Turkey believes that its historical background of authority within the Middle East gives it a unique status to act as a critical intermediary. Diplomacy is the significant feature of Turkish Foreign Policy in

² Ibid. p.250.
the Middle East and if Turkey can achieve peace and, in the process, lose neither Israel nor Palestine, its position as a regional power will be promoted.

**Relations between Turkey and Iraq**

Turkey has been influenced more than any other country in the region by the complicated problems resulted from the wars, embargoes and internal strife in Iraq over the past few decades. Therefore, reconquest of security and stability in Iraq is among the advantages of Turkish Foreign policy. Preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity, reinforcing its democracy, ascertaining its stability, security and prosperity and Iraq’s re-integration with its neighbors and the international community constitute the main parameters of our approach vis-à-vis Iraq. In this framework, Turkey substantially reinforces Iraq’s sovereignty, stability, political unity and territorial integrity. We mention significance to remaining in equally close distance to all segments of the Iraqi society, regardless of their ethnic or sectarian backgrounds.

“Iraq’s Neighboring Countries Process”, which was initiated by Turkey on the eve of Iraq’s invasion in 2003, played an important role in coordinating the efforts of Iraq’s neighbors and other interested countries, as well as international organizations, in contributing to stability and development of Iraq until 2008. (Relations between Turkey and Iraq)

Establishment of the “High Level Strategic Cooperation Council” with Iraq in 2008 and signing in this context of 48 Memoranda of Understanding in a broad configuration of cooperation fields, ranging from security to energy in 2009, opening of a Consulate-General in Erbil in 2010 in integration to those in Mosul and Basra, are paramount milestones in our bilateral cognations. These steps are aimed at providing a long-term mutually advantageous strategic partnership between Turkey and Iraq, through development of bilateral cognations in all fields. (Relations between Turkey and Iraq)

By 2011, Iraq has become the second most immensely massive export market of Turkey. In addition, Turkish companies additionally play a crucial and increasingly visible role in Iraq’s reconstruction and development. Cooperation between Turkey and Iraq in the energy sector is additionally expanding. Iraq is one of the richest countries in the world in terms of hydrocarbon resources, but it has to develop its
infrastructure, promote productivity and refining capacity and build incipient strategic pipelines. Turkey, with its potent private and public companies, offers leading opportunities for cooperation in all those fields. Turkey can play a prominent role in distributing Iraqi oil and gas to international markets, thereby contributing both to the welfare of Iraq as well as to the energy security of Europe and the world through supply and route diversification.¹

The presence of the terrorist organization PKK in the north of Iraq from where it stages attacks against Turkey constitutes an earnest stumbling block in Turkish-Iraqi cognations. Turkey, Iraq and the United States have established a Trilateral Mechanism to develop cooperation with a view to eradicating the presence of this terrorist organization on Iraqi territories. The Trilateral Mechanism perpetuates to function in the aftermath of the withdrawal of the U.S. military forces from Iraq. Turkey is additionally engaged with the Kurdish Regional Regime of Iraq in order to support engender a positive ground for these efforts. (Relations between Turkey and Iraq)

In international relations, discussions about what drives foreign policy, political concern, or identity fall into two categories. On one side lies the notion that foreign policy making is control by rational calculations about how to maximize political issues. On the other side is the conception that decision-making is in fact defined by an actor’s identity, leading to a more subjective approach to international relations.

In fact, what indeed influences foreign policy making is a coalescence of the two: calculations about political interest and gain onto which the actor’s identity and self are projected. In Turkey, notions of identity are among the most influential and ascendant factors at play in domestic politics. Mainstream media, politicians, and even those who challenge the status quo perpetually use identity politics in evaluating policy.

The country’s Justice and Development Party AKP owe a large part of its prosperity to the position it has achieved for itself. It depends on three factors: neo-liberal capitalism, Sunni Islam and a version of conservative liberalism. Different

sides of this identity are confirmed in different conditions, depending on a policy’s target audience. Latest developments in relations between Iraq and Turkey, particularly vis a vis the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of northern Iraq, are a rare instance where all aspects of the AKP’s identity have intertwined with its political interests.¹

The pleasant interaction between these identities and broader regional developments has shown through the institution of arguably argumentative cognations between the regimes of Iraq, Turkey, and the KRG. Economic cooperation and energy deals between Turkey and the KRG and the Turkish government’s posture toward Iraqi politician Tariq al-Hashimi and Kurdish politician Masud Barzani provide fascinating samples of how the AKP has managed its foreign policy by weaving together national concerns and identity.

Turkey’s first preference in Iraq appears to be countering, mitigating, and averting threats or potential threats to Turkey’s security and political unity from Kurds predicated in northern Iraq. Such threats or potential threats include the PKK’s safe haven, but also probably the possibility that deeper KRG-PKK partnership against the Islamic State or a potential KRG declaration of independence could worsen the already alarming Turkey-PKK violence by further emboldening nationalist or irredentist sentiment among Kurds in Turkey. Outright Iraqi Kurdish independence became more of a long-term possibility when the oil-opulent city of Kirkuk came under KRG control in June 2014. However, for now KRG bellwethers may prefer utilizing the threat of independence to maximize their privileges within a federal Iraq to taking on the full liabilities of sovereignty while sandwiched between considerably more great and more big countries Turkey, Iran and Iraq in a generally inhospitable and largely chaotic region.

Despite or perhaps because of Turkish interests concerning Kurdish threats emanating from Iraq, the paramount to Turkey of its political and economic partnership with the KRG and of northern Iraq’s territorial buffer appears to have incentivized Turkey to ascertain the KRG’s perpetuated viability in the face of both the IS threat and unpredictability with Iraq’s central regime, albeit this could avail

¹ Ergun Özbudun. Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2000. p.171
eventual KRG independence. To that end, Turkey provides material assistance to the KRG and various minority groups in Iraq (especially Turkmen) to help them endure and repel the Islamic State. Turkey also facilitates the KRG’s transport of oil through pipelines to Turkish ports for international export.¹

In 2014, the United States had supported block Turkey-expedited KRG oil exports because of allegations that they undermined Iraq’s supremacy, but U.S. remonstrations to the practice appear not to have resurfaced after the KRG continued oil exports in 2015. In the meantime, the tardy 2014 Baghdad-KRG deal under which oil would be pooled and revenue shared appears to have collapsed, and the KRG has become more consequential to the U.S.-led anti-IS effort. Some observers notionally theorize that perpetuated Turkish attacks on PKK targets in northern Iraq could strain the Turkey-KRG relationship, especially if Iraqi Kurds perceive that Turkey is increasingly enervating Kurdish anti-IS capacity or threatening civilians. However, the KRG—in line with its The Iraqi regime has also shown other, more symbolic references of animosity toward Turkey. Last year, for instance, the plane of Turkish Energy Minister, Taner Yıldız, was refused ingress to Erbil.

In early January 2014, the oil that had commenced to flow from Northern Iraq to Turkey was ceased at Turkey’s Ceyhan terminal. It was reported that no more oil could flow until Turkey accomplished a decisive deal with the Iraqi regime. Furthermore, Iraq’s oil minister promulgated that the country would be taking legal action against Turkey as well as any oil company participating in the conveyance of oil.

By imperilling its cognitions with the Iraqi regime and perceiving the legitimacy of the KRG, the AKP has enhanced the United States’ concerns over the increasing intensity of the KRG and possible resulting debilitating of Iraq’s national unity. However, for the AKP, the different economic benefits resulting from the agreements as well as the Sunni – Shiite divide between the two governments outweigh such concerns of Iraq’s unity. (Relations between Turkey and Iraq)

• Sunni Islam as a Dividing Factor:

¹ Kilic Bugra Kanat, *Change and Adaptation in Turkish Foreign Policy Paperback*, 2014.p. 220.
The AKP’s Sunni Muslim identity has demonstrated itself in different ways, whether it be through the party’s policies toward the Alevi community in Turkey, the most immensely colossal non Sunni Muslim sect in Turkey, whose theology and performances differ completely from the ascendant Sunni tradition, or its support for Sunni Islamist organizations in Syria.

The significance of the party’s Sunni identity has become most clear, though, in its support for Iraq’s former Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi. The AKP’s rigorous and bold support for the fugitive politician, who has a pending Interpol apprehend warrant and is currently residing in Turkey, contemplates the sectarian predilections of this Sunni Turkish party backing a sidelined Sunni Iraqi politician.

The AKP’s resolution to help al-Hashimi has integrated salt to the wound of relapsing cognations between Baghdad and Ankara. It appears Turkey had nothing to achieve from supporting al-Hashimi. Instead, the AKP’s support for the absconder politician was rooted in how it read Iraq’s perpetual Sunni-Shia power equilibrium. ¹

Formally, the Turkish regime has that its policy toward Iraq prioritizes the country’s territorial unity, internal peace, safety and stability and the development of adequate living standards. The Turkish regime views the role and power of Iraq’s Sunni population as central to ascertaining stability and territorial unity in Iraq. The steady decline of Sunni power in the country has thus pushed the AKP to intervene in Iraq’s internal affairs.

Prime Minister Erdoğan has made numerous public statements regarding the pending trial against Hashimi, who has been charged with organizing a death squad aimed at killing government officials. Erdoğan has stated that al-Hashimi’s involvement in these alleged crimes is “out of the question”. Such claims were not only made in clear disregard of the Iraqi state’s sovereignty, but also put Turkey at odds with Western powers. ²

Turkey failed to respond to Interpol’s red notice about Hashimi that required international cooperation on locating and apprehending the person in question. It also pretended its reluctance to stand with the United States in backing Maliki’s Shia-led

¹ Kilic Bugra Kanat, "Change and Adaptation in Turkish Foreign Policy Paperback ", 2014.
administration in Iraq. As one of the highest stake-holders in establishing the rule of law in Iraq, the United States was unhappy with Turkey’s outrageous decision to not comply.

In the aftermath of the al-Hashimi affair, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu endeavored to modify the AKP’s sectarian process to Iraq. This included visiting the Shiite cities of Najaf and Karbala during his visit to Iraq in November 2013 and meeting with effective Shiite bellwethers, such as Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani. During his tour, Davutoglu withal made verbal expressions that aimed to re-define the relationship between the two countries and undercut the mischievous communal barriers between them.

**A Democratic Face: the Need to Solve the Kurdish Issue**

The task of re-defining identities has also been occurred on a grand scale inside Turkey, where pressure is building to make the country, its constitution, administration, and people more extensive.

During this period, the Kurdish issue has been one of the most imperious challenges. A recent visit to Turkey by KRG President, Masud Barzani, concentrated on how increasing integration has influenced the AKP’s political issues. The desire to approve the entity of the KRG has caused the government to seek and assume positive methods of handling and politically signifying from the distinct Kurdish region.¹

The AKP has been seeking to deal with its domestic Kurdish issue for several years now. However, its policies have been torn between discordant aims and concerns. From one side, the AKP would like to win promoted votes from Kurdish precinct, which it can only hope to do by giving Kurds more rights. However, any conversations with the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) (the largest organized representative of Kurdish constituencies in the Turkish parliament) could factually setback the ruling party’s original purpose of granting Kurds greater rights. The BDP is a concurrent for Kurdish votes, and will likely convene the AKP’s goals of low Kurdish voters.

On the other hand, Erdoğan cannot sustain to lose the support of the party’s nationalist and reasonable voters, who may not take kindly to any worthy amendments to Kurdish rights, such as allowing Kurds to be educated in their mother tongue. The AKP is, as such, torn between its will to settle the Kurdish issue, and negative political collapse from dilating more rights to the Kurdish people.

Being in this predicament, the AKP appears to have selected for symbolic signs at supporting Kurdish implication. The government’s decision to invite Masud Barzani as well as Shiwan Perwer (a famous Kurdish singer exiled from Turkey) to visit Turkey played lip favor to the AKP’s claimed related to recognizing Kurdish entity both in Turkey and the region at large.

The BDP was notified of the visit at the very last minute, indicating the AKP wished to constitute a relationship with the Kurdish community in Turkey and in the region without help from the BDP. The BDP kept silent at first and then revealed satisfaction that Shiwan Perwer was allowed to come to Turkey and described Barzani’s visit as socially and politically meaningful. Nevertheless, the BDP’s co-president Selahattin Demirtaş did not shy away from expressing the party’s frustration and disturbance at being so clearly sidelined during the events.¹

Turkey’s main opposition party, The Republican People’s Party (CHP), withal took the opportunity to disapprove the regime and incriminate it of endeavoring to divide the Kurds, a well-known and established approach of control. The co-chairman of the DTK (Democratic Society Congress), a integration of Kurdish civil society organizations, Ahmet Turk, claimed that the AKP had aimed to undermine Kurdish political parties in Turkey by inviting Barzani.

Cognations between Iraq and Turkey have turned frequently over the past few years. The AKP has passed a thin line in order to fulfill its ever-transmuting policy intrigues, traditional voter base, and self-projected identity. Its policies have sought to differentiate energy sources and enhance its popularity among Kurds in Turkey, all the while perpetuating to project itself to the world as a democratizing force,

appealing to its Sunni identity for domestic purposes, and working to preserve its nationalist support base. ¹

The AKP’s at times different, at others debatable, but permanently cognitions with Iraq is an example of how the party’s foreign policy is not the product of a massive ideological project. Rather, it is the product of a sequence of reactions to dynamic and arguably natural tensions between the party’s material political issues and symbolic entity.

**Turkey relations with Syria**

In the first stages of the Syrian controversy, Turkey and various Arab Gulf states reportedly provided direct support to Syrian opposition groups, in some cases reportedly with U.S. simplification or deliberation. At that point, Turkish regimes were allowing utilization of their territory for arms shipments and personnel activities. During 2013 and 2014, as the makeup of the Syrian opposition became increasingly complicated, with jihadist groups emerging as among the most efficacious fighters, Turkey and other regional states were reportedly more gradual than the Coalesced States and other international actors in curtailing activities optically discerned as bolstering Sunni Islamist radicals. This may largely consider priorities they may have to eject the Iran-backed Asad regime. Some reports promoted the potential that Turkish perspicacity may have provided material support to the Islamic State in at least one instance, and possibly exchanged as many as 180 Islamic State fighters to secure the September 2014 relinquishment of 49 hostages taken three months earlier at the Turkish consulate in Mosul, Iraq. (Euronews, 2015)

A few months after the Islamic State’s summer 2014 appropriation of considerable portions of Iraqi territory, Vice President Joe Biden verbalized that Turkey and other countries had participated in a sectarian proxy war in an endeavor to eject Asad, and that President Erdoğan had told him “we let an extravagant quantity of people through, now we are endeavoring to seal the border.” Erdoğan responded by publicly gainsaying that he had made those declarations to Biden, and Biden thereafter issued an apology. Most sources and U.S. officials confess that, in response to international stress and growing Turkish official confession of threats confronting Turkish security by the Islamic State and other jihadists, Turkey has introduced or

bolstered subsisting initiatives over the past year aimed at: 1- averting prospected foreign fighters from entering Turkey, 2- obviating those who enter Turkey from departing to Syria, and 3- curbing illicit oil smuggling used to finance jihadist activities. According to a Turkish regime source, these factors include:

- Compelling a no-entry list (created in 2011) for individuals suspicious of traveling to join radical groups in Syria.
- Instituting “risk analysis units” in April 2014 for the detection of travelers’ possible intent to join Syrian extremist organizations.
- Promoted security at the Syrian border, including the general closure of most border gates, the deployment of additional army units and special operations detachments to border areas, and the ingenuity of physical barriers to counter illegal crossings and contraband.
- Appointing and enhancing “forceful and ongoing measures” (dating from 2012) to curb oil smuggling, including the capture of oil stores and destruction of illegal pipelines. (Euronews, 2015)

Turkish-Syrian cognations have been acerbic since the birth of both modern nations following the First World War. A territorial controversy over the modern Turkish district of Hatay was the first point of conflict. Despite being claimed by Ankara under the Turkish National Pact of 1920, Hatay remained part of the French delegation of Syria until 1938. Even then, the decision of the independent parliament to join Turkey in 1939 was never accepted by Syria and poisoned the cognations for decades.

The sharing of water caused another long-running quandary. Turkey’s building of dams on the Euphrates and Asi rivers, constraining the flow across the frontier, caused dissatisfaction. But perhaps the most decisive retrogradation in the relationship came when Bashar Assad’s father Hafez’s provided bases and support for the PKK Kurdish Workers Party in the 1980s and 1990s during their inconsistency against Turkey. ¹

Turkey’s decision to act against Syria to cut its support to PKK in 1998, changed the dynamic and under threat of military attack Damascus brought to an end

the sanctuary it had offered to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. The two countries signed the Adana protocol to terminate conflicts. As an indicator of the new detente, Turkish president Ahmet Necdet Sezer even attended the funeral of Hafez Assad. During the following 10 years, the two countries were firm allies and Ankara even supported the Assad regime escape international isolation after the assassination of Lebanese prime minister Rafic Hariri. Syria became key to Turkey’s “zero quandaries with neighbours” policy and its entry to the Arab World.

However, the civil war that released in Syria, marked another reversal in the relation between the two regimes. After holding off for a few months in the hope of a settlement, Turkey sided with the popular upheaval and openly backed the abstraction of Assad. The opposition Syrian National Council was allowed to meet in Turkey while borders and bases were opened up to revolt groups. One conclusion of this position was a surge of 2 million refugees into Turkey and the security quandaries that resulted from arms and fighters massing around the border area. As ISIL expanded geographically and militarily, bringing the battle of Kobani onto Turkey’s leading attacks inside the territory, the Erdoğan regime had to review its policy once more.¹

1. **New Plans for Syria**

   After the bombardment in Suruç in which 32 people were killed, Turkey officially transmuted its priorities and raised ISIL beside the PKK to the position of the top threat to national security. The precedent objective of eliminating the Assad government, with the hope of a cessation to the civil war, was consequently decreased.

   The modification signs a de facto apperception by Ankara that the regime in Damascus will be able to hold onto some degree of influence for the prospective future and consequently the quandaries related to home need to be dealt with.

   For a long time Turkey has wanted to carry out a no-fly-zone in Syria and a buffer zone supervise by the international community. But Russia and China have obstructed all endeavors aimed at establishing an international mission in Syria, and other allies are disagree with foot the bill or risk the lives of their troops. (Euronews, 2015)

**Turkish Relations with Iran**

Turkey’s strategy to Iran seems to reciprocate between competing with it for geopolitical authority and seeking relatively normal political and economic relations with it to preserve regional stability and ascertain Turkish access to Iranian oil and gas. Turkey-Iran tensions center on Syria and Iraq, though they have also vied for the reverence of Arab and Muslim populations in championing the Palestinian cause. Iranian relations with the Syrian and Iraqi regimes and with different Kurdish groups provide it with a number of potential points of attrition and authority with Turkey.

The security guarantees Turkey has as a NATO member may partly demonstrate Turkish leaders’ prudent openness toward the June 2015 international deal on Iran’s nuclear program and the sanctions assuagement set to accompany it. Turkish leaders may expect that a potential promotion in U.S.-Iran ties could diminish obstacles on Turkish trade with Iran. Yet, Turkish interests persist about potential Iranian emboldenment in the region. U.S. forward-deployed early ultimatum radar was stimulated in December 2011 at the Kurecik base near the eastern Turkish city of Malatya as a component of NATO’s Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) system.

Most analysts explicate this approach as an endeavor to contravene potential ballistic projectile threats to Europe from Iran. Some Iranian officials, after initially meaning disaffection with Turkey’s decision to host the structure, stated that Iran would target the radar in Turkey in the event of a U.S. or Israeli airstrike on Iran. During their visit to Tehran in tardy March 2012, Erdoğan and Davutoğlu reportedly said on Iranian television that Turkey could have the radar dismantled within six months if “conditions Turkey had asked to host the radar are not esteemed”—a likely reference to Turkish leaders’ public insistence that data accumulated from the radar are not to be participated with Israel.

The political measure of the Middle East has been significantly constituted by the contest for regional influence between Turkey and Iran. While fallow for much of modern times, this contest has led to great struggle and butchery throughout history. But Turkey and Iran are more than just historical and strategic rivals. They are additionally the source of each other’s deep-seated threats and anxieties. The Iranian national epic, the Shahname, represented the ancient kingdom of Turan associated
with the Turkic people in Central Asia as Iran’s ultimate nemesis. Iran was often at the mercy of Turkic tribes from Central Asia, many of which not only invaded Iran as they immigrate southward but also came to appreciate and absorb Persian culture as Iran’s rulers. (Affairs)

The Persian Safavid dynasty blunted the Ottoman Empire’s eastward expansion in the 16th and 17th centuries. Therefore, Iran’s ruling Qajar dynasty, of Turkic roots, thought the Ottoman Empire as a symbol for European-style restoration. Reza Shah Pahlavi, the promoter of Iran’s last ruling dynasty and first non-Turkic dynasty in hundreds of years, revered Kemal Ataturk, the progenitor of the Turkish Republic, for his decided potential to secularize and modernize Turkey. The shah’s modernization efforts were inspired by Ataturk’s policies but were ultimately less prosperous and supported the overturn of his son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, and the excess of the Islamic Republic. Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution sent shock waves through Turkey’s military-dominated political establishment. 1

The Islamic Republic, a revolutionary theocracy, was the contradictory of Ataturk’s secular republic. Not only did it seek to invert the regional geopolitical order but, according to the opinion of the Turkish aristocracy, it threatened the identity and entity of the Turkish state. However, the two states were not direct geopolitical rivals in the way Iran and Saudi Arabia have been for decades. The Kemalist aristocracy conventionally incriminated the Islamic Republic of fomenting strife in Turkey through its pretended support of different terrorist and rebellious groups, while the Islamic Republic thought Turkish secularism—and Ankara’s close ties to the Cumulated States—as a threat to its revolutionary Islamic ideology.2

But while the two states considered each other cautiously after 1979, economic relations between the two countries obviously developed. During the Iran-Iraq war, Turkey preserved strong economic relations to both states. Until the supposition of potency by the Justice and Development Party in November 2002, Turkey’s attention and activities were primarily concentrated on the West, rather than the Muslim Middle East. Turkey’s primary role as a North Atlantic Treaty

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Organization NATO member was to bulwark Europe’s southwestern aspect from Soviet Emeri van Donzel, Islamic Desk.

Turkish-Iranian ties in a Transmuting Middle East truculence rather than to contain the threat of a revolutionary Iran. The Turkish aristocracy concentrated its concern on enhancing relations with the West—especially gaining joining the European Union—rather than on founding strong ties to the Middle East. Both Turkey and Iran thought Baathist Iraq and the Soviet Union as the main threats. Turkey and Iran had been founding members of the Central Treaty Organization CENTO, which was instituted in 1955 to contravene Soviet influence in the Middle East. Iran’s revolution in 1979 demonstrated the cessation of CENTO, but CENTO’s vanishing did not reduce the mutual threats Turkey and Iran had confronted before the Iranian revolution. Iran’s eight-year war with Iraq absorbed most of Tehran’s activities after the 1979 revolution; the Islamic Republic did not have the capability to release its revolution throughout the Middle East, including Turkey.¹

In addition, Iran’s radical ideology consolidated much of the region, particularly the Arab nations of the Persian Gulf, against it. The Islamic Republic could scarcely afford to antagonize Turkey as well. Turkish-Iranian economic, political, and security ties ameliorated significantly after the AKP’s supposition of influence in November 2002 and especially after the U.S. incursion of Iraq in March 2003. Though it is committed to secularization, AKP’s core precinct consists of observant Muslims from the Anatolian heartland who are not encouraged to view Islamic Iran as the dire threat that the Turkish secular elite often portrays it as. The AKP’s broader endeavor to ameliorate ties with the Muslim Middle East withal supported warmer ties with the Islamic Republic. However, the processing relations between Turkey and Iran under the AKP were mostly stimulated by common interests about the Kurdish issue and shared economic issues, rather than religious and ideological ties. Despite the rhetoric about Muslim consistency and normal political concerns, beneath the surface, significant ideological and strategic variances

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¹ Şaban Kardaş, Turkey: Redrawing the Middle East Map or Building Sandcastles? , Middle East Policy, Spring 2010, p.115.
perpetuated to support that limited—and perpetuate to limit—the degree of converge between the two countries.¹

The main cause of strains in ties between Turkey and Iran has been variances over Syria. When the disturbance in Syria initially broke out, Erdoğan advised al-Assad to introduce reforms that could reduce social tensions. Al-Assad promised to introduce reforms to Turkish envoys and interlocutors. However, he instead stepped up repressive measures aimed at stifling the unrest. Consequently, Turkey increased its protestation of Assad’s policies and commenced to enhance ties to the Syrian opposition, permitting it to organize and hold meetings on Turkish soil. This support for the Syrian opposition sparked a sharp deterioration in ties with Damascus and engendered strains in ties with Tehran, which backed Syria. Concurrently, it has exposed the inhibitions of Turkey’s Middle Eastern policy. Ankara has been coerced to perceive that it requires American support more than it initially supposed. The swagger and magnified rhetoric about Turkey as a medium-sized power has been superseded by a much more sober and authentic appraisal of the difficulties Turkey faces in Syria. Internal disaffection with Erdoğan’s handling of the Syrian problems has also promoted.²

The growing tensity between Turkey and the Assad regime have engendered deep solicitousness in Tehran. Assad’s government is Iran’s most related proponent in the Middle East; the collaboration between the two countries dates to the incipience of Iran’s revolution. Although ideologically and religiously different, Syria and Iran have shared many geopolitical issues, from protest Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to resisting Israeli and U.S. influence and power in the Middle East. Both countries are patrons of Hezbollah, Lebanon’s most strong political and military representative. Syria and Iran withal share concerns about Turkey’s ambitions and policies in the Middle East. A post-Assad Syria, potentially governed by its Sunni majority, could adopt an openly bellicose posture toward Iran and join the long list of Sunni Arab states opposed to Iranian power in the Middle East. Assad’s fall would also imperil Iran’s ties to Hezbollah.

² Ibid. p.157.
The Islamic Republic relies on Syria as a channel of weapons and funds to its Shi’a ally. Turkey’s prohibition of Iranian arms shipments to Syria is particularly worrisome for the Iranian regime because Assad’s downfall could prohibit Iranian arms supplies to Hezbollah. Conclusively, the toppling of the Syrian regime could lead to promoted internal rockiness in Iran. If the Syrian political regime can be transmuted through popular demonstration, Iranians may come to believe that sustained mass public demonstrations and even active violence can achieve equal results in their own country. Thus, Turkey’s opposition to Assad is a direct threat to the Iranian regime’s most vital issues. Unsurprisingly, Iran’s media and senior Iranian officials have reacted with scorn and animosity toward Turkey’s Syrian policies.

One of the Revolutionary Guards’ most effective papers, Sobhe-Sadegh, proclaimed that Iran’s relation is so significant that it would nominate Assad’s Syria over Turkey, particularly given the latter’s enhancement of the Syrian opposition. The Iranian government’s most critical mouthpiece, the daily Kayhan newspaper, has convicted Turkey’s hosting of Syrian opposition conferences. In an article titled, “Why Has Turkey Been Tricked?” Kayhan thought Turkey’s position toward Syria to be puzzling, particularly given its “anti-Zionist activities,” meaning the rupture of ties with Israel. Iran’s official English-language TV channel, Press TV, has even gone as far to insinuate that Turkey connived the Syrian revolt.¹

**Turkey and the Palestinian Issue**

The Israeli administration could not have committed a worse mistake than invading Gaza to block hopes for peace in the Middle East. Like many, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan incriminated Israel for the human butchery in Gaza. This response may not seem remarkable if one recollects that he upbraided Israel in the same way in response to previous Israeli truculence in the occupied territories. This time, however, Erdoğan stated that the attack on Gaza, which started four days after the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s visit to Ankara, “is an act of disrespect toward Turkey.” The major issue on the meeting agenda for Olmert’s visit was the Turkish-led, indirect conversations between Israel and Syria. In response to the latest Israeli attack, Erdoğan postponed the conversations, and paid visits to

¹ Gruen George, *Turkey’s Relations with Israel: From Ambivalence to Open Cooperation‖, Studies on Turkish Jewish History, 1993, p. 115.
Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to probe for a solution to the Gaza situation. He verbalized with the President of the Palestinian Ascendancy, Mahmud Abbas. Erdoğan’s replication to Israel, his suspension of verbalizes, and his promotion of shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East referring to the high level of Turkish involvement in the Palestinian question.

In the past, Turkish foreign policy creators have achieved aplomb and political will to chase peace endeavors in Turkey’s neighboring regions. Turkey hosts Middle Eastern, Eurasian, and African bellwethers as well as high-level politicians and officials from Western countries, and facilitates platforms for the solution of struggles in different geographies.

Turkish policy makers endeavor to surmount variances between countries in conflict through confidence-building measures and by placing Turkey as a mediator and facilitator in the search for solutions to chronic regional obstacles. Turkish policy makers work to initiate regional dynamics for peace-making and mobilize regional actors to make an incipient cognizance of tranquility in a wide geography elongating from the Middle East to the steppes of Eurasia. Their vision and policy style are exemplary and one may discern the emergence of a peace-maker role for Turkey in the periphery of the international system. Turkey’s involution in the Palestinian question is a conclusive part of a broader placidity vision, bearing with it the supplemental dimensions of an opulent historic-cultural background and a high degree of Turkish societal interest in the issue.¹

Turkish Involvement

The Palestinian question which leads Turkish policy toward the Middle East; the latest adopted Turkish procedure exemplifies Turkey’s incipient policy line in the region. Still, Turkey’s sensitivity to the Palestinian question is not an incipient development. For example, the beginning of the construction of Jewish housing units in East Jerusalem in 1967, the 1969 fire in the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the declaration of Jerusalem as the perpetual capital of Israel under the Basic Law of 1980 have all received rigorous reactions from Turkish peregrine policy makers; binary relations with Israel were nearly severed on different occasions. However, the incipient posture of Turkish policy makers is to consider the Palestinian question an area of

¹ Efraim Inbar, Regional Implications of Israeli : Turkish Strategic Partnership]], Middle East Review of International Affairs, June 2001. p. 214.
responsibility and opportunity wherein to claim a constructive Turkish role in the Middle East. Turkish administrators define their position as a critical policy line that seeks to deter Israeli aggression against the Palestinians and to condemn Palestinian attacks on Israeli targets, while pursuing good ties with both Israel and the legitimate Palestinian regime. ¹

Turkey’s incipient geographic imagination has led to a more convinced role for Turkey in the Middle East, which has found its expression in the declarations of policy makers. Former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit determined the Jenin operation in 2002 as “genocide” and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan criticized the assassination of Sheikh Ahmad Yasin in 2004 and the intensive civilian damages in the Rafah refugee camp as “state terror.” As an example of Turkey’s critical attention to the Palestinian question, Turkey established the Palestine Economic and Social Collaboration regularity office, which is headed by veteran politician and former minister Vehbi Dinçerler. Turkey’s regardness to Palestine also intensified with the construction of the West Bank branch of TİKA Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency.

During Sharon government’s withdrawal from Gaza, Turkey offered to mediate between the Israelis and Palestinians. Sharon refused Turkey’s mediation offer. Erdoğan said at that time that “Turkey has the capacity to help the Palestinians after the redeployment in the economic field.” This capacity is best exemplified by the initiative of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey TOBB with respect to managing an industrial zone on the border of Israel and the Gaza Strip.

The “Industry for peace Initiative in Palestine” is an example of the incipient aplomb among Turkish foreign policy aristocracy and business leaders under the effect of the incipient geographic imagination that celebrates trade as the substructure for prospective peace in the region. This precursory could engender a concrete substructure of cooperation between Palestine, Israel, and Turkey. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also determined the Erez project as “the initiative which would contribute to the regional tranquility.” Although the site on which the TOBB intended to construct an industrial intricate was eradicated during the escalation of the

¹ Oktay Ekşi, Manavgat Still Tests Turkish - Israeli Relations, Turkish Probe, 10 November 2002. p. 254.
Gaza conflict in August 2006, TOBB president Rıfat Hisarcıklıoğlu promulgated the Organization’s resoluteness to invest 100 million US dollars to restore the project and employ six thousand Palestinians after preserving stability in the region.¹

The TOBB held the fourth meeting of the Ankara Forum on January 15, 2007 in Tel Aviv to argue the further steps in the Revival Project for the Erez Industrial Region. Hisarcıklıoğlu determined that the project is the only concrete proposal on the table in economic issues, and repeated that Turkey is as crucial a shareholder in the project as the Palestinians and Israelis.

As verbally expressed in the Joint Declaration of the Fourth Meeting of the Ankara Forum: “The project is now coming to the stage of implementation in early 2007.” The then Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres determined his enhancement for the project by saying that “there is no time to waste any time. The Erez industrial zone will be propitious to all cognate parties.” Although there have been postponement due to security situation in Gaza, TOBB keeps its promise and has preparations to continue with this project after normalization in Gaza. (Zaman, 2009)

The consequence Hamas victories in the local elections of 2005 and in the Parliamentary Legislative Elections opened an incipient era in the Palestinian issue. Hamas’ denial of Israel was the most significant issue of the international community, and the US and the EU commenced to discuss possible measures to coerce Hamas to identify Israel. Turkey interpreted the Hamas victory in another way and selected diplomatic engagement with Hamas to pre-empt possible obstacles.

The Turkish situation, as demonstrated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is that all related parties should appreciate the outcome of democratically managed elections and that it would be against democratic basics if outside actors tried to debilitate the latest elected order by imposing economic measures against the Palestinian administration. Regarding the Turkish policy makers, Hamas was in search of allies in the Middle East to terminate the economic and political embargo it

was confronting with the international system. During this time, without Turkey’s intervention, the only possible gateway for Hamas was the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis.¹

When the Iranian religious leader, Ali Khamanei, invited Hamas leadership to Tehran, he enhanced this conception. In the midst of all these changes, the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs invited Khaled Mashal, the political leader of Hamas in expatriation, to Turkey. This sudden visit was reproved by some circles in the US and Israel. Consequently, the then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül stated that it was not possible for Turkey to still as a viewer to the Palestinian problem while even the land enrollment records of Palestine remain in Turkey. As a response to critical comments from Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, Gül demonstrated that his team advised Hamas to disarm, become more moderate, and enter into diplomatic negotiations with Israel.

Hamas got an invitation from a number of other countries, such as Russia, South Africa, Venezuela, and Iran, designating that Turkey was not the only country in its involvement with the latest elected system. Turkey also sought to diplomatic resolutions in the EU and partially affected the EU decision to go on economic support to the Palestinians under Hamas government. Turkey’s Hamas diplomacy is an incipient development. There is no other ideal of Turkey’s involution at this caliber of intricacy concerning the Palestinian question, which involved intervention in regional leagues, and diplomacy vis-à-vis the US and the EU. During the conflicts between Hamas and another puissant Palestinian group, Fatah, in the Gaza Strip, Turkish policy makers perpetuated an effective policy to persuade the discordant sides to terminate the civil war situation in the Palestinian districts.²

The Palestinian dilemma is a critical issue for a great part of the Turkish community. Palestine is among the few issues that the Turkish electorate concentrated on politicians and policy makers to take positions on in foreign policy. A poll performed in October 2000 showed that 71 percent of Turks have an interest in Palestinian affairs and 60 percent demand a more active Turkish role on behalf of the Palestinian people. Another poll performed in November 2000 revealed that 41

¹ Efraim Inbar, op.cit. p.215.
percent favor distributing Jerusalem to Palestinian rule, 29 percent offered independent administration and only two percent favor Israeli rule over the city.

Another poll, performed in November 2003 surveying 2,183 people in different components of Turkey, determined the Turkish people’s situation toward Palestinians. 66 percent support the Palestinians in their struggle. Public enhancement for Prime Minister Erdoğan’s upbraid Israel for pursuing state terror was 82 percent in another poll executed in July 2004. Different divisions of Turkish society, ranging from political parties to student in the wake of the latest attack, Turkish official and civilian charity organizations rushed into Gaza with aid convoys. Turkey’s Humanitarian Relief Foundation (İHH) stood as an outstanding charity organization for reaching out to Gaza with urgently needed foodstuff and medical equipment. İHH also made preparations to bring wounded Palestinians to Istanbul for treatment. ¹

The substance of the Palestinian dilemma for most Turks is the status of Jerusalem al-Quds and who will control the sacred places in the holy city. This has long been a critical foreign policy issue in which Turkish community has shown the extreme interest. The prevalent complains against Israeli expansion and violence in Palestinian lands in March and April 2002 refer to the societal rockiness in Turkey. The complaints against the latest Israeli attacks on Gaza were even more prevalent in different regions of Turkey after Israeli attack in Gaza. A great Incipient Year’s Eve Party in Istanbul was annulled to show cohesion with Gaza. Tens of thousands of people grouped in Istanbul to protest Israeli aggression against Palestinians on January 4th. This demonstration was propagated on major Arab satellite televisions, including Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabia. Thousands of people still protest against Israel in different regions of Turkey.

Turkish Diplomacy after the Gaza Tragedy

Turkey has started an intensive diplomatic campaign at both the regional and international level to terminate the Gaza dilemma. PM Erdoğan visited major Arab countries and conversed with Palestinian leader Abbas in the initial days of 2009. Erdoğan handled the international community before his visit to Egypt, stated that

“the Palestinian and Gaza people, our brothers, can only be preserved from their isolation when these embargoes are hoisted.”

Turkey’s status is to involve Hamas in the political process; Erdoğan seeks to stimulate Hamas to return to armistice in exchange for hoisting the blockade of Gaza, and Turkish policy makers have transmitted a message to Hamas to declare cease-fire and work for the political accommodation of different groups within Palestinian politics. Erdoğan’s top foreign policy advisor Ahmet Davutoğlu met twice with Khaled Mashal, the leader of Hamas in expatriation, in Syria. Davutoğlu’s second visit was the consequent of French president Sarkozy’s request for support from Erdoğan. Meanwhile, Turkey has already commenced to mediate between Hamas and international actors while maintaining customary contacts with Fatah, the Palestinian Ascendancy as well as the US and European countries

Erdoğan’s dynamic diplomacy, aimed at averting further tragedy in Gaza, coincides with Turkey’s recurrence of a two-year term as a temporary member of the UN Security Council. Erdoğan appreciated the Arab League’s call to lobby for a UN Resolution for a ceasefire and stands yare to cooperate in this initiative. Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan attended the unexpected meeting of the foreign ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference OIC on January 3rd, 2009. 1

The Secretary-General of the OIC, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, called for immediate international action to terminate the Israeli attack in Gaza. The final declaration of the OIC meeting convicted “the perpetual savage Israeli assault on the Palestinian people in Gaza. And prior to leaving Saudi Arabia, Erdoğan stated: “Hamas committed to the armistice. But Israel failed to hoist the embargoes. In Gaza, people seem to live in an open prison. In fact, all Palestine looks like to an open prison. I am calling out to the whole world: why do you not exhibit the same sensitivity you showed in Georgia, now in Gaza? The United Nations, the United States and the EU-member states rallied for Georgia instantly. But now, no one takes action for Gaza”. 2

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1 Mustafa Kibaroğlu, Clash of Interest Over Northern Iraq Drives Turkish - Israeli Alliance to a Crossroads, Middle East Journal, Spring 2000, p. 247.
2 Mustafa Kibaroğlu, Turkey and Israel Strategize, Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2002, p. 61.
Erdoğan’s critical responses led to a phone conversation between President Abdullah Gül and his Israeli counterpart Shimon Peres. Gül released a written declaration after this conversation, expressing interest for the political and humanitarian situation in Gaza, determining the need for supplying humanitarian support, and calling for a prompt cease-fire.

The Turkish National Security Council NSC revealed deep concern over the deaths of large numbers of Palestinians in the Israeli attack in Gaza. The NSC publish its own declaration asking for a prompt end to military attacks, the hoisting of the barriers so that humanitarian support might be provided to the Palestinian people in Gaza, and pursuing the respect of diplomacy for a solution. The declaration also emphasized that the Palestinians should reach a settlement among themselves as soon as possible.

The NSC declaration stated the broad assent on the Palestinian issue in Turkey. Turkey has a two phase plan for dealing with the Gaza problem. The first stage is to broker a ceasefire and offer supervision by international peacekeepers, including Arab and Turkish forces. The second phase is to attain a normalization between rival Palestinian groups to prove Palestinian politics and ascertain a commitment to peace. Erdoğan is working to construct bridges among the Arabs to make a mundane attitude toward the Palestinian dilemma.

Fehmi Huwaydi and Muhammed Nureddin in major Arab dailies like Al-Dustur, the Daily Star, and Al-Safir, appreciated Turkish performances on Gaza’s behalf and asked Erdoğan to remind Arab leaders that the Palestinian matter is an Arab issue. Turkish endeavors are prospective to go on the UN to bring the issue to more international concern. Turkey will withal look for occasions to discuss the issue with the US administration and EU countries.

Turkey’s dynamism at the state and societal level in response to the Gaza tragedy makes evident the consolidation of Turkey’s role as a peace promoter in the Middle East. Turkish involvement in finding a solution to the Palestinian question will continue, as the democratic and societal backing of the policy makers in regard to this issue remain strong. The following points summarize the results of Turkey’s attempts to further the Palestinian cause:
1. Turkey should search for diplomatic relations with the US to affect a transmutation in Washington’s situation towards the Palestinian issue. President-elect Obama has promoted the prospect of stretching conversations with a large Palestinian group; Turkey should set the ground for a renewed US involution with all Palestinian groups.

2. Turkish society’s humanitarian participated in Gaza protests in need of coordination. A civil coordination committee should be instituted to support arrival to Gaza with the most required materials in a more managed fashion.

3. The EU remained “Czech” to the Gaza tragedy. The EU is losing its strategic perception in the Middle East, along with hundreds of years of historical memory. The Czech Presidency showed the lack of prevision in the EU, rendering the EU neighborhood policy and other policy tools simply senseless. Ankara should bring the Gaza tragedy to the EU agenda with a concentration toward essential revision of the EU policy toward the Palestinian question.

4. Turkey should collaborate with France and the UK with the conception that these countries have more historical and strategic experience with the Palestinian problem. French President Sarkozy has followed Erdoğan’s footsteps in Caucasia and the Middle East. Turkey may lead the other major European countries by keeping a cooperative view toward a solution of the Palestinian problem.

5. The Turkish system should bring the Palestinian issue to the agenda of the Turkish parliament. All groups in the parliament have already demonstrated their enhancement for the Palestinian issue; adopting a officially united position would sustain more authority in the regional and international environment. The Palestinian question is a sensitive issue for the Turkish people independent of their political leanings. Turkish policy makers should address the demands of society at large, while keeping domestic tension at a controllable level.

6. Turkey’s two year term in the UN Security Council should be applied to bring the Palestinian question to the world public agenda. Turkey’s temporary position also promotes a chance to be related to different UN forums and to play a more effective role at the UN level. A significant factor for influential
action in the UN is to procure intensive help from the Arab league and the OIC.

7. Turkish-Israeli ties will be exhausted in the short to medium term. Turkish policy makers were stressed by Israel’s precipitous act at the preliminary stage of Syrian-Israeli direct conversations. There has been a loss of confidence on the component of Ankara towards Tel Aviv in regard to future negotiation efforts. For its part, the Israel administration reprehends Turkey for being unnecessarily rigorous toward Israeli security measures. Ankara should ascertain that Israel does not cause irrecoverable harm to the Turkish brokered conversations in the region in the future.

8. Turkey should be ready to support the reconstruction of Gaza after a possible settlement. There is need for coordinated activity, including the construction of state institutions, charity organizations, civil society, universities, research institutes, etc., to help the recall of the Palestinians and the reconstituting of Gaza. Turkey should invite 1,000 Palestinian students to Turkey for education to support the post-war rehabilitation and to enhance the relations between the Turkish people and the Palestinians. (Kaya, 2009)

**Turkey and the Arab Spring:**

Some 15 to 20 years from today, it will be instructive to explore how academic and policy function read the period from early 2013 to late 2014 in Turkey. There are many competing records about the future of the country. One gloomy reading that is currently popular with many American supervisor of Turkey goes as follows: the so-called “Turkish model” was all the rage just two years ago. Turkey was flourishing and democratizing under the Justice and Development Party AK Party, which was appreciated its prosperous fusion of Islamic values and democratic governance. Its leaders were widely appreciated abroad and were even entitled on Foreign Policy’s list of the “Top 100 Global Thinkers” three years in a row. With the Turkish Republic’s centennial anniversary approaching, the AK Party had grand plans to make Turkey a major player on the international stage. Then a small remonstrance by environmentalists turned into something more. From Taksim to Tunceli, Turkey tighten for weeks as the Gezi Park protests disclosed. The Turkish model was
finished—if the wave of protests was not enough, surely the corruption scandal that happened in December 2013 put a terminus to it.¹

Fuller’s Turkey and the Arab Spring raised an optimistic postscript to that narrative. The Turkish model may have fallen out of favor for the time being, the former CIA official acknowledges, but it eventually exemplifies the best model of governance for predominantly Muslim states in the Middle East. In a region “hungry for leaders of genuine vision” and models of “competent governance,” Turkey is the state best prepared to offer both. The AK Party has assured that a democratic government can reflect the piousness of its citizens, while also presenting economic growth and playing a leading role abroad. Recent protests and scandals have called the sturdiness of the model into question. Fuller is gloomy about the AK Party’s near-term electoral spectacles, but in his opinion the party does not have to go on acquisition elections for the Turkish model to survive.

Of course, Turkey may not remain such an interesting option for long. Fuller consummated his manuscript in early 2014, and he acknowledges from the commencement that prompt political changes may surpassed his argument. The Muslim populations of the Middle East have visually perceived enough of authoritarianism and will not be inclined to take up a Turkish variant—the revolts of the Arab Spring would suggest as much.

Prime Minister Erdoğan has requested Arab Leaders, the Palestinian state no longer needs to be established saying that it is consequential voicing AK Party Diyarbakır deputy Friday Internally, the "Arab Spring, the West’s dirty tricks inverted and both Turkey and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the formation of the most effective names have become one.

Turkey in this regard is very functional in a major regional power has become, particularly Marmaray giant projects like our economic field in Europe shrank our magnification, social and cultural issues initiatives in our development and our the most conspicuous proof. This requires development of neighboring countries and

western and imperialist global forces, the universal capital of the startle caused. These dirty-minded offensive games remain the Arab spring will also persist.¹

Chapter 4

Turkey and the Western Direction

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Introduction

At the beginning of the 21st century, Western attention to Turkey is promoted. Developments in Turkey, and in adjacent regions, resulted in more attention. This truth contradicts with the terror of post–Cold War neglect widely expressed by Turkish observers after the fall of the Soviet Union and the fallout of the communist states in the East. The Gulf War refocused Western attention on Turkey, but like the previous context of the involvement of Soviet power, it did so in a creative way. Turkey was remarkable as a result of its position on the map rather than its potential as a regional actor and partner in its own right.

For many Turks, the Gulf War experience and the country’s significant role in the containment of Iraq have enhanced the conception that Western policy especially U.S. policy toward Turkey is factually a product of other more consequential policies—Russia policy, Caspian policy, Balkan policy, Middle East policy, and so on. Recent changes within Turkey increasingly compel analysts and policymakers to view Turkey as a necessary international actor in its own right.

U.S.-Turkey ties overview there have been many situations in which the United States and Turkey have made common cause during their decades-long league in NATO, but their strategic cooperation also has a history of sequences. This is depended largely on divergences in how the two countries’ leaders have appreciated their respective concerns given various geographical positions, threat conceptions, and roles in regional and global political and security architectures. Domestic politics in both countries have also played a role. Yet, both countries have continued to prove the significance of an enduring strategic relationship.¹

A number of policy diversity have arisen in the past few years. It remains obscure whether these diversity are mainly the latest manifestations of structural tension, or whether they signal a more actual promotion in the bilateral relationship. Since the early years of AKP rule, President formerly Prime Minister Erdoğan and Prime Minister formerly Peregrine Minister Ahmet Davutoglu have consistently enunciated aspirant foreign policy vision. This vision—aspects of which Davutoglu has expressed at times through phrases such as “strategic depth” or “zero problems

with neighbors”—draws upon Turkey’s historical, cultural, and religious awareness and relations with other regional actors, as well as its soft power appeal. Erdoğan, Davutoğlu, and other Turkish leaders often indicate to the United States and other countries that Turkey’s marvelous regional position as a Muslim-majority democracy with a strong economy and membership in NATO can support stability in embracing geographical areas, and also reinforce larger political and trade liberalization in neighboring countries.¹

Turkey has become a more effective actor in the Middle East in the past decade, having sought to authorize the regional status. However, recent foreign and domestic policy developments may have presented Turkey less dynamic or desirable than once generally pretended as a shaper of regional outcomes, a model for neighboring countries, and a facilitator of U.S.

Turkey’s NATO membership and economic interdependence with Europe appear to have contributed to consequential Turkish decisions to depend on, and partner with, sources of Western vigor. However, as Turkey has prospered under these circumstances, its economic prosperity has driven its efforts to seek larger overall self-reliance and independence in foreign policy.²

Turkish leaders also explicit concern that U.S. prospects of Turkish cooperation regarding Syria and Iraq are insufficiently critical to Turkey’s domestic stresses and security susceptibilities. Turkey faces the significant encumbrance of hosting refugees from both Syria and Iraq; more than 1.9 million Syrian refugees have entered Turkey since 2011, and they are essentially concentrated in its south and its main civil parts. Erdoğan (first as prime minister and now as president) and President Obama reportedly have had less direct interaction since 2013, perhaps owing to differences over both peregrine policy and the Turkish government’s dealings with domestic issues. Yet, as described below, Turkey is participating with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State alliance in many ways.

U.S. and European Union officials and observers have become more interested in issues regarding civil liberties and checks and balances in Turkey, partly because of

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² Ibid. p. 125.
these issues’ potential to influence internal stability and electoral outcomes in Turkey, as well as the country’s economic viability and regional political role. In March 2015, 74 Senators signed a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry protesting media restraint and observation in Turkey, following a similar February 2015 letter signed by 89 Representatives. However, Obama Administration officials have largely determined explicit criticisms to instances of direct media obstacles on U.S.-predicated companies, such as the spring 2014 bans on Twitter and YouTube (in the run-up to consequential nationwide local elections) that were later overturned by Turkey’s constitutional court. Restraint on U.S. officials’ part might reflect their desire to evade getting involved in domestic policy arguments that seem to be linked at least partly to contests for power among different Turkish parties and groups.¹

In July 2015, Turkish officials proved that they would allow the United States and other members of the U.S.-led alliance against the Islamic State organization to utilize Turkish territory and airspace for anti-IS airstrikes in Syria and Iraq, significantly facilitating the logistical encumbrances of coalition operations. The Obama Administration and Turkish officials accepted these arrangements as part of a larger plan to coordinate U.S.-Turkey action to counter the Islamic State.

Many observers suppose that Turkey’s expanded coordination with the United States is aimed at gaining more authority over the unfolding geopolitical, ethnic, and sectarian struggle along the Turkey-Syria frontier. Shortly after Turkey started military strikes against the Islamic State in Syria in tardy July, Turkey resumed hostilities with the PKK. Since the fall 2014 crisis in the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobane, many analysts have supposed that Turkey is more interested in containing Kurdish political aspirations than countering Islamist extremism at and within its borders. (Barber)

Turkey is reportedly anxious about recent YPG gains and U.S.-PYD/YPG coordination, which raise the potential of YPG control over most of Syria’s northern border. In September 2015, Prime Minister Davutoglu said: By increasing operations against [IS] and the PKK, we also averted the PKK from legitimizing itself. Until the PYD converted its attitude, we will view it in the same way that we perceive the PKK.

Many commentators have reproved Turkey for concentrating its military firepower far more on the PKK than on the Islamic State, with Secretary of Bulwark Ashton Carter stating that Turkish anti IS action was “overdue” prior to Turkey joining airstrikes in August. U.S. officials are also reportedly pursuing Turkey to show restraint in anti-PKK action so as not to undermine anti-IS efforts including the YPG. (Barber)

Despite the United States has believed the PKK to be a terrorist group since 1997, it does not apply this characterization to the Syrian Kurdish PYD/YPG. A State Department deputy spokesperson said in an October 20, 2014, daily press summarizing that “the PYD is a different group than the PKK legally, under United States law.” In a September 21, 2015, daily press briefing, the State Department spokesperson said that the United States does not consider the YPG to be a terrorist organization, and that despite Turkish issues about the group, a coalition of the willing does not “have to approve every issue”. (Barber)

**Turkish Relations with the European Union**

The relationship between Turkey and the European Union (EU) has promoted rapidly and has widely diversified since the two began to enhance relations in the 1990s. But Ankara and Brussels have fallen short of creating a sound framework of collaboration mirroring a trend of ever-closer convergence between a country negotiating EU membership and the union.

The main attribute of this very intensive and complex relation is the truth that it is perceived through different procedures, forums without much solidarity among them. And the difficulties encountered in the EU accession process, which is actually ceased, have tended to poison the relationship in other scopes.¹

Now, facing a number of common challenges, the two have a major chance to move their relationship to a higher level by working together to handle short- and long-term concerns that are of importance for both.

In some ways, both actors are creating a fresh start. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was sworn in on August 28, 2014, as the first Turkish president forthwith elected by the people. The government headed by Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu that took office

presently afterward stated the central prominence of Turkey’s EU orientation. On October 22, the new European Commission, the union’s executive body headed by Jean-Claude Juncker, was assured by the European Parliament. One of the commission’s vice presidents, Federica Mogherini, became the new EU high envoy for foreign policy. On December, Donald Tusk became the president of the European Council of EU heads of state.¹

These alterations in the Turkish and EU political leaderships concurred with the publication in September of a new EU strategy by the Turkish government, as well as two central reports by the European Commission: the yearly progress report on Turkey’s EU involving operation, adopted on October 8, and the first progress report on the country’s visa liberalization road map, published on October 20.

Turkey is a nominee country for EU membership subordinate the Helsinki European Council of December 1999. Accession negotiations initiated in October 2005 with the analytical inspection of the EU legislation (the so-called screening process). Since then the EU stopped temporary one chapter: Science and Research (June 2006). Beside the EU started negotiations on seven chapters: Enterprise and Industry (March 2007) and Financial Control and Statistics (June 2007), Trans-European Networks and Consumer and health protection (December 2007), Intellectual property and Company law (June 2008). On 18 February 2008 the Council adopted a revised Accession Partnership with Turkey.

Turkey has had a long confederation with the project of European integration. The European Economic Community signed in 1963 the Ankara Association Agreement for the advanced institution of a customs union. The Ankara Association was accomplished by an Additional Protocol signed in November 1970. Due to the Turkish shortage to apply to Cyprus the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement the Council settled in December 2006 that eight relevant chapters will not be disclosed and no chapter will be provisionally obstructed until Turkey has accomplished its commitment. The eight chapters are: Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services, Financial Services,

¹ Feroz Ahmad, The Historical Background of Turkey’s Foreign Policy, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004, p. 36.
Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union and External Relations.

Admitted together with the growing tensions on Turkey’s southeastern border as collisions in Syria and Iraq evolve and the effects of these tensions for the country’s normal politics, these developments make it a good time to take a inclusive look at the convoluted and diverse relationship between Turkey and the European Union. This relationship is disclosing against a background identified by five main factors.

2. First, the new Turkish government has stated its intention to accelerate repairs in light of the announced centrality of the EU accession operation.

3. Second, the accession process, which initiated in 2005, is still alive. Yet with the sharp retrogression in Turkey’s rule-of-law architecture since the summer of 2013, this process will be inhibited until the Turkish government is prepared and able to return to a higher degree of commitment with the EU’s political measures for membership. The EU-Turkey Customs Union, initially a portent to accession, has been a major prosperity. But with the starting of mega regional trade agreements, the customs union’s unique features are of growing significance to Turkish policymakers.

4. Third, the notable variation of the relationship has involved Turkey associated to a large number of EU programs and developing new forms of ties, for example, on visas and illegal migration.

5. Fourth, the regional position (and particularly the growing and territorial gains of the terrorist organization Islamic State) calls for growing solidarity between Turkey’s and the EU’s foreign policy goals—itself one of the requirements of the involvement operation. Turmoil along Turkey’s southeastern boundary has become a menace to the EU’s homeland preservation as well as to Turkey’s.

6. Fifth, the EU organizations have just sustained a substantial reshuffling. The union is introducing new methods to use its array of policies and strategies in a more regular manner, a move that has direct effects for Turkey. (Affairs)

Against this varied scenes, it is also a convenient moment to conclude the lessons of the recent past. In general, the EU-Turkey relationship has become much stronger in recent years.
Relations have normally been managed through different set of policies and strategies, each of them used according to its own characteristics and procedures, in a rather inconsistent fashion. The EU-Turkey Customs Union has been determined since the end of 1995 and has been executed by the European Commission, with the trade commissioner taking responsibility. The joining negotiations and their financial strategy, the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance IPA, have also been executed by the commission, under the leadership of the circumlocution commissioner and with persistent interaction from the Council of Ministers (the Council of the European Union). (Affairs)

At the end of 2013, the EU and Turkey made progression on two new measures in the domain of home affairs: a visa accessing process and a readmission agreement regarding illegal migrants crossing through Turkey. The EU’s home affairs commissioner observes these measures. A deliberation process on foreign policy concerns has implemented at regular periods, including at the ministerial level.

Headed by the EU foreign policy high representative, this operation has concentrated on international issues of prevalent concerns. In addition, the EU and Turkey conduct conversations and execute projects in a host of other fields; the most significant ones are counterterrorism (under the EU counterterrorism coordinator) and exigency and humanitarian support (headed by the commission).

The challenges of the following years include those obstacles deep-rooted to the joining operation and to the change of measures such as the customs union. Also of very interesting political significance are counterterrorism, visa facilitation, and other new issues, as well as the more general question of solidarity among the different EU policy measures used in Turkey and in neighboring countries. (Affairs)

In the following years, there will be five areas at the substance of the EU-Turkey ties: trade and economic consolidation; the EU joining process; mobility and migration; foreign policy processes; and counterterrorism collaboration. Assemblage of views on these concerns should not be taken for favored. But the economic, political, and social hazards confronted by both partners should be handled meticulously and jointly as often as possible.

The EU instituted a Customs Union with Turkey in 1995. The major of the
Customs Union handles trade in fabricated products between Turkey and the EU, and also presupposed constancy by Turkey with identified EU policies, such as technical statute of products, competition, and Law of Intellectual Property. Trade between the EU and Turkey in agriculture and iron products is detected by different preferential compacts. The Customs Union has obviously raised the extent of trade which was executed between Turkey and EU member states. Nowadays, more than half of Turkey’s trade is conducted with the EU.  

Turkey’s trade with the EU is almost stable, the deficit being less than € 8.3 billion, and having a share of 13% in Turkey’s total trade shortage. The proportion of exports to the EU enhanced a little from 56.0% in 2006 to 56.4% in 2007. Imports from the EU as a proportion of total imports dismissed, from 42.6% to 40.4%, fundamentally due to the growing import bill for energy, which Turkey imported just from non-EU countries. EU foreign direct investments in Turkey have achieved about € 9 billion in 2007. They weight for about two thirds of total FDI stream in Turkey and they count to 3.5% of Turkey’s GDP. Early in 2008, the proportion of FDI flows from the EU fell further to 53%. Turkey’s leading industrial imports from the EU still to be the mechanization, chemicals, automotive products and steel. Its master agricultural imports from the EU are grains. Considerable EU imports from Turkey include weaving and cloth, machines, and transport instruments.

**Upgrading the EU-Turkey Customs Union**

Twenty-five years ago, Turkey’s ties with the European Community was in unsurpassed. The Cold War had ended; also the Berlin Wall had descended. The perception of Western capitals had transformed to Eastern Europe with a clear expressed preparedness to end the decades-long division of Europe by driving those countries into the wrap of the European Community. The new leadership resulted in the East of the continent also surrounded this objective and started to execute aspirant democratic and economic renovations.

Turkey remained an outlier to this functional of enlargement. Turkish policymakers had quandary in embracing an equally aspirant renovation agenda. Consequently, when Brussels was drawing its attention to the East, Ankara was shifting its attention away from Brussels.

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In this regard, the EU-Turkey Customs Union was initiated as a model to retrieve some of the missing ground. It was thought that just as with the institution of the European Union, forward incentive in economic combination would also bring about progression in political integrity. And to some extent, the customs union was able to reach this goal by reviving Turkey’s concern in EU accession. Now, with EU membership negotiations stopped, economic integrity may become the lynchpin of a strategy to restore the EU-Turkey relationship.¹

There is a solid economic and political substructure for promoting the customs union. As a trade agreement which was negotiated in the mid-1990s, the customs union has already submitted its economic outcomes. New economic benefits can be perceived only by enhancing the range of the customs union to new materials of the economy and to incipient sections. Recently, the agreement addresses only the processing industry. Some services, which comprise a much bigger part of the economies of the EU and Turkey, are not addressed.

At the same time, agricultural trade is also estranged. Thus, a new stage of negotiations that would seek to consolidate services and likely agricultural trade into the settlement would release a new cycle of economic outcomes. This could also be a chance for the two parties to renovate the customs union by driving its ambit new field such as public procurement, a stronger dispute resolution mechanism state aid. The partners would also need to determine a core Turkish requirement, namely that the EU accomplice Turkey more related to EU decision-making on trade strategy and with the union’s discriminatory trade negotiations with the third countries.²

Turkish policymakers have withstood calls to promote the customs union. Ankara associated the goal of renovating the consent to advance on the accession negotiations. According to Turkish view, there was no need to concentrate on a separate active role for renovating the customs union. This supposed to be performed through advancement on the accession negotiations, as Turkey would gradually ensure the interchange of its legislation with the body of EU law in an ever-growing different policy fields.

¹ Ergun Ozbudun," Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation",2000.
² Ibid. p.112.
It was even underlined that an effort to concentrate on the renovation of the customs union would sap the EU’s concern in promoting membership negotiations with Turkey. But with these negotiations now in crisis, Ankara has transformed its position on promoting the customs union and is keen of discuss the views for a new count of economic integrity.

The downtrend in Turkey’s extending performance has also led Turkish policymakers to decrease their withstanding to renovate the customs union. Following its premium accomplishment in the 2000s, when increased about 5 percent a year, the Turkish economy entered a round of low growth. Per capita income has practically stagnated at the level of €8,000 since 2007. This is mostly the result of the consuming of Turkey’s growth schedule, which depends on the pillars of an economic scheme that Turkey issued in 2001, and of the expansion of a global macroeconomic ambience with lax pecuniary policies. ¹

As in 2001, Turkey needs an aspirant economic renovation program that should determine the country’s growth modality in a widely transformed global economic and monetary ambience. The renovation of the customs union can become an functional characteristic of Turkey’s new economic record. Ankara can use this renovation operation to draw the attention of the international investor community on Turkey by submitting a responsible program for the reform agenda.

The effect of renovation the EU-Turkey Customs Union is not restricted to the economic field. The beginning of a new stage of economic talks would revive interest in the EU among Turkey’s large and various business communities and across Turkish society. It was the practice when the country was negotiating the original customs union. Those negotiations galvanized the concern of the business community, resulted in a revival of the EU cause among the Turkish public. A similar result can be predicted if the two parties issued a new round of negotiations.²

Despite these elements, which refer to the need to start talks for a renovated customs union, Ankara has yet to determine to commence such talks. Authenticating

Turkey’s willingness are the particular interest groups that contemplate a threat to the current system of rent apportionment and political funding through the general procurement system. They prefer more estimated as opposed to rule-based decision-making.

**A Place for Turkey in TTIP**

A game changer from Ankara’s standpoint would be to insure a place for Turkey in the large transatlantic marketplace to be constituted by the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Turkey is enthusiastically lobbying Washington and Brussels to be included in the settlement. Turkey is not the only country that is displaying such an interest in TTIP. Other third countries such as Canada, Norway, Mexico, and Switzerland that have a regional trade covenant with either the United States or the EU have also showed a preparedness to be involved. But Turkey is much more influenced than those countries because of the trade transference that Ankara may face on account of its customs union with the EU.

Lately, no formula has been constituted to consolidate Turkey or any other third country into TTIP. But including Turkey in the membership would be amounting to Ankara adopting the same type of new obligations that a renovation of the customs union would presuppose. Becoming part of TTIP would show liberalizing trade in services, opening public procurement to competition, enhancing intellectual property rights, eliminating residual obstacles to cross-border investments, and presenting more important trade dispute mechanisms.

So if Ankara is given an indication that Turkey can ultimately be included in TTIP, it will have no reason for resisting calls to promote the customs union. In addition, this opening would not complicate or affect the ongoing talks between the United States and the EU. For Turkey to be involved in TTIP, Washington and Brussels would need to state that the settlement will be open to the accession of third countries once the talks between the United States and the EU are accomplished and the agreement is approved.

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1. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a proposed trade agreement between the European Union and the United States, with the aim of promoting trade and multilateral economic growth. The American government considers the TTIP a companion agreement to the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Turkey’s EU Minister Volkan Bozkır identified the significance for Ankara of exceeding the country’s possible insularity from TTIP. He stated that Turkey would annotate its customs union with the EU if left outside the range of the transatlantic trade deal. Although the official policy of the Turkish regime has yet to be assured, it is clear that the TTIP question will still on the agenda until the tricky issue of Turkey’s ultimate accession is settled.1

**Turkey relations with Cyprus**

Since Cyprus became autonomous of the United Kingdom in 1960, Turkey has perceived itself and has acted as the guardian of the island’s ethnic Turkish minority from prospective mistreatment by the venous Greek majority. Responding to Greek and Cypriot political outgrowth that raised attention about a possible Greek joining of Cyprus, Turkey’s military interposed in 1974 and constituted control over the northern third of the island, motivation an almost total ethnic and de facto political division along geographical lines. That division still today and is the subject of continuing international efforts aimed at union. Additionally, according to a New York Times article, “after the 1974 invasion, an estimated 150,000 Turkish settlers arrived in the north of Cyprus, many of them poor and agrarian Turks from the mainland, who Greek Cypriots say are illegal immigrants used by Turkey as a demographic weapon.” (Bilefsky, 2012)

Republic of Cyprus is internationally known as having jurisdiction over the whole island, while the de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has only Turkish acknowledgement in the northern third. Congress imposed an embargo on military grants and arms sales to Turkey from 1975 to 1978 in response to Turkey’s use of U.S.-supplied weapons in the 1974 conflict, and many Members still interested in Cyprus-related affairs. The Republic of Cyprus’s accession to the EU in 2004 and Turkey’s disapproval to normalize political and commercial relations with it are seen as major problems to Turkey’s EU membership ambitious.

The Cyprus predicament also prohibits effective EU-NATO defense cooperation. In addition, EU accession may have reduced stimulants for Cyprus’s

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Greek population to create concessions toward a reunification settlement. The Greek Cypriots refused by referendum a United Nations reunification scheme (the Annan plan after then Secretary-General Kofi Annan) in 2004 that the Turkish Cypriot population accepted. Turkey and Turkish Cypriot leaders stated that the Turkish Cypriot regime’s lack of international recognition unfairly declines its people main economic and political rights, especially through obstacles to trade with and travel to countries other than Turkey.

Turkey and Turkish Cypriots have disapproved efforts by the Republic of Cyprus and other Eastern Mediterranean countries—most notably Israel—to agree upon a division of abroad energy drilling rights without a solution to the question of the island’s integration. The Republic of Cyprus seems to expedite reasonable future export gains from drilling in the Aphrodite gas field off Cyprus’s southern coast. However, contention on this issue appears to have been assured with talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots having continued via U.N. mediation following the election of Mustafa Akinci as Turkish Cypriot leader in April 2015. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2016 implicates a term that would make the State and Defense Departments to report to congressional boards on the U.S.-Republic of Cyprus security relationship.¹

**Turkey’s Western Balkans Policy since the 1990s**

Many sides of Turkey’s Western Balkans policy have revealed strong continuity since the end of the Cold War. Having remained practically separated from the region by an iron curtain for about half a century, Turkey has been attempting to renovate itself in the Balkans for about two decades. As the degeneracy of the Communist bloc and the up-growth of new states brought about swift and radical improvements in the international and regional systems and produced new chances as well as challenges for Turkey, the policymakers in Ankara perceived the significance of developing new scenery for relative the region. Given the mood of transition and uncertainty, Turkey released an pertinacity to act pro-actively to frustrate security

fears, participate in regional peace and stability and enhance its social and economic limits with the Balkans, among other close regions.

Besides geo-strategic issues, economic and socio-cultural elements motivated the Turkish policymakers in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War to promote a new policy in the Balkans. Similarly, Turkey presented its collaboration to the safeness and welfare of the region by sharing in security processes and, although sporadically, submitting political initiatives for talks, accomplished bilateral agreements, enhanced trade and provided technical, educational, and developmental support.

However, these efforts did not create a prompt development in Turkey’s political and economic position in the Western Balkans. While the resulted problems and tensions in the region prohibited new places and opportunities for international collaboration, political conflicts as well as economic recession in Turkey throughout the 1990s and early 2000s prevented this country from accomplishing its political, economic, and social goals in attaining its foreign political aspiration.

In other words, neither the political affairs in the Western Balkans nor its own political, economic, nor social resources permitted Turkey to more effectively entice with the region. In terms of local, international, structural and agency-based elements, the early 2000s were a turning point for Turkey’s ties with the Western Balkans. In the wake of the Kosovo War of 1999, the European Union initiated the Stabilization and Association Process with the Western Balkans and at the Thessaloniki Summit of 2003 it presented the prospect of full combination. As all states in the region viewed the accession to the EU as a strategic advantage, the membership motivation has brought peaceful circumstances and led to for normalization procedures of ties among states and communities.

The growing stability has also enhanced the Western Balkan governments to focus more on ordinary reforms, economic liberalization, and institutional consolidation. All this has caused new opportunities for Turkey to be further engaged in the region and increase its relations. The progression of Turkish-Greek ties at the turn of the millennium ended their persistence contest in the Western Balkans and
motivated them to relax their security-based strategy and involve in the region on the ground of economic interdependence and soft power.\(^1\)

Meanwhile, after a series of short-term alliance governments, which continued more than a decade, the coming to the influence of the AK Party with the November 2002 elections initiated a new phase in Turkish familiar politics. During the AK Party government, political constancy, economic developments, as well as structural and democratic improvements have provided Turkey with better resources and higher dependability in foreign policy. The improvements in Turkey have also enhanced its civil community and the role of business representatives, and these actors started to have a growing important part in Turkey’s external relationships.

Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan seems to have reduced his opponents and retrieved his Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to a fourth term of single-party rule over the country. In doing so, he has reinforced his own already-firm control over the country, and is a large step closer to becoming the most effective characteristic in Turkish politics since Ataturk himself. The consequences of the AK Party’s victory are likely to be immense, for Turkey, the region, and likely for Europe, Russia and the United States.

After Sunday’s parliamentary elections, it is now conceivable that the secular Turkish republic will ultimately become mysterious to its founders. In his early years in power, Erdoğan and his AK Party were appreciated by Western governments as factual reformers, and evidence that political Islam could be democratic and pluralistic. Turkey was moving towards critical prominence for EU membership, access to foreign investment and growing economically.

Since the 2008 financial recession, and especially since the 2013 Gezi Park remonstrance in Istanbul, during which Erdoğan cracked down on recognized protesters in full perception of the world, he has become increasingly dictatorial. Really, Erdoğan called for Sunday’s elections after the AK Party refused to achieve more votes in June elections and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu was unable to constitute an alliance with the three protesting parties in parliament. Many Turkey

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analysts think that Erdoğan had no desire of letting the negotiations succeed in the first place, and may have obliged Davutoğlu to allow them to setback.\(^1\)

Erdoğan’s disapproval to accept a legal, democratic election result and his willingness to politicize an office that is superficially non-partisan are just two of many indications that he is sustaining his influence.

Sunday’s results will likely make Erdoğan more autocratic, as the former prime minister has been vocal about his intention to change the parliamentary republic into one headed by a president, which, suitable for him, is the office he already heads. And while the results don’t give the AK Party appropriate power to reform the constitution on its own, Erdoğan’s party has a history of comply with his orders regardless of the content of the constitution.

Erdoğan’s relationship with the liberal and secular Turkish Kurds, obstructed by his aggressive language and political tactics, seems to tumble further under the new AKP government. In fact, it was because of the Kurds’ prosperity in the elections of June that Erdoğan’s AK Party was rejected a majority, forcing him to call for Sunday’s election.

On Sunday the Kurds were just prosperous that they denied Erdoğan his desire to supermajority. Erdoğan doesn’t seem to forget. The potential that the Kurds and the Turkish government will struggle again in the Kurdish regions is no longer that improbable.

All of this, of course, comes a rapidly disturbance situation in Turkey’s backyard, much of which involves Kurds in Iraq and Syria. Additional deterioration in this already very unsteady region threatens Europe and the United States, and also other Middle Eastern countries.

But the same deterioration that troubles these countries also prohibited them from being able to do much about Turkey’s involvement to democracy in a short time. Turkey’s location, beside its NATO membership, makes it essential partner in handling with Russian performance in the region, Islamic State, the Syrian civil war and the disclosing migrant problem. Dealing with Erdoğan is now risky, but the substitution appears much worse.

\(^1\) F. Stephen Larrabee; Ian O. Lesser op.cit. p. 298.
Sunday’s results don’t end the political and social threats that affect Turkey. They simply reform the stage for persistent conflict: the AK Party against the secular international aristocracy; Erdoğan against the Kurds; Islamic State against Turkey and the region; and Europe, the United States and even Russia position by nervously, appreciating the potential impact on their regional interests. Erdoğan has the opportunity to make use of this moment of authority, and his recent political performance offers he will.¹

Chapter 5

Relations with Emerging Powers

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Turkey relations with China

On 28 November 2008, Jia Qinglin, the top political advisor of China and the president of the People’s Political Consultative Conference offered an official intention visit to Turkey as visitor of Turkish Parliament Speaker Köksal Toptan. In Ankara, Jia met Turkish President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan. After visiting Ankara, Jia attended a business convention in İstanbul named "Turkish-Chinese Economic and Commercial Opportunities Forum".

Turkish President Abdullah Gül was the first Turkish president to visit China in 14 years, he was officially visit China between on 24–29 June 2009. Gül said one of the major objectives of his visit was to increase economic ties. In Beijing, Gül hold negotiations with his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao and came to a Turkey-China business forum. Afterwards, seven collaborations agreements were made between the two countries in energy, banking, culture and finance fields. After Beijing, Gül visited Xian, and he was given an honorary doctorate by the Xian Northwest University. In the third phase of his China trip, Gül visited Shenzhen. Based an invitation of the Beijing administration, Gül also visited Urumqi, and has become the first Turkish president to visit Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.¹

In response to the July 2009 Urumqi disorder, the Foreign Ministry of Turkey pursued the Chinese governments to discover the perpetrators and reach to justice. But some officials contradicted: a deputy from Justice & Development (AK) Party leaved the Turkey-China Antiparliamentary Friendship Group, and in his personal capacity, Turkey’s trade minister called on Turks to boycott goods of Chinese origin to protest the persisting ethnic violence, to which the Chinese chargé d’affaires in Ankara expressed "surprise". After daily protests in Ankara and Istanbul, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan enhanced his talk and said "These incidents in China are as if they are genocide. We demand the Chinese government not to still a viewer to these events." China asked that Recep Erdoğan withdrawen his accusation; editorials in the state-run China Daily pointed out that 137 of the 184 victims of the disturbance were Han Chinese, A phone talk between China and Turkey’s competent foreign ministers assured the significance of Turkish-Chinese ties, and Turkish

Foreign Minister Davutoglu said that Turkey did not intend "to interfere with the local issues of China".

On 4 July 2015, 2,000 Turkish nationalists opposing against China fasting ban accidental attack Korean tourists in Istanbul which resulted in China launching travel ultimatum to its citizens who travel to Turkey. The governing AKP party in power in Turkey has different sections, some of them nationalists who want to irritate stress with China over Uyghurs, and other factual members who want to preserve good relations with China and think the Uyghur issue is being maltreated to damage relations between China and Turkey by the United States, some other Islamist AKP have accused Rebiya Kadeer of being an "American agent" and "infidel". Turkey should have to follow its own country’s issues first with a pragmatic strategy to the position of Turkic peoples in other countries like Uyghurs, Gagauz, and Crimean Tatars.¹

Devlet Bahçeli, a leader from Turkey’s MHP Nationalist Movement Party, said that the operations by MHP related to Turkish youth on South Korean tourists was "understandable", telling the Turkish news paper Hurriyet that: "What feature differentiates a Korean from a Chinese? They see that they both have slanted eyes. How can they tell the difference?". Another translation of his notes was: "What is the difference between a Korean and a Chinese anyway? They both have slitty eyes. Does it make any difference? A Uighur staffed, Turkish owned Chinese restaurant was attacked by Turkish nationalists, who have also attacked the Dutch consulate which they thought was the Russian consulate.

**Turkey and India**

Turkey knew India after its declaration of independence on 15 August 1947 and diplomatic relations were constituted between the two countries. As Turkey was part of the Western League and India of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War, the two-sided relations did not promote at a desired promptness. However, since the end of the Cold War era, both sides put in effort in enhancing their mutual relations in every concern.

Turkey is represented in India through its Embassy in New Delhi and Consulates General in Mumbai and Hyderabad. Turkey conceives India as a friendly country taking stable procedures forward to be a global power with its rising economy, military power, great knowledge in technology and informatics, rich human resources and deep-rooted cultural history.

Corresponding to the growing mutual relations between Turkey and India, an increase is perceived in the high level visits between the two countries. In this concern, in November 2008, H.E. Mr. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and in February 2010 President H.E. Mr. Abdullah Gül visited India officially. President Gül’s visit to India was the first visit at Presidential level from Turkey to India after 15 years. Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu visited New Delhi on 18-19 February 2011 to share in the “Harnessing the Positive Contribution of South-South Co-operation for the Development of Least Developed Countries” Conference held in preparation to the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries held in Istanbul, on 7-8 February 2011. (Turkey - India Political Relations)

According to India, Vice President and Chairman of Rajya Sabha H.E. Mr. M. Hamid Ansari visited Turkey on 10-15 October 2011 upon the invitation extended by the Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the then Minister of External Affairs H.E. Mr. Salman Khurshid visited Turkey on 20-22 July 2013. Minister Khurshid’s visit to Turkey has been the first visit at this level after 10 years.

President H.E. Mr. Pranab Mukherjee visited Turkey on 5-7 October 2013 upon the invitation extended by President H.E. Mr. Abdullah Gül. This has been the first visit at the Presidential level from India to Turkey after an interval of 15 years. Finally, Minister of External Affairs H.E. Sushma Swaraj paid a working visit to Turkey on 15-16 January 2015. (Turkey - India Political Relations)

Turkey-India relations have entered 2014 in the shadow of such a dilemma. Indeed, 2014 was an election year for both countries. The general election in India, however, which was scheduled for May 12, was located in the foreground as its results would determine the fate of the leading Congress Party.
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), rather unexpectedly, gained a majority in the parliament as a result of the elections, thus allowing it to form the new government on its own. Because the BJP is a Hindu nationalist party, in addition to the fact that 1,000 Muslims died in clashes between Hindus and Muslims under the previous provincial governorship of BJP leader Narendra Modi in Gujarat, election results caused worry among all ethnic and religious minorities. Again, concerns originating from questions of whether the “multi-cultural, secular democracy”, that has been held in high esteem up until now by India, would be interrupted by Hindu nationalism were often brought to the agenda by the international media. (Turkey - India Political Relations)

BJP leader Modi took the initiative to alleviate such concerns with the statements he made both during his electoral campaign and following his election; he not only relayed warm messages to China and Pakistan, which both qualify as India’s regional rivals, but he also invited Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to his inauguration ceremony.

Experts who closely follow Indian foreign policy are of the opinion that such an attitude on Modi’s part was indeed not surprising at all, and that the foreign policy tradition carried on by New Delhi up until now will not be interrupted under Modi. Accordingly, it is underlined that the main reasons behind Modi’s ascent to power were economic in essence, stemming from high inflation, unemployment, slow growth, and rampant corruption. In this respect, the new government under Modi will prioritize economic policies according to the general view. (Turkey - India Political Relations)

To put it more clearly, India needs to improve its relations with all major economies in the world, and with China first and foremost. Prime Minister Modi is aware of the fact that he first needs to improve New Delhi’s relations with Islamabad, as opposed to giving rise to further tensions with this most important neighbor, in order to promote bilateral ties with the Islamic world and in particular with the G-20 member countries such as Indonesia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia which harbor Muslim majorities. Likewise, in order to attract foreign capital and investment, he needs to preserve the harmony between coexisting ethnic and religious groups in India, including the large Muslim population in the country, within a democratic and multi-cultural framework. All these priorities are embodied in Modi’s restrained approach
and moderate statements, which have been effective until now in alleviating the worries related to the BJP’s rise, both domestically and in the international arena.

7. **Hopes for a new beginning**

The first impression made by Modi presents an opportunity for Turkey as well, in terms of upgrading relations with India in the forthcoming period. In this respect, it is necessary to identify fields in which relations between the two countries can yield concrete results on a larger international scale, as well as on the bilateral level. Firstly, Ankara and New Delhi share many priorities on the multilateral level. Both countries have a broad experience in the resolution of conflicts all around the world through peaceful means and diplomacy. Both countries provide assistance to peace-keeping missions with their military and police forces in all corners of the world. They both argue that the structure of the United Nations Security Council UNSC needs to be reformed, and its membership list rearranged. ¹

New Delhi wants to be admitted to the Security Council as a permanent member with no veto power, and Ankara has similar demands as well. Moreover, the two countries are working to develop a common political agenda and economic policies under the umbrella of the G-20.

Turkey and India are also in agreement with regard to various regional issues. They share a set of common policies aimed at the stabilization of Afghanistan. Turkey and India carried out significant projects in Afghanistan, following the NATO intervention in 2001. The two countries can follow a common cause, and cooperate more closely in the maintenance of stability and promotion of development in Afghanistan following NATO’s withdrawal from the country at the end of 2014. Likewise, India and Turkey can embark on joint economic projects and seize the initiative for conflict-resolution in various parts of Africa, a continent over which both have considerable influence. It is also known that Ankara hopes to cooperate with New Delhi in finding a solution to the ongoing civil wars in Iraq and Syria.²

The most important subject for the sake of advancing bilateral relations is the ordered placement of economic and commercial transactions within a certain framework. In


In this respect, the FTA to be signed between Ankara and New Delhi is of the utmost importance. Preparations for an FTA have been in progress since 2008, but negotiations are yet to be commenced. The two parties can formulate the agreement in a way in which both benefit. Turkish companies taking part in infrastructure and construction projects in India, and Indian companies with high-tech capabilities increasing their investments in Turkey form the solid ground upon which a balanced economic partnership can flourish. Likewise, sectors such as the defense industry and tourism have a high potential for boosting bilateral cooperation. Cooperation in the film industry and education can further serve public diplomacy by enabling the Turkish and Indian peoples to gradually come into frequent cultural contact and to familiarize themselves with one another.¹

In sum, it is possible to make a fresh start which will reinvigorate the immense potential between these two countries that each occupy extremely important positions in their respective regions. And the “Modi era” unprecedentedly offers a fresh and great opportunity to this end.

**Turkey and Brazil**

Although Turkish-Brazil diplomatic ties have 150 years of history, their relationship has gained great momentum recently. Due to the geographic distance and different priorities of the two countries, bilateral relations could not reach a desired level. The change in Turkey’s policy towards South America and Brazil’s policy during the Lula Government to play a more global role and to establish in this framework reliable partnerships in critical regions, have contributed to a significant development of bilateral relations since 2004. (Relations between Turkey and Brazil)

The momentum acquired in Turkish-Brazilian relations in 2009 was kept in 2010. Official visits of Their Excellencies the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Industry and Trade, the Minister of Culture and Tourism, the Minister for European Union Affairs and Chief Negotiator and the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey contributed to preserve the current momentum in bilateral relations and provided a systematic framework for them. Turkey-Brazil Action Plan for Strategic Partnership signed on 27 May 2010 during the official visit of H.E. the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey to

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¹ Arzu C Ekinci, Türkçe - Brezilya - İran ve Beklenen Üçlü Zirveli: The Expected Triple Summit among Turkey - Brazil and Iran, USAK, 14 May 2010. p. 23.
Brazil, constitutes a milestone in the bilateral relations. Furthermore, six agreements that strengthened the legal framework of our relations were signed during the said visit. (Relations between Turkey and Brazil)

There is a mutual understanding at the highest level that close relations, consultation and cooperation between the two countries which have become regional powers in political and economic terms and have assumed global roles, will provide a positive value at national, regional and global scales.

Although Turkish-Brazilian relations in the economic field have recently gained momentum, they are far from reflecting the current potential. The trade balance was in favor of Brazil with a 717 million USD Turkish deficit, and the total trade volume was 1.5 billion USD in 2009. In 2010, our exports to Brazil increased by 58% and reached the level of 614 million USD; our imports from Brazil also increased by 22% and reached 1.348 billion USD. The total trade volume was almost 2 billion USD in 2010. (Relations between Turkey and Brazil)

In line with the mutual will which aims at launching a new era in political and economic fields, the two countries intend to strengthen their cooperation in the field of defense industry. In this regard, the Office of the Turkish Military Attaché started to function in August 2010. Furthermore, during the first Military Dialogue meeting which was held in Brasilia in June 2011, the two sides discussed the opportunities for cooperation in the defense industry field.

Brazil and Turkey have a lot in common - emerging powers with an ambition to project influence in their respective regions, they both desire to modify current structures of global governance. Even their historic trajectory is comparable - both were ruled by system-shaping strongmen in the early 20th century Ataturk in the 1920s, Getulio Vargas in the 1930s, both suffered military coups in the 1960s, financial crises towards the end of the Cold War, and turned into emerging powers in the early 21st century. Their ambivalent identity vis-à-vis the West remains an important issue as both nations seek to define their place in the global system. (Relations between Turkey and Brazil)

Turkey’s foreign policy strategy under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan has been quite astonishing over the past years, as I commented in a post in 2011.
Erdoğan has temporarily been wildly popular across the Middle East, and Turkey is bound to play a key role along with other emerging powers. In the same way, Brazil has begun to assume regional leadership more assertively over the past decade - a far easier enterprise given that South America one of the world’s most peaceful regions. There are thus further similarities between former President Lula and Prime Minister Erdoğan - who, not by chance, quickly identified opportunities to cooperate, a project that culminated in their attempt to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran in 2010.\(^1\)

Turkey has identified Brazil as a key partner in the region, and it has undertaken a significant diplomatic effort to strengthen its presence in Brazil. The Turkish Ambassador to Brazil, Ersin Erçin, is a high-ranking diplomat who played a key role in Turkey’s accession negotiations with the European Union. His appointment reflects the importance Ankara now ascribes to Brazil. Erçin actively strengthens Turkey’s public diplomacy in Brazil, there is a visible Turkish-Brazilian Cultural Center and a Turkish high school in São Paulo. Turkish Airlines now offers multiple direct flights from São Paulo to Istanbul. The Turkish community in São Paulo has grown over the past years, albeit from a relatively small base. Dilma Rousseff’s third foreign visit was to Turkey (after Bulgaria and China). In January 2013, Patriota paid a much-commented visit to Turkey, symbolizing the importance Turks ascribe to Brazil. (Relations between Turkey and Brazil)

From a constructivist point of view, there is plenty evidence for just that, given that their role in global affairs is so similar, and - more importantly - that both are vibrant democracies (despite criticism of Erdoğan’s authoritarian tendencies). Yet, Turkey cannot be easily be called a classic ‘rising power’. She argued that Turkey’s history also strongly differed from Brazil’s: It has been a member of NATO since the 1950s, and it has the one of the organization’s most potent military forces - another striking contrast to Brazil. It is also part of the OECD, a rich country club, since 1961. This raises the question in how far Brazil-Turkey relations are part of the "South-South" category in the first place.

From a realist point of view, Brazil and Turkey can be expected to jointly balance the United States - and their partnership will therefore last as long as their

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\(^1\) Stein, op.cit. p. 176.
national interest is aligned. Yet realists would not expect a meaningful friendship beyond occasional and issue-based cooperation - such as in the financial G20.

Both Brazil and Turkey have, more recently, retreated somewhat from the international scene - faced with intense economic headwinds at home, President Dilma Rousseff cares less about foreign policy than her predecessor. Turkey, at the same time, has lost a bit of its reputation in the region as its 'zero-problem' strategy has run into difficulties. (Relations between Turkey and Brazil)

Despite all the hype, one cannot fail to mention economic ties remain very weak - Turkey ranks as Brazil’s 41st most important trading partner. Considering that Turkey is among the world’s 20 largest economies, it shows how incipient ties still are. It remains unclear how much economic ties can strengthen since Brazil’s and Turkey’s economies are not particularly complementary. Brazil-Turkey relations are thus unlikely to worsen for any particular reason, but a common emerging power identity may not be enough to sustain the high-intensity friendship seen particularly during the final Lula years.
Chapter 6

Is Turkey Moving Away from the European Union?

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Turkey path towards EU membership

The relations between EU and Turkey began with the emergence of European Union itself. It was the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Ankara agreement in 2013, which provided Turkey with the economy basics, political and institutional relations with the then European Economic Community. Although not part of the EU, Turkey is a member of all the other important European organizations such as the Council of Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and Co-operation in Europe and the Organization for Security. Turkey has also been a NATO member since 1952. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, initiate the largest Western-inspired amendments. He eliminated the Sharia, replaced the Arabic alphabet with the Latin, announced the secular state and gave women the rights to vote.

For Turkey, the EU membership operation remains the most significant modernization project to date. Turkey accessed for full membership in 1987. After 18 years after, in 2005, the European Council determined to begin accession negotiations with Turkey. During its early years, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) provided internal reforms in accordance with the EU acquis making Turkey more democratic country. However, in recent years the Turkish government has gradually abandoned its political commitment to the EU. After having accomplished an irrefutable political influence in the country, there is actually little motivation for the AKP to continue with EU resulted reforms. Continuing with the reform path would mean, for example, to decrease the 10% election threshold, the highest in Europe, as well as insuring the independence of the judiciary and emphasizing media pluralism. (BATALLA, 2016)

EU-Turkey relations were unsurpassed for a long time. After the massive waves of 2004 and 2007 in which 12 new countries joined the EU, some voices protested that it would take time to realize the newcomers before even thinking to make the EU a bigger family. Besides, the effects of the economic recession have notably exacerbated enlargement fatigue. For the time being, enlargement is no longer in the EU’s list of concerns. In point of fact, the new European Commission president, Jean Claude Juncker, expressed that “no further enlargement will take place over the next five years”. (BATALLA, 2016)
According to Turkey, Juncker stated that “a government that blocks Twitter is certainly not ready for accession.” Turkey detected that it was increasingly frustrated by the lack of EU committed to proceed Turkey’s accession process. Since the beginning of membership negotiations in 2005, only 14 chapters of the 35 has been opened, with merely one temporarily closed. Six chapters are subject to political veto by Cyprus, due to the ongoing dispute between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and France blocks four other. Moreover, in 2006, the European Council decided to block eight chapters due to Turkey’s failure to accomplish its commitment of executing the Ankara Agreement to all Member States, especially Cyprus, as Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus and its government. Relations between the EU and Turkey was especially tense for the second half of 2012. On July 2012, Turkey decided to abstain from any talks with the Cypriot presidency of the EU.¹

In order to prevent break down during the Cypriot presidency of the EU and still alive the accession process, the European Commission determined to achieve a new positive agenda with an aim to support cooperation in areas of joint concern. Although limited success, the best way to ensure that the EU remains the indicator for reforms in Turkey is the opening of talks chapters. In November 2013 chapter 22 on regional policy was opened after France lifted its veto. Last year Erdoğan stated that 2014 would be the year of the European Union. However, in the past few months, Turkey has increasingly moved away from EU standards. After the mishandling of the protests over the demolition of Gezi Park by the Turkish government, some Member States casted doubts over the convenience for persisting talks with Turkey.²

The European Parliament convicted police violence against protesters who claim that freedom of assembly, freedom of expression and freedom of press are fundamental principles of the European Union. The EU has also expressed serious consequences of the Turkish government following claims of deterioration in December 2013. Lately adopted legislation as it is the case of the law on the Internet or the law on the Turkish brilliance service has promoted serious interests as regards judicial independence and probity, separation of powers and rule of law. Freedom of

expression has also been threatened after attempts to ban social media and obstruct the press, which have resulted in a prevalent self-control by media owners and journalists. In this regard, the European Commission emphasized the importance for the EU to support its engagement with Turkey on rule of law concerns. It is in the concerns of both Turkey and the EU that the opening indicator for chapters 23 on Judiciary and Fundamental Rights and 24 on Justice, Freedom and Security are accepted and conveyed to Turkey. (BATALLA, 2016)

**Atatürk: Modernization through Westernization**

Republic of Turkey was founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the end of WWI and the following independence war. He worked as Turkey’s first president from 1923 until his death in 1938, accomplished reforms that caused the country to be secularised and westernised. Atatürk considered the only way that Turkey could modernise and prosper was by taking on Western values and technology or as he called it ‘civilisation’. Atatürk launched a reform project that can be described as “modernisation through westernisation”. This determined the entry of the term ‘Kemalism’ into Turkey’s political vocabulary. Kemalism refers to the massive transformations Turkey sustained during the past two decades, aimed at bringing the country closer to the western nations which Atatürk viewed as models of success. Numerous far-reaching reforms were carried out: Men were prevented from wearing the fez and turban; women were strongly depressed from wearing the veil; the Latin alphabet replaced the Ottoman alphabet; Sundays replaced Fridays as the day of rest; a women’s Union was constituted to provide women’s rights and school became imperative. (Paul, 2015)

For Atatürk Islam represented the past and the Ottoman Empire. Thus on 3 March 1924 Turkey’s Grand National Assembly eliminated the Caliphate. Given the Caliphate had been in power during some 400 years of Ottoman rule, this exemplified an enormous change. To reduce the influence of Islam religious schools were closed, Islamic courts were replaced by urban courts based on civic laws of European countries, Islamic jurists lost their influence and religious marriages and polygamy were banned; in 1928 the words: ‘official religion of the country is Islam’ were barred from the constitution. As Hugh and Nicole Pope write in their book Turkey Unveiled:
‘With a few strokes of his pen, this religious country was required to become a modern Western state.’\(^1\) Clearly not everybody shared Atatürk’s aspiration for Turkey to become westernised. It was an elite driven project and for Turkish society at that time, which was predominantly conservative and deeply loyal to the Sultan, it was a massive life transformation and one that many deeply infuriated.

On the other hand, despite Turkey’s political aristocracy desire to be a Western state, there was a deep-rooted mistrust vis-à-vis Europe. The origins of this inconsistency date back to the period following WWI when the Western powers restrained the Treaty of Sèvres. According to the Treaty, Turkey was to be more or less carved up among the allied powers, while Armenians and Kurds were to achieve independence. Sèvres was harsh and many in the then Ottoman Empire were left angered. While Sèvres never became legally binding due to the fact that it has never been ratified by any Turkish Parliament, it is important in revealing the endeavors of Western countries concerning Turkey at that time and the lasting effect it had in Turkey.\(^2\)

While Ataturk died in 1938, his view for Turkey’s future was executed on by his close friends including Ismet Inönü, prime minister during most of Atatürk’s rule, who persisted his policies of secularisation and westernisation. Only some 80 years later when the AKP came to power did Islam begin to appear as a social and political power which had a deep effect on the country.

In the aftermath of WW II Turkey began to enter into Western institutions, joining the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development in 1948, the Council of Europe in 1949 and, thanks to its geopolitical position and its contraposition to communism, NATO in 1952. During the Cold War time, Turkey’s geostrategic location along with the size of its armed forces formed an important cooperation with NATO’s strategy of deterrence. Washington perceived that Turkey was the only country in the eastern Mediterranean able to withstand the Soviets and therefore would be an important buffer zone. In addition, Turkey’s implication in the

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Marshall Plan is an important evident that Turkey is viewed as a part of the Western camp. Turkey’s economic and political integration into Western institutions was facilitated by the Cold War as during this period Turkey’s foreign policy was fully anchored to a close alliance with the US and the West more broadly. (Paul, 2015)

In 1959, during the premiership of Adnan Menderes, Turkey became the second country to respond to EEC membership after Greece. This resulted in an Association Agreement, more commonly identified as the Ankara Agreement which was signed on 1 September 1963, and explicitly refers to membership as an ultimate outcome.¹ A key factor of the agreement was the institution of a Customs Union which would allow Turkey to trade goods and agricultural products with EEC countries without restrictions. An additional protocol signed up in 1973 with in order to establish the free movement of goods, services and people. (AYDIN, 2005)

While Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 negatively affected relations, some four years later, three years before Greece achieved full membership in 1981, the EEC submitted Turkey apply for full membership. This was part of a Cold War policy aimed at balancing, and equality towards Greece and Turkey. However, the then Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, refused the offer said ‘we do not think to enter the EEC. For, if we enter the EEC we will become your market. Our economy cannot stand this partnership.’ (AYDIN, 2005) If Ecevit had responded differently, it is more than likely that today Turkey would be a full member of the EU.

The 1980 military coup led to suspending the Ankara Agreement in January 1982. European Parliament published 11 resolutions on the new regime established by the Constitution between 1982 and 1987 the, qualifying it as oppressive and inadequate for guaranteeing fundamental human rights. When Turgut Özal submitted an application for full membership in 1987, it was surprised, ignoring the advice given to Özal by the then German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, who had told him that neither Turkey nor the European Community was ready.²

Two years later, the European Commission’s response stated that the Turkish economy remained insufficiently developed to compete within the Community's

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² Rosamond, Ben, Theories of European Integration, New York, Palgrave, 2000. P. 89.
emerging single market. Furthermore the fact that the application came just after the Community had enlarged to the south, including absorbing Spain and Portugal in 1986, and was also occupied with accomplished the common market, meant that the Club was concentrated on deepening rather than enlargement. However, this result led to the first serious issues from Ankara over whether Turkey would ever be granted EU membership. It is also a first evidence of the central role that Germany would play regarding Turkey’s ties with the EU, with a clear pattern emerging. Turkey’s EU ties get stuck whenever Germany is opposed to accession, yet quickly progress when Germany’s leadership is supportive.¹

On 6 March 1995, Turkey signed its Customs Union with the EU, becoming the first country to have such an agreement with the EC without being a full member. However, two years later, Ankara failed to achieve an enlargement standpoint at the December 1997 Luxembourg European Council, while the EU agreed to open membership talks with the countries of central and eastern Europe, Malta and Cyprus. Turkey was put into a category of its own as an applicant for whom a special ‘European strategy’ should be drawn to attain membership and asked to promote its human rights law and treatment of minorities as well as normalization on issues related to Greece and the decades old Cyprus problem. (Paul, 2015)

Turkey thought it was being pushed to the back of the queue as the post-Cold War Europe identified itself. This outcome provoked an opposite reaction from Turkey’s then Prime Minister, Mesut Yilmaz, who stated ‘for those countries, including Cyprus, there is a very clear potency of membership, and even a timetable. For Turkey there is none. We think this to be a clear religious discrimination. If the EU continues in such discrimination, we will have no place in such an organization even if we comply with all the conditions being put to us, the most important decision in Luxembourg, I believe, is the construction of a new Berlin wall, a cultural Berlin wall’.² Yilmaz immediately froze all political dialogue with the EU and refused to share in the European Conference concluded in March 1998 for candidate countries.

² S Kinzer, Turkey, Rejected, Will Freeze Ties to European Union, NYT, December 15, 1997. P.87
However, the next two years brought a transformation in the EU’s policy and at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 Turkey was given candidate country status, despite the fact there had been no critical development in the human rights situation or its policy towards Cyprus, and told that accession negotiations could start once the Copenhagen Criteria were met.

There were many reasons for the EU’s change: the fact that for many in the EU Turkey was perceived as a base of regional security and stability which promoted interests over the consequences of alienating Turkey permanently; a recognition that Turkey had legitimate protests about oppressive treatment; a critical change in Greek policy towards ties with Ankara with the distressing earthquake in Turkey in August 1999, resulting in a mass flowing of sympathy for the country and the two foreign minister of that time. However, the most significant transformation was related to Germany were after a change of leadership. When Gerhard Schroeder attained authority in 1998, one of his priorities was to promote relations with Turkey. During a talk in the Bundestag he stated “the decisions of Helsinki are necessary for the ability of everyone to live together in Germany, regardless of their origins. For the many people of Turkish origin living among us, it will be critical to know whether the land of their fathers will be able to hope for a democratic future in Europe and as a part of Europe.”

Schroeder believed that in order to deal with the problems of immigration and minority rights at home, Turkey should be included in the larger EU structure.

Another basic factor in the shift of policy was pressure from Washington which viewed Turkey as a crucial transatlantic ally. After the Cold War, the significance of Turkey to the US did not reduce but rather promoted with the outbreak of the Gulf War which was not the same in Europe. In the run-up to Helsinki, Washington made stated clearly that it was unsatisfied with the EU’s treatment of this strategically important NATO member with then US President Bill Clinton, reportedly highly stressed EU leaders.

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Turkey was set on the road to opening accession talks through three developments of significant importance: First, a critical review of the Turkish Constitution in October 3, 2001 when almost one-fifth of the 177 articles of the Constitution were changed. In 2002, three more packages of constitutional reform were implemented. The most inclusive was the one adopted on 2 August 2002 which included eliminating the death penalty in peacetime, revised the Anti-Terror Law, and permitted for broadcasting in languages other than Turkish. Third was the undertaking from Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, following the AKP’s first election victory in November 2002, that opening accession talks was a priority. Elected as a single party government the AKP did not face the same difficulties in reaching agreement as its coalition predecessor. Lastly was the effort of Ankara to enhance a solution to the decades old Cyprus problem. Previously accused of having an intransigent approach, Ankara revolutionised its policy, strongly backing the United Nations Annan Plan for the reunification of Cyprus.

Unfortunately at a referendum in May 2004, while the 65 percent of Turkish Cypriot’s voted ‘yes’, some 76 percent of Greek Cypriots voted ‘no’. The result of this was a divided Cyprus entered the EU a few weeks later. In years to come this decision was to have a sound effect on the future of Turkey-EU relations. In fact, the only main obstacle that the AKP government faced was that the political elite in Turkey perceived its democratisation obligation as an endeavor to reduce the secular, Kemalist aspects of the Turkish state and thus as having a hidden agenda. Brushed off as ludicrous at the time, after a decade, the threats of many back there proved to be in part rather valid.

At the December 2002 Copenhagen Summit EU leaders agreed that “if the European Council in December 2004, based on a report and a recommendation from the Commission, determines that Turkey meets the Copenhagen political standards, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.”

The rise of the AKP and the 2002 decision give Turkey a date for beginning accessions led to the motivation of the reform operation during 2003 and 2004. It was

surpassing in depth and speed. The AKP accomplished several reforms related to the role of the military in politics. The government was also fortunate to have transmitted the economic reforms and packages of Kemal Dervis, economy minister in the previous government, in 2001. These packages significantly constituted the Turkish economy and their positive results were profitable to the AKP government’s performance. (Paul, 2015)

EU Heads of State called the Commission to present to the Council a proposal for a framework for talks with Turkey, at the 2004 Summit, with a view to opening talks on 3 October 2005. Negotiations were finally executed on 5 October but not without fierce resistance from Austria which menaced to prevent the process unless Croatia was not allowed to begin its accession talks the same day. In a last-minute deal, accession negotiations were started together with Turkey and Croatia in what was realized as a quid pro quo between two different camps within the EU led, respectively, by the UK and Austria. ¹

On the contrary, the opening of accession talks was not the critical event which many had hoped. Austria’s behaviour left a bad taste in Ankara’s mouth, which was exacerbated by the then French President, Jacques Chirac, on the same day negotiations began to demonstrate that “Turkey would have to undergo a major cultural revolution in order to realize its dream of the EU membership.” After that, there was an almost prompt improvement in concerns from a number of Member States over what Turkish accession would mean for EU security, human rights, immigration and employment with increasing emphasis being placed on the open ended impression of the process, which means that membership may not be the only result. A further difficulty resulted when Angela Merkel, undertook Germany’s leadership from Schroeder in November 2005. Merkel did not enhance Turkish accession and proposed a strategic partnership instead. This was actually rejected by Ankara. Ankara found its ‘Europeaness’ being increasingly questioned which came as rather a shock for many Turks given that for the entirety of the Cold War, European leaders had never questioned Turkey’s Europeaness. Thus before Turkey had really gotten off the starting-blocks, its accession process was already in peril. (Paul, 2015)

Cyprus’ membership also caused other problems. With Ankara not determining the government in Nicosia it refused to extend its Customs Union to the country and to open its ports and air ports to Greek Cypriot vessels and planes. While this contravened the commitment taken with the signature of the Ankara Protocol in 2005, Ankara insisted it would not budge on the issue until the EU delivered on the commitment it had made to the Turkish Cypriots in the aftermath of the 2004 referendum to implement a direct trade regulation which would allow the Turkish Cypriots to trade with the EU directly from the port of Famagusta. The Greek Cypriots, which perceive the regulation as tantamount to recognition of the authorities in the North, blocked its execution.

At Cyprus’ request, in December 2006, the European Council froze eight negotiating chapters: free movement of goods, right of establishment and freedom to provide services, financial services, agriculture and rural development, fisheries, transport policy, Customs Union and external relations. Further chapters were blocked in 2009: (freedom of movement for workers, energy, judiciary and fundamental rights, justice, freedom and security, education and culture, foreign security and defense policy. (Paul, 2015)

A change of leadership in France in 2007, achieved power to right wing politician Nicolas Sarkozy. Sarkozy strongly opposed Turkish membership, even making it part of his election campaign, declaring Turkey as part of Asia Minor, not Europe. Under Sarkozy, relations between Turkey’s and France demolished both at the political and economic level, with Sarkozy blocking the opening of five chapters for ‘political’ reasons (economic and monetary union), regional policy and coordination of structural instruments, financial and budgetary provisions and institutions. This set him apart from Merkel, because despite Merkel’s preference for a privileged partnership, unlike Sarkozy she refrained from blocking the process. While this may have been in part because of her coalition partners which supported Turkey’s accession, at the same time Merkel is a pragmatic leader, well aware of the close economic ties between Turkey and German, not to mention the some three
million Turks living in the country. Generally Merkel prefers a slow moving process, and is unwilling to use its political weight to change the status quo.¹

In 2014, after the election of Francois Hollande, France opened chapter 22, to date only 14 of the 35 talks chapters have been opened and only one, research and development, has been provisionally closed. Unfortunately those Member States that have blocked negotiating chapters have removed major elements to push for reform. The opening of a chapter is not a gift but rather a roadmap for progress. As a result of these obstacles, the EU’s ability to push for change in Turkey faced.

After five years, the EU had undermined its undermined that Turkey would get the same treatment as other candidate countries. Besides, the EU had become openly polarised on the issue of Turkish membership. What should have been a technical process had become totally politicised with Turkish membership featuring in national election campaigns. This state of affairs led to significant displeasure in Ankara, a slowing down of the reform process and insufficiency of support from Turkey’s population for EU membership. While at the beginning of the process it had been some 74 percent, with a few years it had decreased to 49 and would drop further in the coming years. (Paul, 2015)

The Rise of the AKP and the Erosion of Democracy

When the AKP first came to power, the party was committed to an aspirant reform schedule. Back then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was praised by the West as a diplomat and a reformer, becoming the darling of both Brussels and Washington. The party also adopted a new and bold zero problems with neighbors foreign policy strived at building relations with countries with which Turkey had had intense relations for years, including Syria.²

On the other hand, when the AKP moved into its second and third terms there was a turn of approach. As the EU process died out, which occurred almost at the same time the AKP was elected again, democratic reform in Turkey slowed, then stopped and finally went into retrograde gear with the AKP increasing authority in its

style of governance with a systematic erosion of the rule of law, civil liberties and freedoms, division of powers and balances and checks. They also adopted an increasingly isolationist foreign policy, especially in the Middle East, based more on ideology than its earlier principles of mutual profit through economic interdependence and close political ties. This strategy reflects the following foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's foreign policy doctrine. Turkey needed to embrace its Ottoman imperial past and use its unique geography to increase its influence throughout the Balkans, the Middle East and Central Asia. (Paul, 2015)

According to Turkey expert, Sertaç Aktan, “when the party first came to power they needed “air to breathe” and so made links with liberals, Kurds, religious groups, the EU and the US; Aktan calls this the beginning stage of AKP’s rule. They then moved on to the AKP’s master phase: the master does not need support from anyone else, the master just does as he pleases, the apprentice AKP joined the western democracy not to learn how to better implement it but to learn of its weaknesses and to twistedly exploit them.”¹

When the AKP was elected again in 2007 with a 47 percent majority it began to pay more attention to reinforce its own domestic power than reform. This continued following its 2011 victory when the party took 49.9 percent. The AKP’s prosperity may be resulted from several factors including great investments into infrastructure and social services that significantly developed the lives of a large segment of society, the fact that the AKP remains the only right-wing party, weak opposition and rapid economic development during the first 10 years of their rule despite the recent decline and increasing economic problems.

In 2015 the government’s commitment to Western values and democracy has become little more than lip service. Turkey had turned from being seen as a independent and predictable partner and regional role model to an unreliable and ambiguous illiberal democracy with sectarian tendencies. In addition, Turkish politics has become increasingly polarised with deep political divisions. The AKP’s majoritarian understanding of democracy – that democracy begins and ends at the ballot box - and Erdoğan’s increasing ridicule for disagreement produced significant

discontent in that part of Turkish society that does not share the same views and ideology the government. The Gezi Park protests of May 2013 were a motivation for the built up discontentment from many different social and political groups. ¹

In addition, when Erdoğan won the country's first direct presidential election in 2014 taking more that 50 percent in the first round, he stated that as he was elected by the people he had the right to govern the country according to the Turkish constitution. Since his elections he has acted well based on his authorization, including openly campaigning for the AKP in the 7 June elections. In an interview for the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation he said “It is difficult to govern freely under the present system,” stating, “I should be the one determining who I work with, but I can't do this under the present system because there are those, the judiciary, for example, who prevent it.” Viewing checks and balance as an annoying disturbance. It came as no surprise that Erdoğan made changing Turkey into a presidential system of governance a top priority.²

A European Parliament Resolution from 14 January 2015 “Expresses its concern over backsliding in democratic reforms, and in particular the government's diminishing tolerance of public protestation and critical media; notes, in this regard, that the arrests on 14 December 2014 fall into a deplorable modality of raised pressure and constraints on press and media outlets, including Internet-based social media; notes that website bans are of disproportionate scope in Turkey; deplores the number of journalists in pre-trial detention, effectively punishing them and calls on Turkey’s judicial authorities to review and address these cases as soon as possible.

Political influence is clear in most cases. Because of the frozen accession process the EU has found itself with little authority over Ankara. Calls of concern have fallen on deaf ears as Turkey’s leadership has become increasingly combatant, with its EU related narrative superfluous with resentment accusing the EU of double standards related not only to the accession but also on other issues such as the failure of the EU to grant Turkey a visa free regime, as specified in the Ankara Agreement. (Paul, 2015)

Because there is no unanimity in the EU over Turkey, rather than trying to stop the talks, the EU has attempted to draw attention away from the frozen process by opening what could be called a path two relationship. This began with the creation of a Positive Agenda, the brainchild of former European Commissioner for Enlargement, Stefan Füle, which strived at finding the way to enhance cooperation on not only joint strategic interests but also make progress on issues of importance to Turkey. Hence visa free talks were launched in November 2013, while more recently procedures to improve the Customs Union have been kicked off. Greater dialogue and cooperation in area such as counter terrorism, and energy, with Turkey a significant component in the EU’s Southern Corridor are also underway. While these are initiatives are to be appreciated, they are clearly a short-term distraction from the blocked membership negotiations. In addition, they have not prevented the regular democratic backtracking.¹

**AKP Won the Elections**

The AKP’s success was the first step for stability. Between March 2003 and June 2015, the AKP obtained a majority of seats in Turkey’s parliament. After the party lost it in June, Turkey faced some real uprising. A ceasefire with the PKK, a Kurdish separatist group based in the country's southeast, came down in July, kicking off renewed, deadly fighting in the decades-old conflict. In October, ISIS set off bombs in the capital, Ankara, killing 90, the largest terrorist attack in the country's history. The AKP argued that this new instability could only be fixed by returning its control over Turkey's entire government, and Turkish voters bought it.²

The AKP offered a “narrative of stability, which they had linked to the continuation of single-party rule,” Sinan Ülgen, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, said in a call with reporters. “That narrative proved to be far more effective than many people thought, especially against the backdrop of the rising political instability, a worsening security climate, ISIS-perpetrated attacks, the upsurge of PKK violence.” (Danisman, 2015)

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This stability argument had some pretty nationalist overtones, a general theme in AKP rhetoric for a while now. “In the past year and more, Erdoğan tacked hard to the nationalist, anti-Kurdish right,” (Danisman, 2015) Steven Cook, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, writes. In this election, that involved linking HDP, a smaller progressive party representing the Kurdish minority, to the PKK’s return to violence.

“AKP has picked up seats from the nationalist MHP and from the Kurdish HDP, and turnout overall is up. That says to me that the nationalist positioning worked exactly as it was supposed to, Koplow writes. As has been the case frequently over the last decade and a half, Erdoğan’s political instincts are better than everyone else’s.” This election establishes, quite firmly, that the AKP is still in control of Turkish politics an open question before November 1. (Beauchamp, 2015)

After the AKP lost its majority in June, a number of commentators suggested the years of AKP dominance were ending. Their reasoning made a fair amount of sense: The rapid economic growth of the past decade, which had buoyed the AKP’s initial success, had ended. The ongoing conflict in neighboring Syria and the flood of refugees into the country made the AKP’s foreign policy look ineffectual. President Erdoğan’s creeping authoritarianism, including a plan to change the constitution to empower the presidency at the prime ministership’s expense, scared many Turkish voters.1

These issues, in particular the economy and the presidential system, played a vital role in the AKP’s June conflict. And none of them had gone away by November. “There’s almost no issue in Turkey where you can say people are better off now than they were four years ago,” Koplow said in a phone conversation two days before the vote. (Beauchamp, 2015)

But the results also say something more about Turkey. The AKP is a conservative Islamist party, and a lot of Turks seem to find that authentically attractive. People in the West often like to think of Turkey as a fairly secular country, but outside the cities that isn’t quite real. A lot of people in Turkey plain like the

AKP’s political opinions, and are willing to support the party despite its fairly dismal policy record.

“At the end of the day, Turkey is a pretty socially conservative country, and the AKP is the party of social conservatism,” Koplow explains. Now that Turkey will have a united, one-party government, Erdoğan will be freer to pursue his ideal policy. “I think the first thing is that the AK Party will read these elections essentially as a green light to their policies across the board,” Ülgen says. (Beauchamp, 2015)

But it's not apparent what exactly the AKP is going to do. The PKK conflict, perhaps Turkey's most important concern, is the most apparent example. The AKP's truculent campaign rhetoric might suggest that it plans to step up the military campaign against the PKK. But historically, the AKP has been relatively dovish on the Kurdish conflict it entered into a totally courageous round of peace talks in 2013. It's possible the newly reinforced AKP may want to settle the combat by returning to the peace process.

The election “gives the government quite a bit of margin to maneuver on really the foremost issue facing Turkish policymakers, which is the Kurdish question,” Ülgen says. “I would expect the government now to revitalize the peace process sometime in the near future.” (Beauchamp, 2015)

It's also possible that Erdoğan makes another bid to increase presidential authority. He needs a supermajority, 330 votes, to change the constitution which means he can't do it without getting help from one of the minor parties, all of which withstand his plan to shift power to the presidency. He may try anyway. “On the constitutional issue, this outcome will certainly keep Erdoğan’s aspirations alive,” Ülgen concludes. “They were almost dead after the June elections. Now he has been able, with this outcome, to revitalize his presidential ambitions.” (Beauchamp, 2015)

But it's important not to be too certain in predicting what this election means for the peace process, presidentialism, or any other major issue. Erdoğan is known among Turkey observers for being unpredictable; it's a fool's game to try to predict with any reliance what he'll do.
The only thing that’s sure is that the new government is facing some very big, very real challenges ones very similar to those it faced when it first took power in 2003. “The outcome of the elections is irrelevant to the larger story in Turkey, which is how familiar the violence, tawdry politics, and economic uncertainty all feel,” Cook, the CFR expert, writes. “In important ways, Erdoğan’s Turkey today looks like the country he inherited when he first became prime minister in March 2003.” (Beauchamp, 2015)

Lack of judicial proceedings and legal interventions

“The lack of judicial proceedings because of corruption scandals and intervene in legal proceedings led to the consolidation of a culture and the perception that corrupt actions will be tried,” Transparency International Turkey chair Oya Özarslan said.

“These social mood learned helplessness, indifference and apathy dominate. Furthermore, the lack of anti-corruption reforms in recent years, alongside the social mood described above, does not help to create the necessary conditions for the fight against corruption,” she added. (Makovsky, 1999)

Turkey Relations with EU after 2015 Elections

Through the policies of the AKP Turkey has practically been changed, both in terms of its domestic and foreign policy. This came according to the following three elements: the emasculate of the Turkish army in terms of its role in politics, the empowerment of devout Muslims and the related issue of the renegotiation of Turkey’s national identity. ¹

The AKP had won nine back-to-back elections since it came to power in 2002 when Turks went to the polls on 7 June. The election was a major moment for Turkey’s future not least because of Erdoğan’s purpose of constituting a presidential system of governance. Despite the fact that the party took the largest part of the vote (40.7%), it failed to win enough seats to continue as a single party government. Furthermore, the result was 9% less than in 2011 and far from their 55% target. The AKP’s loss of votes was a consequence of its increasingly authoritarian governing

¹ T. Alaranta, Tukey under the AKP, A critical evaluation from the perspective of Turkey’s EU negotiations, the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, February 2015. P. 98.
style and isolationist foreign policy. It also showed many Turks’ opposition to the idea of an executive presidency with more powers for Erdoğan. This change in mentality started with the Gezi protests and has become prevalent among the youth and the middle class, breaking down old stereotypes.¹

Three other parties also entered parliament: the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP). The new Turkish Parliament will be the most assorted yet. Furthermore the result showed that Turkey is still a democracy where elections can change governments, despite the critical back-pedalling in terms of democracy over the past few years.

Turkey is presently in the process of constituting a new coalition government. This is proving to be a far from easy task because of significant distinctions between the parties. If these cannot be controlled, early elections will take place. The result of a new election would be very unpredictable especially for the HDP, which took many votes from other parties and which may not happen again, and possibly only advantageous to Erdoğan who will claim the oppositions failure to create a coalition underlines their incompetence and the only way Turkey have achieve stability, in particular economic instability is by returning to an AKP single party government.

Therewith, the election result represents an opportunity for the EU to represent its support for pro-democracy forces in the country by finding ways to rejoin, rebuild trust and open a new chapter in this important relationship. As announced by the European Parliament's Turkey Rapporteur Kati Piri, “Turkish voters have indicated that they want change. Our reaction should not be to shut the door.”² “more not less, engagement with Turkey at all levels.” In addition, according to the most recent German Marshall Fund Transatlantic Trends Survey, Turkish public opinion still view the EU as an anchor of stability, despite its internal problems. Moreover it showed

that help for the EU has enhanced to some 53 percent which is almost obviously a reflection of both the internal and external (Syria) threats that Turkey is facing.¹

While today Turkey’s membership continues to remain a faraway potency and it may be that the EU and Turkey will never marry, this relationship is clearly going to still one of considerable importance. Despite being engulfed by crises the EU needs to show that it is also ready to show greater strategic thinking in terms of its Turkey policy than it has done in the past. The European Commission should review the behaviour of the EU accession negotiations with Turkey and reflect how EU-Turkey relations could be strengthened. At least one new negotiating chapter should be created as soon as possible, in particular chapter 23 dealing with basic EU values, essential rights and freedoms. Further cooperation on issues of mutual interest, ranging from TTIP and the updating of Turkey’s Customs Union to illegal immigration and Syrian refugees is also critical. While nobody is expecting a necessary change of approach from those Member States that are opposed to Turkish membership, such a step would help rebuild trust.

Furthermore there are currently many unknowns that will affect the future aspect of relations. While the shape of the new government in Ankara will be significant, other issues including the result of the Cyprus peace negotiations and the future aspect of the EU, post-crisis could also be important game changers. For example, in the future there could be dissimilar integration which would make new members such as Turkey to enter the EU but with some obstacles on federal elements. In addition, the UK’s referendum on EU membership could create a new model of relationship between the EU and UK which may open up a new chance for Turkey too. (Paul, 2015)

How 2015 elections affected Turkey-EU Future Relations

On 7 June 2015 Turkey will set its 2015 general election to elect the 550 members of the Grand National Assembly. The outcome will definitely have an effect on Turkey-EU relations. There are a number of formidable issues standing in the way of Turkey and the EU making any progress in their already bumpy partnership:

accession negotiations have been stalled, as a result of Cyprus’s blockage of most of the chapters and Turkey’s perplexity to open the remaining ones. Furthermore, Turkey and the EU have common challenges other than accession talks, such as security ISIS, refugees and energy fields. (Danisman, 2015)

Despite these many common difficulties, the attention drawn to Turkey-EU relations by Turkish political parties is limited and in their electoral campaigns, parties rather concentrated on issues such as economic development, the long-standing Kurdish issue, large infrastructure projects and rule of law. At all events, the four major parties, the Justice and Development Party AKP, the Nationalist Action Party MHP, the Social democrat Republican People’s Party CHP and the People’s Democratic Party HDP have very different positions with respect to the EU and their political manifestos ahead of the elections reflect these variations. After the elections a new relation can be expected between Turkey and the EU due to the growing desire to cooperate, even though this will probably not translate into a honeymoon.¹

The ruling AKP may be the winner of the elections but with less margin compared to former elections. According to AKP’s election manifesto, EU membership is a strategic goal, but it should not be considered as a substitution to Turkey’s relations with other countries. The government party also aim at lifting visas for Turkish citizens traveling to the EU, and wants an update of the Customs Union and support financial cooperation along with a renewal of EU accession talks. Especially lifting the visa requirements for other countries than the EU member states is an accomplishment the AKP prides itself on visas for Turkish citizens traveling to China are predicted to be raised in 2016; while visa requirements for Ukraine and Russia have already been raised and it is predicted that they will be pursuing negotiations with the EU on this matter after the elections. The issue of improving the Customs Union has been raised by Turkish policy-makers for a long time and recently Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström asked for a talk mandate. (Danisman, 2015)

The Social Democrat Republican People’s Party CHP is actually the major opposition party and this will probably still the same after the elections. CHP has the boldest position on EU accession and promises to accomplish EU accession talks by

making Turkey an EU member. In addition, CHP promises to not give one-sided concessions to the EU, protect Turkey’s interest in relation to the TTIP, explain how Turkey’s membership will make both sides more peaceful and supported Turkish-Cypriots legitimate demands vis-à-vis the EU. Compared to other parties that are expected to be represented in the Grand National Assembly, the ruling AKP and main opposition party CHP seem to give more priority to EU membership than other opponents.¹

The Nationalist Action Party MHP, a centre-right nationalist party and third force in the parliament, does not consider EU membership as a priority and looks at the EU as an institution not related to Turkey’s identity and power. Although, in case of a victory, it would reinforce continuing accession talks unless they will touch upon issues considered fundamental to Turkey’s national integrity. This particularly represents relations with Armenia, Cyprus and Greece and the fight against terrorism.

The People’s Democratic Party HDP could to be the fourth party under the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s roof and is, rather, taking a leftist approach related to that of Greece’s Syriza. HDP is walking on thin ice: it’s not sure whether it will be able to pass the 10% outset. However, its potential existence in the parliament could mainly change the power balance in the Turkish parliament. HDP’s political manifesto touches upon Turkey–EU relations only briefly, simply saying “we will consider EU accession negotiations and full membership according to our principles”.

Elections are expected to be created by the governing AKP’s victory. However, the number of parties in the parliament will determine whether or not the AKP can change the constitution alone or even whether the AKP can form an unlimited plurality government on its own. If HDP passes the 10% outset, the AKP will possibly be faced with two choices: either form a coalition government with one of the mentioned parties, or rule as a minority government. The AKP needs 368 seats in order to change the constitution on its own, 331 to bring the submitted changes in the constitution to the referendum and 276 to form a single party government. If HDP will not be able to pass the threshold, the proceedings of a single party government is the most likely result. (Danisman, 2015)

Regardless of who will win the elections, the new Turkish government will need to cooperate with the EU to vanquish different tricky challenges. This needs an approach beyond the accession talks. Recently the European Commission asked a authorize to revise the Customs Union and on-going TTIP talks possible impacts to the Turkey would be on the agenda. Moreover, visa-free travel talks are on-going and according to the European Stability Initiative (ESI), Turkey needs to make some significant efforts if it wants to accomplish the standard and reach the visa-free travel goal.¹

Migration and security also pose a challenge to the partners; at the moment, Turkey is accommodating around 2 million Syrian refugees and is in dire need of help from EU countries. At the same time, the EU is attempting to deal with the continuing disasters in the Mediterranean. Both sides definitely need each other in that realm. They will also have to cooperate against ISIS and the threat of terrorism, especially regarding foreign fighters originating from the EU member states. However, despite these common challenges, EU accession talks will not make any obvious progress unless a deal is made on Cyprus. (Danisman, 2015)

Elections have a tendency to slow everything down, and Turkey and the EU relations are far away from its potential. In order to avert another lost term, leaders on both sides should appreciate revitalizing common ties.

**Turkish Foreign Policy after the 2015 Elections**

The result of the 7 June general elections in Turkey led to an acute questioning of the future content and direction of some of the country’s key policy tendency. Among the key election outcomes were the loss of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) ultimate majority in Parliament after thirteen years with a decline of 10 percent in its vote share, as well as the 13 percent of the vote that was attained by the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) and led to their accession to the Turkish Parliament with eighty deputies. These outcomes offer that key policy changes could be in store for Turkey, and foreign policy is among the top contenders in the negotiation on potential policy change. (Danisman, 2015)

One major reason for this is the fact that Turkish foreign policy has been widely criticised since the late 2000s by many domestic and international observers on various grounds, including, but not limited to: a shift of axis towards the Middle East and North Africa at the expense of relations with Europe and the West; the pursuit, primarily after the Arab uprisings, of a heavily ideological and sectarian foreign policy; and henceforth its soft power in the region, due to its worsening domestic track record in democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental freedoms. (Danisman, 2015)

More recent criticisms concentrated on the AKP government’s disinterest towards the radical Islamists in Syria, many of whom entered Syria through the Turkish border, in its strong insistence to eject the Syrian government from power. These criticisms stand in severe contrast to the very appreciated Turkish foreign policy of the AKP’s former years in power, in which relations with the EU developed in tandem with Turkey’s growing weight in the Middle East and North Africa, Turkey’s improved democratic performance was realized as a key aspect of its growing soft power regionally and globally, and economic relations and more liberal mobility regimes were successfully instrumentalised to reinforce closer relations with the countries of its wider neighborhood. Thus a major question which immediately surfaced after the elections was whether Turkish foreign policy in its current form, with a rapidly diminishing regional power, is sustainable any longer and whether it has the chance to be changed under the post-election domestic power balances.

Another major reason for the increased importance of foreign policy in the post-election scenarios regarding the role that foreign policy actually accomplished in the election outcome. Research mentioned that foreign policy issues ordinarily have an unpretentious impact on the voting behaviour of the Turkish electorate compared to factors such as party identification and perceptions of economic action.1

Therewith, incipient postelection findings suggest that foreign policy positions may have played a vital role in these elections due to the mutual relations between the Kurdish issue and Turkish foreign policy in Syria. When the Islamic state militants beleaguered the Kurdish town of Kobane in Syria, the Turkish government initially

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did not allow the Kurdish Peshmerge forces from Iraq or the Kurdish citizens of Turkey to pass Turkish territory and the Turkish border to help the Kurdish forces in Kobane combat against the forces of the Islamic state.

Furthermore, President Erdoğan made declarations that gave the impression that the government realized the Islamic State forces to be less threatening than the prospect of a larger Kurdish state that included parts of Iraq and Syria, given its own domestic problems with its Kurdish minority. The government have changed its procession and allowed passage to Kobane upon strong pressure extended by the United States. The municipal uprisings in Turkey in reaction to the government’s initial indifference to the Kurdish militia’s and to its own Kurdish citizens calls for help to Kobane resulted in a death toll of thirty-five people in the country within three days in October 2014. (Danisman, 2015)

The large transformation of the AKP’s ethnical Kurdish vote to the HDP in the elections, which claimed that it played a vital role in the AKP’s loss of its single party rule, was in turn partly attributed to the Kobane incidents. The HDP in particular brought up the issue several times during its election campaign, and it has widely been argued that the government’s initial position in Kobane created a significant disillusionment across the Kurdish constituency that had formerly selected to vote for the AKP. While change seems both necessary and predestined given the rapidly shifting dynamics in Turkey’s greater neighbourhood, the heavy local and international criticisms levelled at its actual foreign policy, and the close internal-external linkage represented in the election result, much depends on post-election constellations. ¹

As of now, it is still to be seen whether Turkey will have a coalition government or, in the case that no government is successfully created, early elections. If an agreement can be obtained, a coalition government is most likely to be constituted between the AKP and the Republican People’s Party or between the AKP and the Nationalist Movement Party. Although hard to contemplate about, an AKP-CHP coalition may run the prospect of tendency the country’s foreign policy towards

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a more rationalist line by which ideological tendency of the former era are dropped in favor of more factual steps in the wider region.

This could possibly suggest improved and thus more balanced ties with the West, a tougher attitude against the Islamic state, better ties with other key regional players including Israel, and the sustenance of the internal peace process with its Kurdish citizens, which could in turn uphold Turkey’s confident activity in its region. This positive result would largely depended on the prosperity of the coalition and the extent to which the AKP would be universal of its coalition partner in foreign policy-making.

A possible AKP-MHP coalition, on the other hand, may represent a different, and less positive outcome. Given MHP’s strong euroscepticism and the AKP’s growing aversion to the European project since the second half of the 2000s, Turkey could be further excluded from the EU under an AKP-MHP coalition government. The rise of the nationalist tone in government would also conflicts with a possible reconciliation with Armenia or the resolution of the Cyprus conflict. Relations with the South could fare even worse. This is mainly due to the MHP’s potent opposition to the internal peace process and to the scopes of an independent Kurdish entity outside the country’s immediate borders. (Danisman, 2015)

Foreign policy pundits have already begun to contemplate that, if perceived, this could be a war coalition wherein Turkey would invade Syria to repulse the possibility of an independent Kurdish state or an autonomous Kurdish region along Turkey’s southern border. It has been argued that this would help to support the MHP’s nationalist goal, besides it would uphold Erdoğan and the AKP in the case that early elections are held even after the forming of the coalition. In other words, it could help to reinforce Erdoğan’s claim that the country needs a potent one-man rule thus presidentialism à la Erdoğan if it is to overcome these increasing sources of insecurity in the neighborhood. ¹

Some have also argued that Erdoğan may also go down that road in the case that no coalition is constituted and early elections become predestined. Government

¹ T. Alaranta, Tukey under the AKP, A critical evaluation from the perspective of Turkey’s EU negotiations, the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, February 2015. P.176.
officials have lately stated that any entry into Syria would be with the purpose of enhancing the fight against the Islamic state and that the PYD forces in Syria (Kurdish forces which are seen as an extension of the PKK by the Turkish state) are not viewed as the enemy. Yet it remains to be seen whether reason will finally predominate for the common good or whether Turkish foreign policy will further sink into the sump of its southern neighborhood in the post-election time.

Experts Opinion on Turkey Elections

Turkey held a national election Sunday and the results were shocking. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's AKP won 316 seats in Turkey's parliament, a stringent majority. That reflects the AKP's failure in June's elections, when it lost majority control in the legislature for the first time since it came to authority in 2003.

This was quite a surprise. "I know of no serious Turkey analyst, either Turkish or otherwise, who saw this coming," Michael Koplow, a Turkey expert at the Israel Policy Forum, writes. "The polling whiffed entirely." The AKP's big victory came on the back of an aggressive nationalist campaign and shows us that the AKP is still in control over Turkish politics. Here's why, and why that matters.

Turkey moving away from the European Union

"Macedonia is shaken by tape scandals in the past year, Turkey is tied for third place among the 19 States of Central and Eastern Europe and the central Asian states. Among the G-20 member states and the refusal of Turkey ranked from 10 to 12. Moreover, Turkey listed in the central index the worst performer in the past four years, including Libya and Brazil, which is being shaken with scandals," the announcement added. (Makovsky, 1999)

According to data index, 68 percent from 168 countries in the 2015 CPI scored below 50. Denmark was listed as the best performer with a score of 91, while Finland with 90 points and Sweden with 89 points after respectively. On the other hand, North Korea and Somalia were the worst performance this year is higher than awareness of corruption, a score of eight points. "These results clearly show the need to develop a more transparent, proper and accountable policies by public institutions and officials," urged Transparency International. (Makovsky, 1999)
Could Turkey redress its relationship with the EU?

The Turkish government should seriously determine the shortcomings towards the rule of law and fundamental rights. The AKP government should concentrate its attempts to write a new modern, civilian and contributory constitution, which guarantee the fundamental rights and freedoms of all citizens. Equally, restorative cause to a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish affair should also remain.

EU’s reform operation has made Turkey more democratic, stable and progressive. In this regard, the accession process should remain an anchor for Turkey’s economic and political reforms, and should not be replaced with other forms of association. While the accession process is at a crisis, cooperation between Turkey and the EU should be supported in crucial areas: The Customs Union, one of the main achievements of the Ankara Agreement, needs to be enhanced, following the recommendations of the World Bank report. Political talks on foreign policy issue, particularly in Syria and Iraq, should be enhanced, promoting counterterrorism collaboration and innovating new methods for humanitarian aid to comply with the Syrian refugee problem. Energy is a basic concern in EU-Turkey relations. Turkey’s further expansion as an energy bridge and potential energy hub will benefit both Turkey and the EU, helping to minimize energy dependency from Russia. Let me reiterate once again that the most suitable framework for exploiting the full potential of EU-Turkey relations remains to be active and credible accession negotiations. (BATALLA, 2016)

However, in order to give a new motivation to the relations between Turkey and the EU, the Turkish government needs to show first its desire and truthfulness in with regard to all the standards and values of the EU. Full transcript of speech made at the conference “A new Turkey, a new Europe and the new Middle East” held in Barcelona on October 28 at Blanquerna-Ramon Llull University School of Communication and International Relations. (BATALLA, 2016)

In recent years, many observers of international politics have tended to depict the Turkish foreign policy as increasingly moving away from its pro-Western orientation. This is surprising given the proliferation of political, economic, military and Turkey has with the United States and its European allies since the end of World War II. Turkey’s membership in NATO since 1952 – before traditional European
powers such as Spain, West Germany, or its role as a founding member of the Council of Europe in 1949 – again by Spain, Portugal, and the Central and Eastern European states which have become members to that organization, for integration into the European Union with an Association Agreement in 1963, later as a candidate for accession, Turkey final image photography system. (Makovsky, 1999)

Institutional linkages with European Turkey extensive irreversible in many cases. In addition, the military and economic capabilities reflect the country and the ability to exercise significant influence on the region and are located in Muftuler - Bac, 2014. Turkey's role in NATO's potential membership in the European Union, the turkish foreign policy in the Middle East have the ability to influence the global dynamics and the European role in the region.

Turkey’s geostrategic position historical and cultural with great neighbors to transform Turkey into a spearhead in world affairs. This is particularly important in a very turbulent period currently in international relations and specifically with the increasing instability in the region is located in Turkey.View and strategic geographical location, historical relations in the Middle East, military and economic capabilities, and one should expect Turkey to play a more active leadership role in foreign policy. But in recent years, Turkish foreign policy is increasingly filled with multiple deficiencies. To give some concrete examples, Turkey has no diplomatic relations with Israel, a one-time close friend and ally in the 1990s, with Syria or with Egypt. Relations with Iran and Iraq in accession negotiations with the European Union, which continues since 2005, slowly ceased, the biggest ally, the United States, it seems that serious concerns the relationship between them. (Makovsky, 1999)

Even Turkey's apparently stable relations with the Gulf States are deteriorating. Of course, there are other factors that play a role in this area to hold Turkey's relations with these States and groups of States, and the main cause of this disorder is not only because of its foreign policy options. An important pillar of Turkish foreign policy that its relations with the European Union. Turkey formulated its foreign policy
objectives to become a member of the then European Community as early as 1959, two years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome. ¹

The negotiation of an Association Agreement in 1963, the Customs Union Agreement in 1995, officially became a candidate to join the European Union in 1999 began accession negotiations in 2005. Despite the high level of political commitment to European Union norms and standards until 2008, Turkey drifted away from its EU membership objective.

An important factor leading this difference on mixed signals from the European Union: The European Union suspended negotiations for 8 chapters at the end of 2006 due to the Turkish non-implementation of the Additional Protocol on the Customs Union to Cyprus. EU members such as France and Cyprus opening chapters where Turkey opposed capable of opening the European Union long marks been achieved in most of them. Internal problems within the European Union towards further expansion towards Turkey’s accession especially reflected on Turkey, resulting in a loss of credibility for the process of negotiations. (Makovsky, 1999)

Turkey’s commitment to the European Union is also doubtful while moved away from the European Union norms of liberal democracy, and adopted measures to limit freedoms. As relations between Turkey and the European Union, accession negotiations are broken, Turkey moved away from Europe. However, Turkey draws a decisive European position of Turkish political transformation to promote democracy. The weakening of this anchor does not bode well for the future of European Turkish relations, and also for Turkish democracy.²

To give a sense of deteriorating democratic standards during the past five years, through a quick look at the different classifications of democracy from Freedom House to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy Index of press freedom index, the gender gap in the world apparently. For example, in 2014, Turkey occupied its 154 among 180 States in press freedom. As well as reports of Freedom House reports on Turkey lists the country as partly free, Turkey ranked 125 among 140 countries in

2014 Gender Gap Index. In all of these categories, could see the deterioration increasingly democratic after 2011. (Makovsky, 1999)

This democratic deterioration is then reflected on Turkey’s relations with Europe, but also its relative role in the Middle East region. Although Turkey has increasingly moved away from Europe, in its relations with its neighbours in the Middle East have passed similar pros and cons. Until 2010, Turkey’s relations with its Arab neighbors. Adopted soft power of diplomacy with all these States to expand economic relations both through trade and foreign direct investment, increased social interactions between Turkey and the Arab countries through tourism as well as the export of Turkish soap operas.

However, developments in the Arab world after 2010 were a sudden shock in Turkish foreign policy. The Arab spring constituted a serious test for Turkish foreign policy of “zero problems” or did not identify the Turkish foreign policy since 2007, where the main objective is to eliminate all sources of tension with its neighbors, particularly in the Middle East. However, the process of socio-political transformation in the Middle East since 2010 led to the collapse of authoritarian governments. Specifically, the old regimes in the Arab world found itself facing demands for Justice, freedom and democracy.¹

The common is that there appears to be a societal demand increased political participation and fundamental freedoms. Despite its commitment to promoting democracy in its periphery, the European Union’s role in Arab spring has been largely ineffective. As a result, Turkey had a prime opportunity to work on strengthening regional actor promoting both democratic consolidations in the region and democratization process in the spring. (Makovsky, 1999)

This was partly because Turkey considered democratic and secular state the overwhelming majority of the Muslim community in a system where there is coexistence of Islamic values with Western lifestyles. These unique characteristics of the Turkish political system were confusing in neighboring Turkey, but also to

Western Europe. In the Arab world, there monitoring developments in Turkey, notably the "secular liberal and reformist groups.

Turkey is making transparency international’s 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) declined by three points from the previous year to reach 42, making the country the worst performer in the index over the past four years, along with countries like Libya and Brazil. This also indicated a two-spot drop in the rankings compared to last year; put the Turkey in 66 among 168 countries participating, according to a report released on Jan. 27.¹

Transparency International, the global civil society organization in the fight against corruption, published the index annually since 1995, when the total was 41. According to the data released by the transparency International Turkey, Turkey’s score fell three points to 42, down from its 2014 score of 45. Turkey also dropped from 64th to 66th.

“Tuning improved in the past six years, with the drop in 2014, the reported decrease in 2015 means Turkey has suffered a negative status,” said the report. This decline stemmed from the “negative unfavorable deterioration of the reforms had improved over the past few years,” said the index statement. (Makovsky, 1999)

Extending has been one of the EU’s most successful foreign policy strategies. Theoretically all Member States are complying with EU enlargement as an irreversible process, as declared at the 2001 Gothenburg European Council summit. However, history has shown that EU Member States, while committed to the general idea of enlargement, have showed different support methods for certain candidates, which is often determined by their self-interest. Furthermore, according to the academic Piers Ludlow, despite its centrality to the life and operation of the EC/EU, extending has never been simple and has seldom been perceived positively by those already inside. (Paul, 2015)

Despite reservations enlargement has remained although the EU’s appetite has reduced with the restrictions of the EU’s enlargement policy becoming increasingly obvious. These days, not only is the EU in an almost permanent state of enlargement

crisis, the extended economic recession which has covered the eurozone since 2008 has brought about a more domestic looking EU and stymied its foreign policy outreach, which has affected on the motivation in accession talks with a number of countries in the Western Balkans as well as Turkey. This crisis was made obvious by the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, in his assertion vote in the European Parliament when he said “There will be no new enlargement in the next five years, the EU needs to mark a pause in its enlargement process so that we can consolidate what has been done with 28.” (Paul, 2015)

Historically Turkey has strong relations with the West, going back to the days of the Ottoman Empire with Turkish history and identity inextricably sophisticated with that of Europe. However, while the two have cooperated for centuries in numerous areas, according to Turkey expert Nathalie Tocci it is a relationship identified by cooperation and assemblage and by recurrent ups and downs. This remains the case today.

Turkey’s EU story began over fifty years ago in 1959 when the following Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, responded to membership of the EEC. At that time the EEC was a group of six countries, Francisco Franco was the head of a totalitarian regime in Spain and the Berlin Wall had not yet been built. After half a decade both the EU and Turkey have become very different. The EU has converted into the world’s largest economic cluster, increasing to 28 members. Meanwhile Turkey has gone from being named ‘the sick man of Europe’ to a dynamic and influence regional power with prosperity. Yet despite Turkey having strating accession talks with the EU in 2005, the country is no closer to joining the Club than it was half a decade ago. The accession talks are de facto congealed, while all opinion polls demonstrate the division in the European public over this issue, as are governments and parliaments across the continent. At the same time, as accession talks have run aground, democratic values and civil liberties in have been eroded as the ruling the Justice and Development Party and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, have taken procedures to centralise power and identify the rule of law.1

Regarding the membership operation, Turkey remains a country of vital significance for the EU with a serious level of interdependence in many fields.

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including trade, foreign and security policy, migration and energy. When the EU faces crises with eastern and southern countries, a reliable and predictable Turkey, with which it can cooperate in the Black Sea and Middle East countries, is serious. The EU’s policy of the last few years has confirmed counterproductive, eroding trust and cooperation rather than supporting it and needs to be revised. (Paul, 2015)

**Global response to severe restrictions**

This decline may also explains that “a global response to severe restrictions on freedom of speech and expression, and increasing internet censorship and social media clear pressure on the judiciary in Turkey,” according to Özarslan.

“In the social and political situation, the results of the 2015 index confirms that the issue of corruption has become an issue of freedom of democracy, speech and expression. In this context, Transparency International states that fast growing economies, classifying Turkey belong, to develop the culture of impunity, and to embrace a culture of transparency, which is indispensable and responsible democratic society.,” she said.¹

The international data can have an impact on the volume of direct foreign investments (FDI) Turkey receives, said Özarslan, who urged that “compared to states in strict economic cooperation and/or competition with Turkey, Turkey is in a continuous decline.” The Transparency International Turkey chief stressed, “Such a trend could influence national and multinational companies operating in Turkey directly due to increased perceived risk. Bearing in mind that states the concepts of corruption perceptions are high and a culture of transparency does not exist, weak economic growth and rising production costs is unavoidable, and it hurts the local economy.” ²

The methodology of CPI is based on data sources from 12 different studies by 11 international institutions specializing in governance and business climate analysis for 168 countries, and reflects the opinions of experts and business people on

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corruption in the public sector. The index uses a scale from 0 which is considered highly corrupt to 100 which are very clean ranking. (Makovsky, 1999)

Turkey’s score determined the content and results of eight surveys out of these 12 international surveys. These eight surveys were by the World Economic Forum EOS, the Bertelsmann Foundation TI, IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, Bertelsmann Foundation SGI, World Justice Project ROL, PRS International Country Risk Guide, Economic Intelligence Unit and IHS Global Insight. (Makovsky, 1999)

**The EU’s altering external environment**

There is a significant alteration in the European Union’s external environment, especially with regards to the changing political landscape in the Middle East. The EU is faced with a massive refugee crisis since the beginning of 2015 when an unprecedented flow of people, from Syria in particular, have flocked to the gates of Europe. The crisis reached its peak in September 2015, with thousands of refugees trying to cross the Balkans and EU member states such as Hungary in their quest to reach their ultimate destinations on the European continent, specifically Germany. The massive influx of people combined with the European uncertainty over the proper responses to the refugee crisis led to increased border controls and a discussion on re-inserting closed door policy. According to Dimitris Avramopoulos, the European Commissioner in charge of immigration policy, the refugee crisis poses challenges to the European integration process and the Schengen zone since “Schengen is the greatest and most tangible achievement of European integration. But some policies are putting Schengen in danger.”

It is difficult moment for Europe. Unfortunately, the European dream has vanished.” So, how did one of the greatest achievements of the European Union's borderless Europe, reached the brink of collapse and what can be done to save it? Syrian civil war which broke out in 2011 has led to the displacement of people in neighboring countries. These neighboring countries, that Turkey received more than 2 million Syrian refugees, putting an economic, social and political burden on the Turkish government.

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Although most of the Syrian neighbors, such as Turkey where humanitarian aftershocks left Syrian civil war, the European Union and adopted measures only when directly threatened with massive influx of people, but not a relationship before Turkey. It might be useful to recall that to recall that Turkey has received more than 2 million refugees, but the European Union cannot host countries until about 100 thousand people.¹

It was only in the summer of 2015 that the European Union found itself in the face of the wave of refugees who remain in transit from Turkey to the European Union. In July 2015 alone, around 150,000 Syrian refugees reached Europe through the Aegean Sea and the Balkan route. As the Balkan countries and Central and Eastern European countries found themselves on the front line for the refugees, they suffered greatly from this flow.

On August 20, 2015, Macedonia declared a state of emergency unable to cope with the daily flux of people onto its borders and on August 30, 2015 Hungary built a fence on its border with Serbia. With the closure of the Hungarian border for refugees this time to Croatia and Slovenia in order to cross into Austria, and eventually to Germany. Faced with this massive exodus, the European Union had no choice but to formulate a plan of action, a feat that it was able to avoid since 2011. The first step was taken in September 2015, with a pre-set calendar and quotas for accepting refugees. The German government has taken a leading position with its unilateral announcement that it would welcome 800,000 Syrian refugees in 2015.²

Of course, this has led to an increase in the worse of another wave of refugees trying to reach Germany by chance. However, the burden of front line confrontation such as Greece and Italy, as well as the countries of Central and Eastern Europe cannot be solved unilaterally by the German initiative of welcoming refugees. In September 2015, the European Union member states agreed to adopt a Syrian refugee quotas redistribution of 160,000 Syrian refugees in Greece and Italy to the rest of the European Union member states,² in a time span of two years.

Perhaps expect some European Union member states such as Hungary opposed Germany welcomed the refugees, as well as the redistribution of quotas, accused Germany of moral imperialism’.3 The bickering among the member states over the redistribution was illustrated in the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting on September 14, 2015. 1

The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania opposed the redistribution of the refugees among the European Union members in the JHA Council. However, because the proposal was adopted in the JHA Council and not the European Council, a qualified majority was sufficient for its adoption rather than unanimity which would have been the case had the vote was taken in the European Council, where any one of the above mentioned member states would have vetoed the proposal.

United Kingdom has not been included in the meeting of the board as excluded from the Schengen zone and the Common Asylum policy. Of those whose vote could not stop the adoption of the proposal, Slovakia decided to take legal action against this re-distribution taking the complaints to the European Court of Justice.

Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Minister of Finance in the Netherlands in the hope from the standpoint of the Western European point of view with regard to Central and Eastern European members as “Poland is taking only a limited number of people…Poland gets a lot of support. Help build Poland - they should take up asylum seekers in return. 2

According to Miro Cerar, the Slovenian Prime Minister: “The European Union will start falling apart if it fails to take concrete action to tackle the refugee crisis.”5 This is why, on October 15, 2015, the European Council met to discuss a new action plan to deal with the refugee crisis and agreed on stepping up efforts to coordinate with the countries of origin and transit.6 In other words, the European Union was unable to come to a consensus on the fate of the refugees after they succeeded getting

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on the European soil, so a shift in focus was adopted with solving the problem prior to their departure, either with their home countries or with the countries of transit.

On October 25, 2015, a European Union mini-summit with Balkan countries was held in Brussels in which the JHA Council decision was pushed back, and a new deal was agreed on. The European Union agreed to a new policy for the processing of the refugees and asylum seekers by setting up centers of reception in the European Union member states in the Balkans, such as Greece, Slovenia, and Croatia but also candidate states such as Serbia. The reception centers would process the arriving refugees by finger printing and registering them prior to their re-distribution to the European Union members, in particular Germany. ¹

In addition, the humanitarian needs of refugees in these centers provide shelter, food and basic necessities provided. Increased border controls, and increase contacts between the European Union members and the Balkan countries as part of this 17-point action plan agreement.

The registration of the refugees prior to their arrival in Germany would enable the German government to decide on whom to take and send back those deemed undesirable back to where they come from. This, in turn, required a deal with countries where they departed from to get to the European Union. While this deal took care of the processing and at least ameliorated the needs of the refugees, there was still the need to cope with the 1 million potential refugees waiting in line to come to Europe.²

The most important route seemed to be from Turkey to Greece via the Aegean Sea, and then from there to Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia or Slovenia onto Austria and Germany. Turkey was not invited to the October 25 summit that the European Union agreed on new measures. The border closure in Hungary more or less closed road Hungarian.

The need to keep refugees at home and/ or sending them again after it has been processed and registered in reception centers and have become a pressing issue for the

European Union, and requires reaching agreement with third parties. As a result, on November 11-12, 2015, the European Union member states held an emergency summit in Malta on the refugee crisis. The Valletta Conference address common concerns for European and African countries on migration flows, particularly with a focus on readmission measures for African countries.

The European Union decided to set-up an emergency fund of 1.8 billion Euros to assist the African governments to deal with unwanted migration and keep possible refugees at home. Thus, by the end of November 2015, it seemed that the European Union, unable to cope with what it perceived was a massive influx of people, decided to outsource the solution to the countries in the periphery and assist them in keeping the refugees in their countries. The pressing problem created a rift between the European Union member states, Especially with Germany on one side, and Greece and in Central and Eastern Europe members-the other front-line States.¹

The German position was one of commitment to the EU’s open door policy, and Germany also indicated its initial desire to accept refugees from Syria, about 1 million in the next year. According to the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, “This is one of the greatest litmus test faced by Europe.” ²

However, the German commitment to keep internal borders in Europe open and its ‘Welcomekultur’ for Syrian refugees was perceived by the rest of the European Union members as a unilateral decision. The German leadership in this aspect favored controlled admission to the refugees coming to Europe, but precisely because it was adopted unilaterally, the other European Union member states.

The only reasonable solution seems to be to reach an agreement with Turkey, a particularly appealing way out. Interestingly, “Merkel cautioned that there would be no solution without Turkey as ’we will not solve the refugee problem completely; we need, among other things, further talks with Turkey. Only with Turkey we can switch illegality to legality. It is very important that the European Commission discusses further the migration agenda with Turkey.” This is precisely why the German

Chancellor Angela Merkel visited Istanbul on November 1, 2015 and met with the Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan, reaching a deal on EU aid of 3 billion Euros and revitalizing the accession talks in return for the Turkish commitment to act as a gatekeeper for the Syrian refugees and keep them in Turkey. This also fits change the course of action adopted by the European Union with its top 25 October on refugees, outsourcing the problem. In October 2015, Turkey and the European Union agreed on a joint plan of action.

According to this plan, Turkey would process the asylum applications to Europe and send a pre-set number of refugees to Europe, and keep the rest in its own camps. The European Union will pay the costs of material to keep the camps open and running. Most importantly, Turkey would be obliged to take back and provide for those who are either unable to move to Europe, or asylum applications. ¹

The re-energized accession process

The developments at the end of 2015 for Turkey European Union relations have been largely unexpected and sudden. In return for keeping Turkey firmly tied to the European Union, the European Union leaders seemed intent to revitalize and re-energize the almost paralyzed Turkish European Union relations. Turkey's accession negotiations, since 2005, have been particularly Rocky. While it began with high hopes on both sides, increasingly after 2011, they were stalled and frozen. The European Commission suspended in 2006 opening of 8 chapters on the free movement of Turkish goods non compliance with the additional Protocol ”, Customs Union agreement in 1995 on the basis, mainly it's no implementation of the customs union to Cyprus (Muftuler-Bac, 2008).

In the post 2006 period, Cyprus which acceded to the EU in 2004, vetoed 6 chapters even in areas where Turkey and the European Union were ready to negotiate, and France vetoed 5 chapters. However, the European Union's role in the political transition process crucial to Turkish, and the European Union anchor mattered to a great extent in terms of the democratization process in Turkey. However, as European Union's accession goal redeployment as well as with individual Member States veto, the Turkish commitment to political reforms also waned.

As a result of fluctuations and internal conflicts within the EU about Turkey's accession, the accession process has come to a standstill, with only 14 Chapters out of 35 opened since 2005 (Cicek, 2015).

Therefore, it was surprising to see that the European Union decided to proceed with the opening of chapter 17-frozen since June 2007. In October 2015, when it was more-or-less clear that the European Union was unable to overcome its own internal divisions over the refugee crisis, the emphasis on the problem shifted to Turkey, which emerged as a key interlocutor for the refugee issues.

However, Turkey's accession process was going nowhere with talks on the remaining chapters were either frozen or suspended. In order to conclude an agreement with the Turkish Government on refugees in line with the new priorities in the European Union, it seems that the European Union had in the process. In Exchange for its role in assisting refugee problems in the European Union, there were two clear demands from the Turkish side, one was related to the visa free travel for the Turks, and the other was revitalizing the accession process. On 29 may 2015, the EU held a bilateral Summit with Turkey for the first time in the enlargement process. In the EU-Turkey summit, the European Union agreed to lift the visa restrictions on the Turkish citizens on a gradual basis in return for the Turkish compliance with the terms of its Readmission Agreement with the European Union signed on December 16, 2013.¹

**New Relations between Turkey and EU in 2015?**

2014 was an intense year for both Turkey and the EU. Against the backdrop of a cooling-down economy Turkey and sluggish recovery EU, the most important changes for both players undoubtedly took place in the political domain. In August 2014, after having served eleven years as prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became Turkey's first-ever directly elected president. Erdoğan’s trusted aide, former Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmed Davutoğlu was appointed as prime minister. Following the presidential elections, Erdoğan’s conservative Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Justice and Development Party further consolidated its power.

Consequentially, Erdoğan’s notion of the new Turkey a strong, independent Turkey with a ballot-style democracy, wary of military coups and ‘parallel structures’ and with Erdoğan and the AKP firmly steering the country into its first centennial in 2023 was brought one step closer to fruition.

More or less simultaneously, three major European Institutions – the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament– experienced significant overhauls as mandates expired. Former Polish PM, Donald Tusk was hailed President of the European Council– a landmark decision as it was the first time a not so new EU Member State managed to secure one of the EU’s top jobs. Luxembourgian political veteran Jean-Claude Juncker became President of the European Commission, whereas the European Parliament elections resulted in a victory largely for the Eurosceptic party groups and parliamentarians –mostly at the expense of the three ‘traditional’ parliamentary groups, the conservative European Peoples Party EPP, the Social-Democrats and the Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe ALDE. ¹

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s presidential term started-out hopeful for EU-Turkey relations, at least in theory. Already during his election campaign in summer 2014, Erdoğan declared to become an ‘active’ president, particularly in the foreign policy domain. And indeed, when taking his oath Erdoğan already vowed to make EU membership the top priority of Turkey. Policy-makers followed suit, and under the guidance of Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator, Volkan Bozkır, a new EU strategy was launched in November 2014. The Strategy itself boldly takes stock of Turkey’s “spectacular transformation” since 2002 while simultaneously envisaging getting the country closer to the EU in terms of political and socio-economic standards.²

More positivity filled the air following a visit of three members of the new European Commission –including Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Commissioner for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn. During its visit the EU’s top brass recalled

the “strategically important” bilateral relations between the EU-Turkey, with Mogherini allegedly declaring that “Our top priority will be Turkey’s EU accession process.”

After these platitudes heard so often already over the years– the mood changed drastically and things spiralled out of control quickly. On December 14, Turkish police arrested 24 leading journalists on the suspicion of being linked to a terrorist organisation and having ties with wanted Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen –whom the Turkish authorities suspect wanting to establish a ‘parallel state.’ Not entirely coincidentally, and with some sense for drama, the raid took place nearly one year after the Turkish judiciary launched a massive graft probe into Erdoğan’s’s inner circle. This presumably Gülen-instigated graft operation led to the resignation of 4 ministers and presented Erdoğan with his biggest political challenge up-to-date.

In a statement issued directly after the arrests, the EU appeared not-amused. In strong wordings it reminded Turkey that its dire track-record with regard to media freedom is incompatible with one of the core conditions for EU-membership: liberal democracy. And despite declaring 2014, a “European Year” for Turkey, Erdoğan in turn was quick to return to ‘business as usual’, rebuking any criticism and telling the EU that it should mind its own business and keep its own opinions to itself.”

In just a matter of days, the fragile ‘rapprochement’ was smashed to tatters and once more EU-Turkey relations hit rock-bottom. Certainly, Turkey and the EU are strategic partners –in terms of economy and geopolitics–and would benefit from having close relations. Over the past decades, ties between the EU and Turkey have frequently severed. Yet, mutual dependency has often soothed and salvaged relations. This was especially pertinent when Turkey was one of the world’s fastest growing economies –one of the ‘MINT’ countries alongside Mexico, Indonesia and Nigeria– while EU Members where experiencing the worst recession since the 1920s.

It remains to be seen whether Turkey-EU relations can be polished once more in 2015. It might well be that negativity finally has gotten hold over the intrinsic value of mutual dependency between the EU and Turkey.

Compared to a few years ago, Turkey’s present economic prospects look rather gloomy. With inflation and unemployment on the rise and the Lira devaluing, Turkey has seen its growth prospects dampen. Instead of a MINT country, Turkey is now considered a member of the “Fragile Five.” Alongside Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia and India, analysts consider Turkey particularly prone to negative external influences –predominantly due its significant current account deficit.\(^1\)

Another aspect which could hamper EU-Turkey relations further is Erdoğan himself. Policy-makers in Europe feel increasingly doubtful about Turkey’s European credentials when reading Erdoğan’s statements about the “natural” inequality between men and women or his pledge to reintroduce the Ottoman language at schools –nearly a century after Atatürk introduced the Latin alphabet at the expense of the Arabic one.\(^2\) Moreover, many feel increasingly worried about Erdoğan’s autocratic tendencies. Although an ‘active’ President, many fear that Erdoğan has become rather too active, with the president recently chairing cabinet meetings or National Security Council meetings in his Ak Saray his new and pompous presidential palace built on the premises of the former Atatürk forest.\(^3\)

Equally worrying, Erdoğan has never made secret out of his ambitions to transform the Turkish presidency from a largely symbolic position into a more ‘American-style’ posting, in which a president possesses significant executive powers. In order to bring forward necessary constitutional amendments the AKP should ensure a two-thirds majority in the June 2015 parliamentary elections.

\(^1\) BBC (26 September 2013). The Fragile Five. [Accessed date 07 January 2015], Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24280172


\(^3\) The Guardian (29 December 2014). Turkey’s Erdoğan to chair first cabinet meeting as president. [Accessed date 08 January 2015], Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/29/turkey-president-erdogan-chair-cabinet-meeting
Another issue impeding Turkey-EU relations are Turkey’s foreign policy choices, which although serving Turkey’s interests in the short-run—raise question marks in the West. So far, NATO-member Turkey has acted reluctantly in the Syria conflict and has been slow to heed American requests for using its İncirlik airbase in operations against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.\footnote{Hürriyet Daily News (15 December 2014). İncirlik airbase for anti-ISIL coalition to be part of a single package: Turkish FM. [Accessed date 08 January 2015], Available at: \url{http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/incirlik-airbase-for-anti-isil-coalition-to-be-part-of-a-single-package-turkish-fm.aspx?pageID=238&nID=75624&NewsCatID=359}}

Moreover, in the wake of the recent conflict in Ukraine—in which Russia annexed the Crimea, stirred-up secessionist movements in East Ukraine, and consequentially saw tensions between the EU and Russia rise to unprecedented levels—Turkey has been steadily vamping relations with Russia. Despite an EU trade-embargo with Russia, Turkey is currently negotiating a free trade agreement with Russia while talks about increased and discounted Russian gas imports are continuing at a steady pace.\footnote{Today’s Zaman (08 December 2014). Turkey’s gas deals with Russia raise concerns of dependency. [Accessed date 08 January 2015], Available at: \url{http://www.todayszaman.com/national_turkeys-gas-deals-with-russia-raise-concerns-of-dependency_365960.html}} Unsurprisingly, the first related indignations have arisen at European level, with the European Parliament’s Chair of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee Kefalogiannis accusing Turkey of exploiting the EU’s Russian quagmire for its own interests while urging “As a candidate country, Turkey should bring its foreign policy into line with that of the EU.”

Perhaps most importantly, it seems that the mood has changed in Brussels and Strasbourg. The EU has been slow to recover from a severe recession, whereas concerns about the Islamification of Europe are currently increasing in breadth and profundity with the Pegida movement in Germany and the Al-Qaida-backed assault on French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo as prime examples. Simultaneously, enlargement appears to have tumbled-down the European Commission’s priority list. Juncker’s Political Guidelines which largely define the policy orientation of the European Commission for the years to come—state that “the EU needs to take a break from enlargement.” Although he declared that negotiations will continue predominantly with the Western Balkans—, Juncker envisages halting the expansion of
the EU for at least five years. In accordance with this policy orientation, the new European Commission lacks a commissioner solely responsible for enlargement. Instead, Commissioner Johannes Hahn has been charged merely with ‘negotiating’ enlargement, not with making enlargement actually happen. (Wedekind, 2015)

In addition, the EU has been largely unresponsive to respond to Turkey’s calls to be included in Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership TTIP the massive free trade agreement between the EU and US. Although it is still too early to tell whether Turkey will be in or excluded in the final deal, Prime Minister Davutoğlu has already signalled that Turkey is ready to “discuss” the EU-Turkey Customs Union in case of exclusion.

As the Customs Union is a sine qua non for Turkey’s EU-membership, dissolving it would mean that Turkey’s EU-bid will be effectively halted. All of this is dire news for Turkey’s EU aspirations especially when considering that many of its European friends have left the stage following elections. To make matters worse, the ones that are still present in Brussels and Strasbourg are often left disgruntled and disappointed over Turkey’s present course, with the country apparently drifting away from the West.

The times that Turkey could count on support from the European Parliament’s Friends of Turkey intergroup or the former European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan Füle –sharp, but always keen to continue dialogue while pointing-out the common interests of Turkey and the EU appear to have long gone. Instead, Turkey appears to have been removed from the EU’s immanent policy priorities, with no formal reference to the country in Juncker’s Political Guidelines.¹

So, 2015 could well be a year of at least stalemate and possibly even further regression in Turkey-EU relations. Is there nothing positive to mention at all then? Yes there is: first, in its October 2014 Progress Report on Turkey, the European Commission called for setting opening benchmarks for negotiation chapters 23 and 24

Assessment of Turkey – EU relations

Relations between Turkey and the European Union have fluctuated between support for and wariness over future membership on both sides, but not over the need for close relations. There is little wariness among most observers that over its first eight years, the EU joining process has been a major motivation behind Turkey’s internal march toward reform and democratization. It has also been a factor in supporting transform Turkey’s economy and its political and military institutions, leadership, and political culture, both at the national and the local government level. It has helped to constitute a closer relationship between Europe and Turkey. Economic ties between the EU and Turkey, despite the current obstacles within the Eurozone, have developed over the past several years with nearly half of Turkey’s exports flowing to Europe.¹

Turkey’s strong and developing economy offers a large and important market for European goods and services and will remain in doing so for a long time. Turkish

businesses are prospering in parts of Europe and Turkey has become a magnate for foreign direct investment with that from Europe. Turkey's role as an important energy hub and transit region for European energy supply change continues to increase as was recently seen with the decision to construct the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline TAP which will bring natural gas from Azerbaijan across Turkey, via the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline TANAP, into Italy and parts of Europe. The case of instability in Europe's southern neighborhood of North Africa and the Middle East suggest closer EU-Turkey relations.  

The new activity in Turkey’s foreign policy which started in 2010 by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu with the aim at constituting Turkey as a more independent regional power has led EU Enlargement Commissioner Füle and others to suggest that a “strategic dialogue” with Turkey on foreign policy should become a regular feature of the relationship. These examples enhanced the belief among many that both the EU and Turkey do need each other for many reasons.

The need for good neighborly relations, the current economic and financial recession within the Eurozone and a continued healthy level of public skepticism or inconsistency toward EU enlargement to Turkey on the part of many Europeans, fueled by cultural and religious differences, however, continues to cloud European situation about Turkey, not as an important neighbor to Europe, economic partner, or regional foreign policy authority, but simply as a total member of the Union. This situation was highlighted in June when it was reported that German Chancellor Merkel’s coalition partners, the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union included in their election manifesto that Turkey should not become a member of the European Union. In addition, it appears that the increased number of Europeans have expressed concerns regarding what seems to some as a change in Turkey’s political, economic, social, and religious orientation.  

Europeans believe that "Turkish public opinion polls reflect deepening cynicism about the EU and that the popularity of a Turkish leadership more keen on flaunting its affinity, solidarity, and close links to Muslim brothers than European friends exacerbates concerns that Turkey has an inherently non-European

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configuration. Despite these problems, a few EU member states, and in particular the EU Commission, still continue to publically express a need to see Turkey’s joining move forward. ¹

On the other hand, it has been suggested that Europe’s nonchalance, skepticism or in the case of a few, explicit opposition to Turkey’s membership, along with the identified EU foot-dragging in the accession talks have enhanced a growing ambivalence in Turkey about its future in the EU. Many observers have offered that the AK Party’s early adopt the reforms required under the EU accession process was an endeavor to help transform and legitimize the AK as a post-Islamist party. Many feel Turkey’s leadership’s goals were more about supporting their own authority and acceptance by the Turkish people than the long-term “Europeanization” of Turkey. Others point to the September 2010 constitutional plebiscite and the June 2011 national elections.

Despite statements by Prime Minister Erdoğan and others that the proposed constitutional reforms would help bring Turkey into line with European norms, some observers believe that Turkey’s EU pretensions were not central to any of the Turkish political parties’ messages during the plebiscite campaign or the national elections and are not essential considerations in the writing of the new constitution. Still others have said that after eight years of accession talks and various iterations of reform, Turkey’s citizenry have accepted an unprecedented changes. But some now think that the reform process has slowed as EU membership may no longer be the desired end point for Turkey’s leadership.

Semih Idiz commented in the Hurriyet Daily News that the EU Commission’s 2011 progress report on accession, while performing as a mirror for Turkey, was more of a concern for Turkish bureaucrats and Eurocrats and that “the EU is not something the majority of Turks look to with confidence or enthusiasm anymore.” In addition, he wrote that what drives Turkey’s reform process today “is its own pressing needs.” Continuing on this theme, Idiz reported the 2012 Commission assessment was “a report with no effect” that has “hardly created a stir among Turks.” Reflecting a similar view, columnist Mehmet Ali Birand wrote that “Europe is not on Turkey’s

agenda,” that “for the first time in 47 years the influence of the EU over Turkish politics has reached almost zero,” and that “today, Ankara does not pay attention to either the Council of Europe or the European Parliament.” Idiz, in another article, also pointed out that during Prime Minister Erdoğan’s 2012 three hour speech to the AKP party congress, “Turkey’s EU perspective was not once mentioned.”

Despite what some have asserted as dynamic changes that have taken place in Turkey, driven in part by its EU aspirations, the EU accession process remains at a relatively slow promptness, a pace some have called comatose. Supporters of Turkey’s EU membership understand that actions taken, or not taken, by Turkey have made achieving that goal more difficult. Turkey’s longstanding reject to identify EU member state, Cyprus, and its persistent refusal to open its air and sea ports to Cypriot commercial operations as required under the Additional Protocol will remain major obstacles to any forward progress, even as the accession negotiations restart in October 2013.

Turkey’s decision to disregard the Cypriot circuitous presidency of the EU Council further exacerbated the problem as has Turkey’s tough accent and naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean as part of Ankara’s response to the decision by the Republic of Cyprus to begin exploring for energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. The handling of the Gezi park protests in June also served to further caused those in Europe who remain prudent of Turkey’s ability and willingness to meet the requirements set in all the chapters of the acquis. With many in Ankara now believing it may no longer be necessary for Turkey to become a member of the EU in order to identify Turkey or its place in the international community and with what seems to be a great deal of rhetoric but little real enthusiasm in Europe, except from the EU Commission, for Turkey as a full voting member of the club, observers have begun to ask why both the EU and Turkey continue with the joining process at all.

Turkey and its supporters have continued to negotiate that at least an enhanced talk with the EU should continue. Obviously, the EU can benefit from Turkey’s position as an economic partner and as a n essential regional actor regarding the greater Middle East, and that Turkey will continue to play a critical energy role for Europe as a gateway to the Caspian and Central Asian oil and gas supply system. Many Europeans share that view and determine that Turkey already plays a vital role
in supporting foreign policy matters with Europe, including through its membership in NATO although some seem concerned that foreign policy developments in Turkey have become increasingly derived from the EU.¹

However, many European view that while energy security and foreign policy are important elements for the EU, those issues constitute only two or three of the 35 chapters in the acquis, and Turkey should comply with the requirements of the entire acquis. Turkey, for its part must depend on the European market for its goods and services and Europe’s political good will and engagement for the longer term. Nevertheless, and despite the wariness, Turkish leaders seem to have decided that at least for now they need to continue the accession process. This seemed to be the case when in a 2013 New Year’s message Turkish President Gül stated that EU membership was still necessary and as the Turkish leadership insisted on the resumption of talks and the opening of new chapters of the acquis before June 2013.

Some view this approach is being used possibly as a surround in the event Ankara’s goal of becoming a regional leader and authority fails to take hold or that the Turkish people become interested in the internal reform process, called into question by the Gezi park demonstrations and government reaction, will come to an end, which could affect Prime Minister Erdoğan’s future political plans. Neither Turkey nor the EU appear to be ready to actually end the accession process, although it has been said that Prime Minister Erdoğan may have stated that “if they EU do not want Turkey in, they should say so.” If, when the talks resume later in 2013, both the EU and Turkey feel formal membership in the Union is no longer an EU possession or in Turkey’s best interest, both could seek a way to agree to end the formal joining process.

This would not end necessarily end talks between the EU and Turkey as the “positive agenda” could be revitalized and used to draw Turkey and the EU closer to each other as “privileged partners,” or for Turkey, a “virtual EU member.”

Findings and Recommendations

United States can actually put the EU-Turkey relationship on healthier position in today’s context. American officials should remain to enhance Turkey’s EU membership. Europeans instinctively refer that the United States cannot motivate the Union to implicate Turkey into its fold. If the United States were to abandon the goal of Turkey’s European integration, Turkey’s EU vocation would not be well served. In the 1990s the United States played an essential role in motivating closer relations between Turkey and the European project. If United States played quietly behind closed doors, this role continues to be important, especially so at a time when European reflection has been motivated by the euro zone crisis.¹

The most important fact is that U.S. is the only external actor that can contribute to removing the major problems in the side of the EU-Turkey relationship: the Cyprus conflict. Peace talks in Cyprus were returned in February 2015, but after a hopeful beginning, they soon ran into a mysterious fate of pessimism and mutual recrimination so abundant on the island. No matter what the prospective endowments of pacifying may be bounties which are increasingly apparent today in view of Eastern Mediterranean gas finds if left to themselves, Cypriots are unlikely to settle the conflict. The perceived risks in taking a step into unknown territory is simply too great when measured against the assurance of the present, which is anything but terrible when compared to the rest of the war-ravaged region.²

A relatively peaceful present is Cyprus’s biggest imprecate, which not only reduces the parties’ motivation to reach a comprehensive settlement, but also divert international attention away from the conflict, particularly at a time when the wider region is flaming. Vice-President Biden’s visit to Cyprus in May this year could have determined the beginning of renewed U.S. attention to the conflict. A U.S. political investment in the Cyprus peace process could concomitantly spur cooperation on Eastern Mediterranean gas, open the way to EU-NATO cooperation whose urgency is highlighted by the Ukraine crisis, and the EU-Turkey relationship.

Turkey’s European future relations remain highly mysterious. This dissertation has outlined the range of possible destinations, which supposed and highlighted the

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² Ibid. p. 143.
diametrically opposite trajectories EU-Turkey relations. After that, this paper turns to the repercussions these scenarios may have for the United States. Today in Washington, there are few who still believe in Turkey’s EU membership. Whereas the United States had been a(n excessively) vocal advocate of Turkey’s European integration throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Turkey’s EU accession is seldom talked about the Beltway these days. Partly due to the more low-key strategy of the Obama administration towards Western European affairs and due largely to the objective retard of the accession, Americans have given up on Turkey’s EU membership.¹

The stories mentioned above uniquely refer to the fact that EU-Turkey convergence remains a critical U.S. interest. In the event of an EU-Turkey inconsistent scenario, the U.S.-Turkey relationship would probably suffer; adding unpredictability and unreliability to the turbulence in the Middle East, where the U.S. would remain immersed much to its gloom. With the rise of excessive ideologies, weakening of state borders, and unprecedented levels of violence and deepening socio-economic indisposition, ensuring Turkey is safely rooted in the Euro-Atlantic community is critical. In a scenario of complementarity, with which many toy with on both sides of the Atlantic, the secession of Turkey from the Atlantic community would be debilitated and slow down, particularly if a formula is found to implicate Turkey in TTIP. This point was actually made by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu when he negotiated that TTIP would help to implicate Turkey in the West in an article.

It is essential to determine that a complementarity stories that falls short of EU membership would fail to service the United States in a comprehensive manner. Here it is worth recalling the main reason why Washington insisted on Turkey’s European integration back in the 1990s. It did so partly to compile credit in Ankara and to require greater strategic solidarity within the Atlantic community. But the main reason why the U.S. vocally enhanced Turkey’s EU membership was because it considered that only through a mixed domestic-foreign policy project such as European integration, could Turkey’s domestic conversion be truly motivated. There are apparent restrictions to how much an external factor, even one as potent and close as

¹ Ibid, p. 185
the U.S., can do to promote comprehensive local reforms in Turkey. In this regard, the EU has transformative power the U.S. lacks. Only a complete democratic and succeeded Turkey can represent the model partner Barack Obama proud it was in the early days of his presidency.

Turkey has always been a critical position in the regional and global balances. Its geostrategic position, historical and institutional ties in the international global governance structures and crude potency present the basis for this position. However, the country seems to be facing an increased solitude in global affairs as its relations with traditional allies in the West as well as its newly constituted close ties with the Middle Eastern states go through ups and downs.

Problems of democratization in Turkey converted to obstacles on its capacity to project force in the region, and expanded the chasm with the European Union. Foreign Policy begins at home. In order to have a vital role in the world, Turkey needs to take great steps towards liberal democracy. This seems to be most important element which faces the Turkish foreign policy.

The Turkish-EU relations received unexpected support at the end of 2015, when the European Union members found themselves dealing with a refugee problem that they were largely not ready to respond. The influx of people also menaced the Foundation of the fundamental freedoms of the European, open obstructions, and the European Union members bickered over determining the responsible party, the most likely solution that emerged was to control the external borders of the European Union, rather than close down the internal borders.¹

In November 2015, the European Union met with countries of origin and transit at the Summit of Valletta, and fixed reception centers to be more orderly flow of people on European territory in different States. However, Turkey emerged as a critical player in managing the flow of refugees onto the European territories as it turned out to be the key transit country, but also countries where most people are running away from prosecution at home have fled to.

Intensify European Union dependence on Turkey for two reasons, it relies on Turkey to keep the refugees in Turkey rather than flock to Europe and it also relies on the Turkish acceptance of the refugees it sends back centers when they are considered to be unwanted or unsuitable for resettlement in the European Union territory after being processed at the reception.

In addition, the refugee crisis would be solved through the support of Turks outside the territory of the European Union, but with financial and administrative assistance with the European Union. Is, ultimately, a positive development is the motivating the Turkish European Union talks, which had been fallow for a long period. Whether the process of revitalization spills over onto a solution in Cyprus, and leads to the lifting of Cyprus’s vetoes on Turkey. ¹

An imperious question is the extent to which this new deal would decrease the power of the European Union on Turkish political reforms and democratization process; however, with the accession negotiations already freezing, there was little hope of such an effect. Now that accession talks seem to be moving forward a little, there may be a new controversy with the political reforms in Turkey.

Conclusion

To sum up, I displayed through this dissertation the complex history of Turkey’s relationship with Europe, the trajectory of Turkey’s European future is at once predictable and highly uncertain. What can be obviously predicted is that Turkey-EU relationship will last in future, in both the collaborative and conflictual level. Much like the centuries-long history between the two was marked by critical times of cooperation and conflict, the depth of current economic, political, security, societal and cultural relations is such that it is difficult to conceive a clean break in Turkey’s relationship with the EU.

Both Turkey and Europe have integrated identities to one another and when this identity crisis has lasted for some 200 years it is no longer a crisis. It is an integrated identity’. At the same time, the future path of the EU-Turkey relationship remains highly mysterious. In determining scenes for the future, this dissertation has supposed elements from current fact that demonstrate that at the current phase all scenarios or combinations therein, remain distinct possibilities. While both Turkey and the EU are in the same tropical ship, the ship is on a journey towards unknown destination.
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